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Abstract

While scholars have studied talking animals in British children’s literature of the long
eighteenth century, little attention has been given to cross-species conversations. Thus, my research
starts with the following questions: what does it mean when humans talk to animals in literary texts?
What do representations of interspecific communication in eighteenth-century British literature
accomplish? Interspecific communication in the literary works of this study may be understood in

the context of the philosophy of sensibility’s debt to French Renaissance humanist Michel de
Montaigne, particularly his arguments about animal semiosis in An Apology for Raymond
Sebond. I argue that interspecific conversations challenge Enlightenment arguments for the
radical ontological separation of humans and animals.
I deploy a historicist methodology and the lens of post-linguistic semiotics, situating, and
interpreting the literature next to concomitant philosophical discourses. Post-linguistic semiotics
brings together zoosemiotics and cultural and literary criticism. My investigation expands our
knowledge of how eighteenth-century British authors responded to the watershed philosophy of
René Descartes, particularly the denial of language and reason to animals. Contrary to the
longstanding view that the eighteenth-century had purely instrumental views towards animals,
the authors of this study embrace a relational ontology in their attitudes towards animals,
presenting a model for constructing the human and animal relationship based on an ethics of
friendship, or, as in the case of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, a repudiation of the animal and a
denial of humanity’s relationship to its own animality.
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Introduction

The surge of interest in animals in the humanities and social sciences in the past twenty
years is known as the “animal turn,” and this relatively new field has reinvigorated the
disciplines producing new knowledge about animals, and human and animal relationships (Ritvo
119). Scholars have begun to re-evaluate the Enlightenment’s representation of nature and
animals, correcting the long-held view that the period had a strictly instrumental attitude towards
nature, epitomized by the philosophy of René Descartes, the Scientific Revolution, and the
biblical teaching of human dominion.1 The eighteenth century had its own “animal turn” in
which cultural representations of animals shifted significantly (Keenleyside 7). For example, pet
portraiture, part of a wider attempt to represent the natural world accurately, became a genre unto
itself revealing an interest in the idea of animal subjectivity and interspecies sympathy (Tague
184-185). British authors understood that empiricism could never fully define what an animal is
and that our understanding of them is mediated by language (Keenleyside 7). They perceived the
need for “literary forms of knowledge” in addition to the scientific because eighteenth-century
readers understood that “rhetorical conventions make real world claims” (Keenleyside 7).
Many fine monographs on animals in eighteenth-century British literature have been
produced, such as Laura Brown’s Homeless Dogs & Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other
Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination; Heather Keenleyside’s Animals and Other People:
Literary Forms and Living Beings in the Long Eighteenth Century; and Tobias Menely’s The
Animal Claim Sensibility and the Creaturely Voice. If Nathaniel Wolloch’s 2019 The
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Enlightenment’s Changing Conceptions of Animals in the Long Eighteenth Century is any
indication, the scholarly trend shows no signs of abating.
Talking literary animals, which had their modern origin in this period, have since become
a generic convention of children’s literature and have also begun to receive critical attention. For
instance, Tess Cosslett, in her 2006 monograph Talking Animals in British Children's Fiction,
1786-1914, explores the cultural significance of animal narrators in the period’s proliferation of
children’s literature, arguing that they function as didactic mouthpieces. In this study, I am also
interested in representations of communicating animals. However, I begin with a related but
inverted question. Instead of asking what function talking literary animals serve, I ask, what does
it mean when a human speaks to an animal in a literary work from this period? What do scenes
of interspecific communication in literary works of the long eighteenth century accomplish?
My attempt to offer an answer to the question above has led me to the intersection of
Enlightenment philosophy and literature. In order to understand the nature of human beings,
philosophers have turned to consider our closest biological relatives—the animals. Speculation
on animals, however, has engendered more questions than answers, and the animal question has
perpetually vexed philosophers in their attempt to articulate postulations in metaphysics,
particularly the branch of ontology, which seeks to know what is real and the nature of being.
The long-standing philosophical debate about animals is known as the animal question. That is,
are animals capable of reason and language, and if so, are they therefore ontologically equivalent
to humans? The debate goes back to ancient Greece. Christian theologians such as St. Augustine
of Hippo (354-430) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) articulated ideas about animals, and
the debate resurfaced with renewed vigor in the early modern period and served philosophical,
scientific, and cultural ends. Sixteenth-century humanist, theriophilist, and philosophical skeptic
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Michel de Montaigne argued that animals possess languages of their own, and thus, a measure of
reason. Italian anatomist Hieronymus Fabricius recorded similar ideas about animal language in
his 1603 De Loquela Brutorum. However, seventeenth-century mathematician and philosopher
René Descartes postulated that animals were machines, mindless languageless automatons.
Cartesian metaphysics theorized a radical ontological separation between the human and all other
animal species, based on a “new definition of speech” as exclusively human language that
carried over into the Enlightenment (Senior 62).
In addition to framing my discussion with the early modern animal debate between
Montaigne and Descartes, I deploy the insights of French philosopher Jacques Derrida, who has
observed that “animal” is an umbrella term that “men have given themselves the right and the
authority to give the living other” (23). With this observation, Derrida reveals another facet of
how language functions in the animal debate. Humans deploy monolithic terms that have the
effect of erasure—of glossing over the wonderful heterogeneity of species. My inclusion of
Derrida adds further theoretical grounding for the importance of the animal debate, its
pervasiveness in French thinking, and its British reception. I bring in additional insights of
French thinkers such as Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emmanuel Levinas, and contemporary French
ethologist Dominique Lestel. Thus, my investigation has revealed a fertile cross-cultural
exchange between French and British thinking about animals that continues to reverberate in the
West. In addition, I discuss important British philosophers of sensibility such as David Hume.
I am positioning this study in relation to Tobias Menely’s compellingly written The
Animal Claim: Sensibility and the Creaturely Voice (2015). As I do, Menely investigates the
interest in animal semiotics in eighteenth-century British literature of sensibility, a counter
Enlightenment discourse. The sensibility movement stressed the epistemological validity of the
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body and emotion in contrast to rationalism’s privileging of reason. For writers of sensibility, the
human is defined by “receptivity, a susceptibility to the signs of others” rather than verbal speech
acts and political contracts (Menely 15). “The sociolinguistic domain,” writes Menely, “which
offers a foundational register for humanist historiography, is only a special case in a world in
which the vicissitudes of the sign provide a common condition of all living beings” (13). Writers
of sensibility took note of the extralinguistic semiosis shared by humans and animals,
recognizing that the “somatically legible body” of the animal could signify (Menely 6). Menely
argues that writers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau understood the vocalizations of animals as
constituting appeals of address to human beings (in this case writers) who respond as political
advocates giving the animals voices via literary representation (1).
The discourse of sensibility’s “semiology of creaturely affect and address” might be
considered a proto discourse of zoosemiotics (Menely 20). Coined by Thomas A. Sebeok in
1963, “zoosemiotics” refers to a line of inquiry that brings together “methods and subject matters
of semiotics and ethology” (the study of animal behavior) and is defined as the “study of
signification, communication, and representation within and across animal species” (Maran 1).
This dissertation approaches literary representation of animals through the lens of what Timo
Maran has identified as “post-linguistic semiotics,” defined as a “synthesis between zoosemiotics
and cultural and literary criticism” (Maran 1). Maran explains that this synthesis incorporates
several possible “approaches such as common ancestry of humans and other animals, humananimal communicative relations, corporal and endosemiotic aspects of humans related to
linguistic activities, and analogies between semiotic processes in humans and other animals” (6).
I focus further by approaching eighteenth-century representations of literary animals
through the lens of anthropo-zoosemiotics, or human and animal communication. My analysis
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adds to our knowledge of how the literature of sensibility in eighteenth-century Britain engaged
the animal question. Many writers of sensibility such as Antony Ashley Cooper, the Earl of
Shaftesbury and Henry More believed that animal signification communicated feeling and not
ideas (Menely 2). I argue, however, that following Montaigne in the skeptical tradition of
theriophily, the writers I discuss entertain the idea of animal reason, in varying degrees, in
addition to animal emotion. The writing of anti-Cartesian French theriophilists including
Montaigne had become available in English in the late seventeenth century (Lewis 6). Jayne
Lewis writes, “arguing that animals can reason and develop language, the theriophilists
implicitly located the foundations of all human habits of representation in the sensible particulars
that make up even animal cognition" (6). This interest in the “sensible particulars” of the
theriophilists overlaps with the interests of the eighteenth-century British writers of sensibility
(Lewis 6). In the eighteenth century, extralinguistic communication challenged Enlightenment
claims to language-based human exceptionalism, and thus, pushed back against the new
metaphysical and epistemological paradigm of the Scientific era.
Interest in the animal question in this period was not confined solely to writers and
philosophers. The Cartesian beast-machine hypothesis was widely known in eighteenth-century
Britain and written about in popular discourse. For example, in May of 1739, excerpts from
French Jesuit priest Guillaume-Hyacinthe Bougeant’s bestselling Amusement philosophique sur
le langage des bêtes were published in The Gentleman’s Magazine, a widely read monthly
compendium of news, essays, and poetry printed in London. Cartesianism made great fodder for
the genre of satire, and Bougeant heavily lampoons the beast-machine theory. For example, he
writes about human and canine relationships: “you have a bitch which you love, and which you
think yourself reciprocally loved by. Now I defy all the Cartesians in the world to persuade you
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that your bitch is a mere machine” (7). Bougeant’s challenge suggests that people in this era had
strong personal convictions regarding the Cartesian theory.
Bougeant’s arguments against the Cartesian hypothesis are comprised of claims about
animal language. He says, for example, “[w]e everyday speak to beasts, and they understand us
very well…animals, in turn speak to us, and we understand them” (40). Bougeant likens the
capacity for animals to communicate with humans to knowledge of a “foreign language” (41).
He infers therefore that animals must also be naturally endowed with “the faculty of
understanding and speaking” (41). According to Bougeant, the lack of variety in animal language
is compensated for by “miens, gestures, and motions which are a kind of language very
intelligible, and a supplement of the vocal expression” (54). Based on their responses, Bougeant
claimed that animals can perceive human emotion. Animals, then, for Bougeant, possess a range
of semiotic options for communication that do not rely on conventional language.2
Many of Bougeant’s ideas sound as if lifted straight from the pages of Montaigne.
As I will demonstrate, the authors in this study all read or were familiar with Montaigne. In An
Apology for Raymond Sebond, an important Counter-Reformation text combining classical
Pyrrhonism and Christian natural theology, Montaigne deploys theriophily as an argumentative
strategy to counter modern reiterations of ancient Stoic pride. Raymond Sebond was a Spanish
scholar of religion, philosophy, and medicine at Toulouse who claims in his 1430 Natural
Theology (published posthumously in 1484) that his method teaches “every truth necessary to
Man concerning Man and God” (qtd. in Screech xiv). Natural theology derives from biblical
passages such as Job 12, which positions animals as speakers who can teach humankind about
divine attributes. The apostle Paul alluded to the earlier tradition in the New Testament book of
Romans and states that humans can gain insight into the creator by studying the creation and that
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therefore, humans will be held accountable for this access to divine knowledge, implying that
natural theology has an immense doctrinal gravitas for new testament hermeneutics.
Sebond believed fallen reason prevented a correct interpretation of the lex naturae, and
he positioned himself as a sort of theological reading instructor (Screech xiv-xv). The religious
establishment charged Sebond with heresy since he appeared to dispense with the divine
revelation of scripture (Screech xiii). In defense, Montaigne qualified Sebond’s method by
claiming it teaches “truth insofar as it is possible for natural reason, concerning knowledge of
God” (Screech xiv). In other words, Montaigne taught that human reason and divine revelation
work in tandem. Montaigne biographer and scholar M.A. Screech says that according to
Montaigne, “no purely human reasons [sic] can show conclusively that man—for all his
‘reason’—is in any way higher than the other animals. They, too, like us have reasoning powers”
(xxi). For Montaigne, human reason cannot secure absolute knowledge of anything, including
the minds of animals.
In order to lower humans by raising animals, Montaigne provided a detailed exposition of
animal anecdotes that demonstrate emotion and intelligence. He raised the ontological status of
animals through empirical observation of their faculties.3 Drawing on ancient sources, mostly
Plutarch, Montaigne argues that the corporeal movements and gestures of animals function as
semiotic evidence of reason (18). He speaks of animals talking to each other and to humans. He
observes that they demonstrate sympathetic response to one another’s distress calls, all through
extralinguistic modes. In sum, Montaigne argues that animals speak languages of their own. The
availability of this point of view on animal language helps to explain why the Enlightenment’s
definition of speech as exclusively human language represented a monumental shift.
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This shift is evident in the writing of Descartes. It is clear from his abundant comments
on animals, reason, and language in his 1637 A Discourse on the Method that Descartes was
positioning himself within the animal debate going back to ancient Greece.4 Aristotle claimed in
the Politics that “man is the only animal with the gift of speech” (1.1253a). However, the Stoics
pushed the argument further to claim that internal speech, exclusive to the human, was the
foundation of human superiority. The impetus for this qualification was what is generally known
as the “parrot problem.” Since several species of birds can speak human words, it presented a
problem for defining a strictly human ontology according to the presence of verbal language.
Thus, it followed that verbal language must be proved in context dependent situations.
With the use of reason (here deduction), Descartes sought “a first principle of
philosophy,” an all-encompassing methodology that would establish epistemological certainty
and erase “the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics,” i.e., Montaigne (28). The result
was the syllogistic cogito, which I here paraphrase as: The only thing I know without a doubt is
that I exist because I am thinking. The cogito stabilizes the “flux of signs” since no sense
impression or sign is reliable for Descartes (Melehy 268). Several commentators including
Friedrich Nietzsche pointed out that the cogito is not the unmediated, a priori, or self-evident
certainty Descartes thought it was, but rather an effect of language itself. The major premise of
Descartes’ well-known syllogism is derived from the logic of a grammar in which all action
requires an actor (Melehy 267). In other words, the conclusion necessitates the premise.
Descartes took the position of the Stoics, who argued that human and animal difference was
based on internal speech. The cogito is a metaphysical postulation based on the presence of
internal speech.
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In order to articulate the cogito, Descartes had to confront the problem of animal
intelligence and communication. As a solution, he offered what is perhaps his second most
famous, or infamous, proposition known as the beast-machine theory in which he asserted that
animals are automatons. Unlike humans, animals do not possess a transcendent immortal soul or
res cogitans manifested in the faculty of reason. Descartes’ theory benefitted the scientific
community, whose rapid discoveries were dependent on the instrumental use of animals
conducted in dissection and vivisection. Many, however, rejected what Percy Bysshe Shelley
called the “monstrous sophism” of the beast machine (qtd. in Rowe 137).
The debate between Montaigne and Descartes is a microcosm of one of the foundational
attributes of modernity: competing philosophical positions. Historian Stephen Toulmin’s
revisionist history of the origin of modernity, Cosmopolis, is helpful for contextualizing the
Cartesian epistemological watershed articulated in the cogito. In opposition to the dominant
historical narrative of the early-to-mid-twentieth century stating that modernity was inaugurated
with Descartes and the Enlightenment’s scientific revolution, Toulmin locates the origins of
modernity in the tension between the late-Renaissance humanism of Montaigne and the
rationalism of Descartes. The Cartesian quest for certainty, according to Toulmin, can best be
understood in the context of the aftermath of the tremendous upheaval of the Thirty Years War.
Toulmin writes, for the survivors of this war “the dream of logically necessary arguments whose
‘certainty’ could go beyond the ‘certitude’ of any theological position kept its charm in both
modes of reasoning and language” (89). Before Descartes, the rediscovery of ancient history and
literature “intensified” appreciation “for the kaleidoscope diversity and contextual dependence of
human affairs” (26-27). Montaigne had argued, in Toulmin’s words, that “it was best to suspend
judgment about matters of general theory, and to concentrate on accumulating a rich perspective,
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both on the natural world and on human affairs, as we encounter them in our actual experience”
(27). Montaigne “saw attempts to reach theoretical consensus about nature as the result of human
presumption or self-deception” (Toulmin 29). The cogito would represent just such human
arrogance to Montaigne.
In their quest for “theoretical consensus,” seventeenth-century philosophers “disclaimed
any serious interest in four different kinds of practical knowledge: the oral, the particular, the
local, and the timely” (Toulmin 30). Human reception had no bearing on rational facts because
modern philosophy does not concern itself with the concrete situatedness of argumentation
among specific groups of people for specific purposes (Toulmin 31). Instead, the new method
relies on “written” “proofs” that transcend the particular as opposed to “the rhetorical force of
oral reasoning” (34). This new emphasis on written argumentation not only underplays alternate
human modes and contexts of communication but effaces the complex nonverbal communicative
exchanges between humans and animals situated in domestic and natural environments.
Montaigne was a humanist who had a genuine appreciation of animals and sought to put
a check on the human disavowal of animals that he characterized as an “insane arrogance,” but
post-humanist scholars such as Carey Wolfe assert that humanism is essentially an
anthropocentric discourse as its name suggests (51). Wolfe argues that the scholarly treatment of
the animal question upholds the same anthropocentric binaries that privilege the human over the
animal whether from a historical approach or from one based on representational theories such as
Giorgio Agamben’s argument in The Open (99). Wolfe argues that the concept of subjectivity
reinforces speciesism and should be demolished (99). For Wolfe, to be a “humanist” is “by
definition, anthropocentric” (99). However, many literary authors, including those in this study,
push back against the anthropocentrism of the Cartesian paradigm.
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In addition to the charge of anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism is often cited in
critiques of animal studies. However, scholars and scientists have begun a reevaluation of the
concept. Tess Cosslett argues for the positive outcomes associated with anthropomorphic literary
strategies. One of the main functions of talking animals as a narrative strategy is to invert
hierarchical relationships between the human and animal (132). Cosslett claims that the
“anecdotal” methods of Darwin and his disciple George Romanes are “deliberately
anthropomorphic, in order to stress the continuity between animals and man” (142). She explains
that her purpose is to show that anthropomorphism is not “unscientific,” but is often part of a
scientific approach: “once you have a theory that admits no significant gap between man and
animal the term loses much of its negative meaning” (Cosslett 146).
A second anthropomorphic literary strategy is the naming of animals in stories. Cosslett
comments that the “naming of the animals is a human device, again to give them individuality
[and are not] a sign of human possession in a crude sense. They serve instead as recognition
devices, a sign that these animals are ‘known’ by humans” (143). Ultimately, in children’s
stories “anthropomorphic animals meet theriomorphic children, often with the effect of blurring
or questioning the difference between human and animal, stopping in its tracks the
‘anthropological machine’… —a thought machine that always reinstates the difference between
man and animal” (her emphasis 2). In his series of lectures published under the title L’Animal
Que Donc Je suis (The Animal That Therefore I Am) Jacques Derrida describes this same
tendency to stress difference as an “immense disavowal” of the animal in Western philosophy
(14).
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In Talking Animals in Children’s Fiction: A Critical Study, Catherine Elick points
out the potentially transformative power of anthropomorphism to alter the human and animal
relationship. Elick says, “the anthropomorphic approach … has not denatured animals, as some
detractors who find anthropomorphism to be ‘sentimental’ claim, but re-natured them so that
they represent more than just a standard by which humans judge their own morality and
maturity” (8). In a related point, Erica Fudge observes the inherent relationship between
communication and ethics demonstrated in representations of literary animals: they “offer a way
of thinking about animals more generally, and potentially, more positively … if we don’t
believe that in some way we can communicate with and understand animals, what is to make us
stop and think as we experiment on them, eat them and put them in cages?” (76-77). I would add
that in my estimation, Montaigne’s arguments are highly effective precisely because they are not
simply rhetorical or anthropomorphic exercises but hold a measure of empirical weight in terms
of observable animal behaviors. It is because animals are so close to us in many ways that they
function so well in arguments that challenge metaphysical assumptions.
I chose the literary works in this study for their extended explorations of interspecific
communication. There are many other canonical eighteenth-century works that feature animals
such as Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, Thomas Gray’s “Ode on the Death of a Favourite Cat
Drowned in a Tub of Goldfishes,” and Thomas Cowper’s “The Garden,” which features his
musings on his beloved pet hares. There are eighteenth-century works featuring talking animals
that are not for a children’s audience, such as the canine narrator of Francis Coventry’s 1740 The
History of Pompey the Little or The Life and Adventures of a Lapdog; the caged starling in
Laurence Sterne’s 1768 Sentimental Journey; and the mouse rhetorician in Anna Laetitia
Barbauld’s 1773 poem “The Mouse’s Petition.” These works, however, are not primarily
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concerned with communication, human or animal. What is unique to the scenes I examine in the
works in this study is their exploration of the implications of extralinguistic communication in
the tradition of Montaigne.
The century long range of publication dates of the works I discuss, starting in 1726 and
ending in 1831 with the revised Frankenstein, is indicative of the tremendous upheaval of the
Scientific Revolution as it rippled out and intersected with the nascent Industrial Revolution in
the early nineteenth century. Therefore, I have arranged the chapters chronologically. I
commence with Jonathan Swift’s 1726 Gulliver’s Travels, a proto novel of sensibility,
innovating on Montaignian ideas. Next, I examine Christopher Smart’s highly personal critique
of the Scientific Revolution in his mid-century poem 1759 Jubilate Agno. I move to the high
novel of sensibility examining extended scenes of interspecific communication in Frances
Burney’s 1782 Cecilia, 1814 The Wanderer, and her diary, finishing with the culminating
representation of the human and animal relationship in British literature, Mary Shelley’s 1831
Frankenstein.
In chapter one, entitled “Avowing the Animal in Gulliver’s Travels: Reason, Language
and the Kinesthetic Imagination,” I argue that Gulliver’s controversial late-novel equiphilia is an
intervention in the animal debate, positioned in the theriophilic tradition of Montaigne. Swift’s
debt to Montaigne, largely overlooked, offers an alternative avenue of inquiry to the longstanding critical aporia in Gulliver’s Travels studies, identified by James Clifford as the “soft”
and “hard” schools of criticism. The “soft” critics view Gulliver as the target of Swift’s satire
while “hard” critics view the novel as a manifestation of Swift’s misanthropy (33).
In the Houyhnhnm episode, Swift explores the implications of human and animal
nonverbal semiosis, informed by Montaigne’s arguments on animal communication in An
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Apology for Raymond Sebond. As a result of his several adventures as a creature of ontological
ambiguity, Gulliver learns to avow his human animality, an innovation on Montaignian
theriophily. My reading of Gulliver’s Travels suggests Swift was cognizant of the intersection of
gender and species oppression in eighteenth-century speciesist culture and adds to our
understanding of the literature of sensibility as a discourse exploring extralinguistic forms of
communication as part of a larger critique of the Enlightenment. I draw on contemporary
zoosemiotic theories of human and horse communication to suggest that Gulliver’s kinesthetic
imagination has been awakened to greater empathy for all species.
In chapter two, entitled “‘He Worships in His Way’: Feline Kinesis and the Topos of the
Writer’s Cat in Christopher Smart’s Jubilate Agno,” I argue that the portion of Jubilate Agno
featuring Smart’s extended meditation on his cat, Jeoffry, functions on both a cultural and
personal level. Attempting to recapture a mythopoeic view of nature, Smart encodes his response
to the Scientific Revolution in representations of his cat’s embodied movement. I argue that
Smart deploys what I call the topos of the writer’s cat, in the tradition of Montaigne’s famous
feline in the Apology, to imagine Newtonian laws of physics in terms of animal semiosis. I
contend that Smart’s project is to read Jeoffry’s movements and articulate their spiritual
meaning. That is, Smart translates his cat’s maneuvers into spiritual acts, in which Jeoffry, the
cat, functions as a symbol of unfettered religious freedom—a proxy for Smart’s thwarted
religious expressions. On the personal level, Smart, imprisoned in a mental asylum for improper
public prayer, stands in solidarity with Jeoffry, representing himself as a vulnerable animal
unwillingly confined.
While Montaigne’s rhetorical use of his pet cat has received much critical attention, I
discuss an overlooked human and feline encounter recounted by Montaigne, which helps to
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illuminate the political implications of interspecific communication in Jubilate Agno. I
emphasize the connection between the “somatically legible body,” to use Menely’s highly apt
phrase, and the concept of reading animals in the Montaignian tradition of natural theology (6).
The animal, as a chapter in the lex naturae, is a theological advocate, and by demonstrating its
divine purpose advocates, in a sense, for itself. The poet’s task is to illuminate this for the reader
by writing criticism, if you will, of the book of creation.
In chapter three, entitled “Talking the Dog: Communicating with Canine Characters in
the Writing of Frances Burney,” I examine representations of human and canine interaction in
two novels and an extended diary passage. Recent scholarship on the representation of dogs in
eighteenth-century British literature has focused primarily on the “misogynist trope” of the
lapdog (Ellis 97), an expression of eighteenth-century anxieties in which “the woman and her
lapdog were common tropes for the evils of eighteenth-century acquisitiveness” (Wyett 283-84).
In this chapter, I argue that Burney, empowering her female characters, challenges the
misogynist lapdog trope by appropriating the eighteenth-century sentimental view of the dog, the
“unswerving servant” dog, normatively associated with men and aligning it with women (Wyett
276). Burney not only aligns feminine virtue with the capacity for sympathy for animals, a
cultural standard of the time, but the reverse, making the very Montaignian suggestion that
animals are endowed with the capacity for sympathy towards human beings. Thus, she counters
ideas reaching back to Aristotle who recognized that both humans and animals can communicate
vocally but denied that animals can express their emotions to humans (Menely 2, my emphasis).
Burney explores the animal recognition of human signs as well as the human recognition
of animal signs, underscores the agency of dogs, and creates canine characters who are
semiotically empowered with a profound ability to impinge on human outcomes. Her
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representation of canines as interlocutors of human speech and speakers of embodied language
renders them active participants in the discourse of sensibility. As they did in Swift and Smart,
shared forms of embodied expressivity in Burney’s work resist the radical discontinuity between
the human and animal of Cartesian dualism. Her depictions of situational similarity between
heroine and canine resonate with Smart’s sense of vulnerability and self-identification with his
cat.
In chapter four, entitled “‘What Was I?’: The Creature, the Cat, and the Monster of
Ontology in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein,” I argue that Shelley entertains the skeptical
philosophical ethos of Montaigne in her treatment of the animal question. In the figure of the
creature, Shelley ingeniously incorporates the central philosophical dilemma of the
Enlightenment: the animal question. I draw on provocative contemporary scholarship to suggest
that her contemplation is Montaignian even in the evocation of his now famous feline, deployed
in An Apology for Raymond Sebond as a rhetorical figure through which he explores the limits of
human reason. In distinction to Montaigne, Shelley explores not the limits of human reason, but
the tragic potential of human reason. Through the relationship between the creature and Victor,
Shelley investigates philosophical and ethical questions such as those surrounding the practice of
vivisection, making Montaignian moves by depicting instances of interspecific communication
and creaturely kinesis to put pressure on Enlightenment notions of a strictly language-based
criterion for human exceptionalism. Frankenstein represents the culminating literary engagement
of the animal question in literature in English.
In the discussion that follows, I use the term “animal” rather than “nonhuman animal.” I
concur with Fudge, who writes, “‘animal’ follows early modern usage more closely …
‘nonhuman animal’ can distance the reader from discussion in ways that are not always helpful”
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(1). She comments that “‘animal’ has an emotive quality that ‘nonhuman animal’ does not” (1).
This, I would argue, is most likely due to the close relationships modern humans have with their
pet “animals,” and their ubiquitous presence in representations.
At stake in the representations I examine is a definition of human ontology, making them,
therefore, very high stakes. The Eighteenth-century literary representations of animals, and
human and animal relationships, in this study provide a compelling exploration of the ethical
implications of early modern metaphysical and epistemological theories on animal lives, and by
extension human lives, that are still being worked out as a historical process. In our era of STEM
and the seemingly limitless possibilities of scientific advancements, including bio-engineering
experiments, such as cultivating meat from animal cells—a further erasure of the animal in
modern systems of food production that could be argued as more troubling ethically than eating
animals because it’s an additional obfuscation—the need for competing epistemologies and
theorizations of humans and animals is more urgent than ever. Notions of radical separation
between humans and animals re-instantiated in the early modern era by the Cartesian paradigm
enables the exploitation of animals undergirding the exploitation of human beings in Western
political and economic systems. The systematic exploitation of animals enabled by Cartesianism
has, at least in part, precipitated the global climate crisis and extinction of species now facing
humanity. The production of animal protein is highly wasteful, yielding about a four percent
return on one hundred percent of plant protein fed to livestock. In addition, excrement from
industrial meat farms produces high amounts of methane, a greenhouse gas with more severe
consequences than carbon dioxide (Koneswaran and Nierenberg). Today, more animals are
slaughtered in the U.S. in one day than were slaughtered in a year when Upton Sinclair published
The Jungle (1905) (Patterson 64). Perhaps we could listen to the animals again as they mew,
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bark, chirp, low, squawk, and sing; seeing what they say as they fly, swim, crawl, creep, and trot,
and thereby, reclaim part of our humanity that was lost, cleaved off by the Cartesian divide.
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Chapter One

Avowing the Animal in Gulliver’s Travels: Reason, Language, and the Kinesthetic Imagination
If this is the best human philosophy can offer … I would rather go and live among horses.
—J.M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals

“My friends often tell me in a blunt way that I trot like a horse,” says Gulliver towards
the end of the Houyhnhnm episode (Swift’s emphasis 235).5 He also says, “My horses
understand me tolerably well; I converse with them at least four hours a day” (244). These
statements have caused much consternation in the critical reception of Gulliver’s Travels—so
much so that in the 1970s, James Clifford identified two critical camps he dubbed the “soft” and
“hard” schools in the ongoing debate (33). In sum, the “hard” school reads Gulliver’s aversion to
his family and concurrent equiphilia as a statement of Swift’s misanthropy while the “soft”
school insists Gulliver is the satiric target because of his faith in Houyhnhnm rationality (Clifford
33). “Soft” school critics have labeled Gulliver’s actions “plain foolishness,” “obviously
ridiculous,” “asinine,” “hippanthropic folly,” “delusional,” “mad,” and of “questionable sanity.”6
Readers and critics even doubted Swift’s mental health.7 The assumption seems to be that talking
to and moving like animals is a self-evident sign of mental illness.8
In this chapter, I wish to make neither a “soft” nor “hard” school intervention; instead, I
suggest that Gulliver’s statements themselves are an intervention in early modern debates at the
nexus of animals, language, and reason positioned in the tradition of Michel de Montaigne’s
theriophilic text An Apology for Raymond Sebond. Theriophilic texts rely on the inversion of
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human and animal characteristics, for moral instruction, often depicting a view of animals as
superior to humans. The works of French theriophilists including Montaigne had become
available in English in the late seventeenth century. Jane Lewis writes, “arguing that animals can
reason and develop language, the theriophilists implicitly located the foundations of all human
habits of representation in the sensible particulars that make up even animal cognition” (6).
While Swift depicts theriophilic inversions in Gulliver’s Travels—the human who moves like a
horse, for example, can be understood as an inversion of the horse who talks like the human—he
also picks up on a second pivotal strain in Montaigne’s thinking on animals which relies on
human and animal contiguities, particularly the mutual capacity for embodied modes of
communication. These semiotic similarities put pressure on the Enlightenment’s division of
human and animal languages into “science and fiction” in a “new definition” of speech as
exclusively human verbal language (Senior 62). For philosophers such as René Descartes, the
absence of verbal language in animals indicated an absence of reason. However, Montaigne held
the view that animals speak languages of their own and therefore possessed a measure of reason.
Long ago, T.O. Wedel identified Montaigne as Swift’s philosophical ancestor writing, the
“best commentary on Gulliver’s Travels is [Montaigne’s] great Apologie de Raymond Sebond,”
which “like Gulliver’s Travels, is a scathing attack upon Stoic pride” (33). Recently, Claude
Rawson has described Montaigne as “a formative figure in Swift’s outlook and thought” (69).9
James Ramsey Wallen, in his comparison of Montaigne and Nietzsche’s negative humanism (a
belief that human nature is inherently flawed), cites Swift’s masterpiece, with its “superlatively
reasonable talking horse” as the literary exemplar of “a certain subterranean counter-conception
of the human/animal distinction that occasionally surfaces in the Western literary philosophical
tradition” but says no more of Swift (466, 449).
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On the other hand, Rob Boddice adduces Gulliver’s Travels as the epitome of eighteenthcentury popular print’s power to disseminate philosophical ideas, yet summarily dismisses
Montaigne from having an influence on English thought about animals (27). I would stress
Montaigne for bringing classical theriophily forward, his ethical thinking on animal semiosis,
and his literary influence, and I submit that Gulliver’s “trot[ting] like a horse” and adopting their
“gait and gesture,” (235) is Swift’s rather oblique yet coltish allusion to Montaigne, whose
middle name Eyquem “points to the outward movement of the horse” as Georges Van Den
Abbeele observes in his analysis of the horse motif in Montaigne’s travel writing (33). An
intertextual reading of Swift and Montaigne offers an alternative to the critical aporia regarding
Gulliver’s late-novel equiphilia. Swift’s debt to Montaigne has not been fully explored.
In An Apology for Raymond Sebond, the longest of the Essays and an important CounterReformation text, Montaigne interweaves classical Pyrrhonism and Christian natural theology,
derived from the apostle Paul’s teaching that a reprobate humanity is “without excuse” since
divine attributes can be inferred from reading the book of nature as well as the book of scripture
(Romans 1:20). Sebond, a Spaniard who taught medicine, philosophy, and religion at Toulouse,
claims in the highly censored Prologue to his ca. 1430 Natural Theology (published
posthumously in 1484) that his method teaches “every truth necessary to Man concerning Man
and God” (qtd. in Screech xiv). Sebond believed that humanity’s postlapsarian faculty of reason
prevented a correct interpretation of the lex naturae, and he positioned himself as a sort of
theological reading instructor (Screech xiv-xv). His audience was women and laymen who, he
thought, needed no formal education to gain moral wisdom from reading the book of nature. The
religious establishment misinterpreted Sebond as advocating a method independent of the bible,
i.e., “heretical,” and the remainder of his Natural Theology was misunderstood (Screech xiii).

21

Enter Montaigne. Sebond’s method, he qualifies, is one that teaches “truth insofar
as it is possible for natural reason, concerning knowledge of God” (Screech xiv). His aim is to
quash human vanity, particularly updated iterations of ancient Stoic pride in reason, and
Protestant heresy. Reading the animal as a sign, as well as a user of signs, is central to
Montaigne’s argument, and the Apology, which he had previously translated, is a virtual primer
on the right use of reason in the interpretation of animal signs. Montaigne argues that reason
cannot secure absolute knowledge of anything, including the minds of animals. He doubts that
language, and therefore reason, is exclusively human, arguing that the embodied expressivity of
animals is evidence of ratiocination, asserting that “their very movements serve as arguments and
ideas” (18).10
As an interpretive framework, I draw on Hassan Melehy’s reading of An Apology for
Raymond Sebond as an allegory for the “limits of human reason” (273). The function of allegory,
says Melehy, is to demonstrate that the “objects of discourse” can’t be fully represented due to
the allegorical nature of language itself (274). Montaigne’s animal signs are borrowed from
ancients such as Plutarch, and as such, “jostled” in their present context since their prior
signifying context is unavailable, demonstrating the distance between signs and thus the
instability of meaning (Melehy 274). Melehy situates his analysis in the quarrel between
Descartes and Montaigne, identified by Stephen Toulmin as the origin of modernity.11 Taking
umbrage with Montaigne, Descartes wrote to the Marquess of Newcastle in 1646 that
Montaigne’s crediting of “understanding” and “thought to animals” was in error (qtd. in Melehy
264). Melehy argues that Descartes mistakenly read Montaigne literally, failing to perceive that
his observations of animal signs point to something, such as “speech and intelligence,” which
may be beyond human understanding (272).12
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In Montaigne’s allegory there are no one to one correspondences, and he issues a
challenge to see “whether it is in man to arrive at any certainty by argument and reflection” (12).
Descartes answered that challenge, indicating in his 1637 A Discourse on the Method that his
“method” allowed him to arrive at an epistemology that was “certain” (28). Alluding to
Montaigne’s animal argument, he writes, “[o]ne must not confuse words with natural signs that
express the passions and can be imitated by machines and animals nor think, like some of the
ancients, that the beasts speak, even though we don’t understand their language” (47-48). In his
view, language is “continuous, as a system of signs, with reason” (Melehy 270).
In Gulliver’s Travels, Swift weighs in on the Montaignian-Cartesian quarrel. His
representations of animal semiosis, borrowed from Montaigne, do not signify directly according
to their prior context but take on an altered meaning in their post-Cartesian context. Nonverbal
embodied modes of communication in both humans and animals issue a challenge to the
Cartesian argument that animals are automata devoid of cognition while simultaneously pointing
to how humans create semiotic meaning, often constructing it with animals in interspecific
contexts.13 The deliberate ambiguity of talking human-like horses, horse-like humans, and
humanoid Yahoo animals pushes back against Cartesian certainty, ontological distinctions, and
language-based claims to human exceptionality. The discontinuity between Swift’s
representations of speaking horses and the equine body provide the reader with a prototype for
imagining a horse’s mind a century and a half before Anna Sewell’s socio-politically influential
1877 Black Beauty. With their ability to speak their own language, the Houyhnhnms flout the
Enlightenment’s “new definition” of speech, adding a clever post-Cartesian nuance to Swift’s
riff on the narrative device of the talking fabular animal (Senior 62).
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After a series of embodied communicative encounters and episodes of animalization,
Gulliver experiences a sort of anagnoristic shock, later figured allegorically in his equinesque
movements and human-horse conversations, which are given not as empirical evidence of
insanity but instead emblematize an avowal of the animal.14 After his increase in self-knowledge,
Gulliver no longer accedes to arbitrary hierarchies that position humans higher than animals.
Swift’s depictions suggest an awakening of Gulliver’s kinesthetic imagination wherein he
sympathetically identifies with his horses in embodied knowledge. Gulliver’s subsequent
avoidance of his family is not an absolute repudiation, but a measure of realizing the primary
incongruity of the human: the human is an animal endowed with reason, but which seems to take
pride in using reason primarily for immoral purposes, which other animals do not do. If
Montaigne’s An Apology for Raymond Sebond is an allegory for the “limits of human reason,”
Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels is an allegory for the failure of philosophy to account for the animality
of the human, here defined as material and sentient (Melehy 273).15 Gulliver’s Travels, then, is
an imaginative rendering of Montaigne—a lesson in the book of human nature that asks the
reader to question her own assumptions about what it means to be human in terms of human and
animal relationships. It’s also a reinvestment in the pedagogical validity of allegory in a culture
increasingly saturated with the truth claims of scientific discourse—a discourse that relegates
animals to automatism—and “realistic” literary forms such as Robinson Crusoe.16 In other
words, Gulliver’s Travels is a satire of the animal debate.
In what follows, I briefly elaborate on the Montaignian ideas that Descartes objected to
before discussing Swift’s critique of Descartes. Next, I read Swift and Montaigne intertextually,
analyzing their views on reason and language, which are essential for understanding their view
of the human and animal relationship. Next, I focus on the commencement of the Houyhnhnm
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episode as the locus of Swift’s most pointed parallel with Montaigne’s primary skeptical
argument: humans and animals share embodied communicative modes. I also review crucial
instances in previous episodes that anticipate the culminating example. Finally, I offer an
alternate interpretation of Gulliver’s controversial statements with which this essay began and
suggest a parallel between Swift’s investigation of interspecific communication and
contemporary ideas in the field of zoosemiotics, particularly the symbolic interactionist theory of
human-horse communication, which speaks to the continued relevance of Gulliver’s Travels.
Aristotle claimed in the Politics that “man is the only animal with the gift of speech”
(1.1253a). In what seems a direct rejoinder, Montaigne queries: if the “complaining, rejoicing,
calling on each other for help or inviting each other to love [of animals] … is not talking, what is
it?” (23). His insistence that animal vocalizations qualify as speech distinguishes him from both
Aristotle and Descartes. “How could they fail to talk among themselves,” writes Montaigne,
“since they talk to us and we to them?” (23). His syntax implies that human and animal
communication precedes animal to animal, an intriguing logic. To prevent misreading, he states
the inference: “Consequently, we should admit that animals employ the same method and the
same reasoning as ourselves when we do anything” (25). His choice of “admit” is telling, boldly
insinuating that humans ignore, even willfully deny, the implications of animal signs.
Montaigne argues analogically that sign language, an embodied form of gestural
communication, is the fundamental human language and comparable to animal signs. He
catalogues examples of human communication, mainly but not exclusively, in hand gestures to
underscore his point. For example, he lists “request, promise, summon, dismiss, menace, pray,
supplicate, refuse, question, show astonishment,” providing nearly fifty examples, finishing with
the phrase “and what not else” to suggest that there are many more (18). He affirms that humans
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use the hands “with a variety and multiplicity rivalling the tongue,” and his conclusion is
striking: “this suggests that it is, rather, sign-language that should be judged the ‘property’ of
man” (18-19). He challenges the abiding view that verbal language is the bedrock of human
communication, proposing nonverbal language instead.
In perhaps the most meaningful statement in the Apology, he accounts the human as one
among many animal species, charging that “[w]e do not place ourselves above other animals and
reject their condition and companionship by right reason but out of stubbornness and insane
arrogance” (51). According to Montaigne, the human “reject[ion]” of the animal “condition” is
an abject ontological repudiation that is in a very real sense an abnegation of ourselves, and the
human disavowal of the animal is tantamount to insanity. He contends humans misuse reason (a
salient theme in Gulliver’s Travels) to construct dubious ontological distinctions for the
purpose of elevating and thereby separating themselves from animals. His approach towards
animals could be described as a relational ontology, suggesting humans should live in
“companionship” with them (51).
Montaigne claims that ascribing animal behaviors to instinct is irrational: “there is, I say,
no rational likelihood that beasts are forced to do by natural inclination the selfsame things
which we do by choice and ingenuity” (25). He makes a radical argument here for the agency of
animals. Positing a chain of being that is horizontal rather than vertical, he says, “I have gone
into all of this to emphasize similarities with things human, so bringing man into conformity with
the majority of creatures. We are neither above them nor below them” (24). In sum, Montaigne’s
An Apology for Raymond Sebond could be considered a pioneering work in the field of
zoosemiotics, which “includ[es] semiotic arguments in animal ethics” (Maran 1). Swift will
explore similar ideas in Gulliver’s Travels.
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Swift disdained the project of Descartes, making him a literal target in The Battel of the
Books (1704). Descartes rejected Scholastic Aristotelianism, which was still the dominant
intellectual paradigm. In Swift’s piece, Aristotle, aiming an arrow at Bacon, misses and shoots
Descartes in the eye (Basic Writings 132). An empiricist, Bacon did not seek systematizing
theorems or first principles as Descartes did. Much has been written about Swift’s criticism of
empiricism in Gulliver’s Travels, but he criticizes rationalism equally, and in Battel, it seems he
would have it over rationalism; he reroutes the arrow. That Descartes is shot in the eye, rather
than, say, the heel, is not without metaphorical import since empiricism’s primary methodology
is visual observation. Descartes, says Swift, is blind.
In the Laputa episode of Gulliver’s Travels, Gulliver brings up Descartes—from the dead
that is. Laputa is a flying island of mathematicians who literally have their heads in the clouds.
They are so lost in their own internal thoughts, like Descartes, that they need “flappers” to strike
various parts of their bodies to awaken them to immediate reality. Gulliver, temporarily
empowered to summon the dead in pairs, requests Descartes and Gassendi among others. He
directs the pair to explain to Aristotle their “systems” (168). While Gassendi would agree with
Descartes that the animal soul is corporeal, he believed animals had minds since they had the
same biological equipment such as brains and nerves (Boas 132). He disagreed with Descartes
on animal intelligence, acknowledging a measure of reason and asserting that animals speak their
own words (Boas 91, 132). Gassendi, a empiricist, critiqued Descartes. After admitting his own
errors, Aristotle dismantles both philosophers and their theories are “exploded” like lab
experiments gone awry (168). Swift is aiming at the unstable, even fashionable, aspect of
scientific discovery, which like a coat, seems to change with the season. He also satirizes
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philosophical technical arguments that split hairs over notions of animal souls and language
since our own limited reason can never ascertain with certainty the answers to these questions.
Instead, Swift believes that the pretext of these disquisitions is to prove human superiority. In
other words, what better method to prove the superiority of human reason than through tortuous
arguments?
An even more humorous critique of Descartes appears in the chapter “A Digression on
Madness” from A Tale of the Tub (1704). Swift’s narrator investigates the cause underlying the
“madness” in the human compulsion for building empires and propounding new “schemes” of
philosophy (Tale 91). Swift writes: “Cartesius reckoned to see, before he died, the sentiments of
all philosophers, like so many stars in his romantic system, wrapped and drawn within his
vortex” (Tale 89). That is, Descartes was a systematizer who sought to best all previous thought.
Swift thought that moderns like Descartes were “mad in the clinical sense” for the sin of
“reduction, the stripping away of whatever in the outside world does not square with one’s
private fantasies, or of whatever is tedious and beyond one’s capacity to master,” and for
“arrogant self-sufficiency” (Spiller 15-16). He uproariously attributes Descartes’ metaphysical
compulsion to flatulence that has wandered from the bowels to the brain (Tale 91). For religious
conservatives such as Swift, Descartes’ “I think therefore I am” must have reverberated
blasphemously with the divine “I am.” In sum, Swift’s assessment of Descartes might be
articulated as follows: “I fart; therefore, I am.”
Swift was not alone in his negative assessment. Blaise Pascal, who attended a lecture
given by Descartes agreed with him about animals, but he found the rationalist method
untenable. Meric Casaubon, a scholar and clergyman appointed by James I, referred to Descartes
as “a crack-brained man” filled with “excessive pride and self-conceit” (qtd. in Spiller 21-23).
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According to Spiller, besides Casaubon, Swift was the only critic who perceptively amalgamated
Descartes’ many weaknesses, including intellectual laziness, excessive introversion, and
resemblance to religious fanaticism (22-23). Spiller does not give an example of Cartesian
faineance, but the following from the “Second Meditation,” which sounds remarkably, at the
sentence level, like an answer to Porphyry in Isagoge, the classic text on Aristotelian logic, lends
insight into Swift’s critique:
But what is a man? Shall I say a rational animal? Assuredly not; for it would be
necessary forthwith to inquire into what is meant by animal, and what by rational,
and thus, from a single question, I should insensibly glide into others, and these
more difficult than the first; nor do I now possess enough of leisure to warrant me
in wasting my time amid subtleties of this sort. I prefer here to attend to the
thoughts that sprung up of themselves in my mind and were inspired by my
own nature alone… (para. 5).
The animal rationale is an ancient Greek definition of the human, possibly Aristotle’s. Descartes
completely avoids the implications of “animal,” dodging difficult questions because answering
them requires rigorous investigation and involves raising other questions. Like a Greek god, he
counts as knowledge whatever springs fully formed from his skull. It strikes the ear oddly when
a thinker says he doesn’t have time to think—like a Laputan “flap” in reverse. In his well-known
letter to Pope, Swift writes, “I have got materials towards a treatise proving the falsity of the
definition animal rationale; and to show it should only be rationis capax” (capable of reason)
(262). If Descartes wasn’t willing to do the work, Swift was.
Western arguments about human and animal difference, that is, the animal question, have
always hinged on language and reason, and Swift’s fluency in the Enlightenment debate is patent
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in Gulliver’s Travels. Next to the Houyhnhnm episode, the Brobdingnag chapter contains the
most pointed evidence. In Brobdingnag, the land of giants where Gulliver is diminutive, the shift
in perspective caused by physical dimensions controls categorization, trumping other more
barefaced similarities. The Brobdingnagian farmer who first finds Gulliver classifies him as a
human “shaped” animal about the size of an indigenous beast known as a “splacknuck” (80). The
Brobdingnagians observe Gulliver as a creature who imitates humans, but that “seemed to speak
in a little language of its own” (80) —one of several allusions throughout Gulliver’s Travels to
Montaigne’s suggestion that animals speak languages of their own, and a direct reply to
Descartes’ admonition that to think so is to err like the “ancients” (47).
Gulliver’s Travels was highly popular in 1730s France (Percival 63). At least one French
writer, lampooning early modern ontology, seemed to take a cue from Swift. Jesuit priest
Guillaume-Hyacinthe Bougeant writes in his 1739 Amusement philosophique sur le langage des
bêtes, “Imagine to yourself a man who should love his watch as we love a dog, and caress it
because he should think himself dearly beloved by it, so as to think that when it points to twelve
or one o’clock, it does it knowingly and out of tenderness to him” (7).17 This passage is
ingenious in the complexity of its critique. First, in order to criticize the proposition that animals
are non-sentient automata, he ironically attacks the proposition that animals are sentient, by
equating loving a clock with loving a dog. Second, he makes the comparison between animals
and machines ridiculous in a reversal suggesting that machines are sentient. Third, the
comparison is hilariously effective because according to this logic, if one believes that animals
are automata, then developing affective relationships with other automata such as clocks is
perfectly reasonable. Descartes is the source of the clock analogy. He reasons that since some
animals “show more skill” than humans in some things, they should be more intelligent and
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“surpass us in everything” (Discourse 48). But since those same animals are also inferior to
humans in other ways, what they can do better does not demonstrate “mental powers” but rather
the fact “that they have no mental powers whatsoever” and is an effect of instinct analogous to “a
clock consisting only of ropes and springs” (Discourse 48). This is an obscure logic. Would it
follow that because one person exceeds another in mathematics, the second has no reason at all?
Back in Brobdingnag, the king modulates from thinking that Gulliver is a “splacknuck,”
a ridiculous sounding name that speaks to the arbitrariness of terminology, to thinking him a
“piece of clock-work,” that is, an automaton, to suspecting him merely a parrot trained to speak
by Glumdaclitch, Gulliver’s child-nurse, and her father (85-86). The parrot problem in the
language and reason argument is well-known. John Locke spends time on the parrot in his
discussion of language and identity in his 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, but
forty years earlier, Descartes utilized the bird argument in the Discourse saying, “magpies and
parrots can utter words as we do, and yet cannot speak like us, that is, by showing that they are
thinking what they are saying” (47). The argument is that animals have no internal “thoughts”
and therefore no reason because they cannot truly engage in context dependent discussion
(Discourse 46-47).
Descartes’s ideas are, for all and intents and purposes, a reiteration of the Stoic position
(Percival 58). The Stoics staked their philosophy on claims about animals, holding that the
difference between the human and animal was the assumption of “internal speech” in humans as
opposed to verbalization, for even some birds can imitate human speech, and with this
distinction, they “pushed the argument further” than other philosophic schools (Percival 57).
Above, I cited T. O. Wedel’s observation that Gulliver’s Travels follows Montaigne in attacking
Stoic pride (33). It was the Stoics, in the Western tradition, with their theory of justice based on
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“fellow feeling,” who first excluded animals from the moral purview because of their apparent
lack of reason (Sorabji 7-8). The connection between Swift’s attack on human pride and the
function of animals in Stoic thinking is striking.
In the case of the bird, Gulliver’s speaking would be nothing but mechanistic mimicry
devoid of understanding. He does, however, finally demonstrate a semblance of human status by
answering specific questions with “rational answers” in a human “voice” (86). The king of
Brobdingnag is something of a Cartesian, requiring appropriate response. The human voice, not
the human body, proven in verbalized context dependent ratiocination, would be the categorical
arbiter in this instance. Perhaps, implies Swift, the animal body does not authentically demarcate
ontological status either. However, because of the difference in size, and despite his use of verbal
language, Gulliver is finally pronounced a “lusus naturae,” freak of nature, by Brobdingnagian
scientists, suggesting ontological instability (87). A difference in degree (physical dimension) is
taken as a difference in kind—a reversal of the theriophilic argument that human and animal
difference is one of degree rather than kind. In this episode, Gulliver’s vulnerability as a sign,
even though he can signify in language parallels many instances of corporeal vulnerability; he is
prey to rats, flies, monkeys, eagles, and mischievous schoolboys. He is imprisoned like an
animal by Glumdaclitch in a protective yet cage-like “box,” symbolizing the restrictive aspect of
his temporary animal identity and suggesting the same for philosophical demarcations (103).18
Swift treats the question of animal language extensively in the Houyhnhnm episode.
Upon his first encounter with the Houyhnhnms, for example, Gulliver evinces a Cartesian point
of view observing that the horses’ “language expressed the passions very well” (192). That
animals could express their instinctual drives and primal emotions but nothing else was a
Cartesian belief and an early modern commonplace. Gulliver states “my principal endeavour was

32

to learn the language … for they looked upon it as a prodigy that a brute animal should discover
such marks of a rational creature” (198). In this single sentence, Swift tallies the essence of the
debate: only rational animals, i.e., humans speak language; therefore, only humans are rational.
The horse master reveals the belief that language use trumps the body in ontological distinctions
when Gulliver reports that the horse “was more astonished at my capacity for speech and reason,
than at the figure of my body” (201). Gulliver looks suspiciously like a Yahoo, and so his
acquisition of the Houyhnhnm language transgresses the normative order, for the Yahoos do not
speak. The horse master, a Cartesian, assumes that animals are devoid of language and reason.
Swift, then, was clearly cognizant of the debate at the intersection of animals, language,
and reason, but what exactly was his view of human reason? I am interested in this question
because one of the main objectives of the theriophilists was to challenge the notion that human
ontological superiority is predicated on reason. The distinguishing factor when it comes to
reason, Swift says, is that “…reason itself is true and just; but the reason of every particular man
is weak and wavering, perpetually swayed and turned by his interests, his passions and vices”
(Sermon 10). Swift displays a nuanced appreciation of the difference between abstract concepts
and the individuality of human experience. Gulliver echoes Swift’s description of reason, telling
the reader that Houyhnhnm reason “strikes you with immediate conviction; as it must needs do
where it is not mingled, obscured or discolored by passion and interest” (225). In this instance,
Houyhnhnm reason is represented as the antithesis of human reason; they are a collective and the
individual’s desires are subsumed within the group.
Swift, however, utilizes the talking horses as a sounding board for multiple viewpoints
on reason. As opposed to espousing a strictly Cartesian view, the Houyhnhnms are a mélange of
perspectives including the Montaignian. For example, the horse master asks additional questions
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that demonstrate a level of complexity in his understanding. He asks, says Gulliver, “how I
acquired those appearances of reason, which I discovered in all my actions” (198). He observes
Gulliver’s “actions” and makes an inference of intelligence, reiterating Montaigne’s empirical
contention that animals demonstrate enough observable behaviors to warrant an inference of
reason. Swift presents here the Montaignian view that when it comes to animals that “from
similar effects we should conclude that there are similar faculties” (25).
In the same discussion with the horse master, Gulliver tries to explain the meaning of the
word “opinion” and the origin of disputes, of which, the horses have no experience. Swift alludes
to the Cartesian cogito—the infamous rationalist proposition of certainty, “I think therefore I
am.” Gulliver says that “reason taught us to affirm or deny only where we are certain; and
beyond our knowledge we cannot do either” (225). Gulliver makes a positive assertion here that
human reason can lead to certainty, but the implication in the Montaignian sense is that human
knowledge is limited because reason is not sufficient for absolute affirmation or denial of
anything. For Montaigne, the only certainty is uncertainty, and Swift hints that the skeptical
position is the reasonable position. Gulliver goes on to discuss “several systems of natural
philosophy,” and the horse master’s reaction is to “laugh that a creature pretending to reason,
should value itself upon the knowledge of other peoples [sic] conjectures, and in things, where
that knowledge, if it were certain, could be of no use” (226). In this instance, the horse master
presents Swift’s skeptical perspective on science and epistemology in general, and Cartesian
metaphysics in particular. For Swift, philosophical systems are risible, hot air, flatulence.
It is a critical commonplace to interpret Gulliver’s Travels as satire on reason, but it’s
more accurate to say that Gulliver’s Travels is a satire on the misuse of reason. In addition to the
dialogue with the Houyhnhnm horse master cited above, Swift’s primary strategy for elaborating
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his judgment of human reason throughout Gulliver’s Travels is through definition ex negativo.
He depicts example upon example of the human abuse of reason. People slaughter each other
over the proper end for cracking an egg. Scientists vivisect dogs and attempt to reduce feces back
into food. Mathematicians are so caught up in their calculations they don’t notice when their
wives look for love elsewhere. In the Houyhnhnm episode, Swift criticizes, among other things,
mendacity, vice, war and weapons of mass destruction, and animal cruelty. He alludes to
Aristotle’s claim that only “man” has the “gift of speech,” but astutely observes that the human
utilizes the reason that accompanies that gift solely to increase degeneracy (234).
The Houyhnhnms also misuse reason; they forbid familial bonding, make servants of
their own, enslave the Yahoos and contemplate exterminating them. In their moral ambiguity, the
Houyhnhnms are not unlike the mixed characters of late-century British novels. These
modulating statements on reason and its use indicate, I think, Swift’s pragmatic approach to the
subject. If so-called ideal reason can be allied with practices of slavery and philosophical
exercises that contemplate extermination of animate species, then having an inflated sense of
pride in that faculty is highly questionable even unreasonable. Swift implies instead that a reason
that is swayed by the passions and plagued by uncertainty, that is human reason, is preferable to
a reason that is systematically hidebound, like Gulliver clothed in Yahoo skins. The overarching
implicit question of Gulliver’s Travels is, then, what is the reasonable use of reason? I am
arguing that Swift’s deployment of the animal question is one strategy for working out an answer
to that question.
Montaigne’s negative assessment of human reason in the Apology has a caustic bite that
Swift must have admired. Directly prior to his observations on animal semiosis, he launches into
an extended diatribe against humanity’s most esteemed faculty, defining reason as an
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“appearance of rationality which each of us constructs for himself,” and comparing it to a “tool
of malleable lead or wax” (144). As Swift does, he suggests that reason is not absolute but an
“appearance,” contingent, individualized, and highly impressionable, subject to the vagaries of
“passion” and therefore a shaky foundation for claims to absolute knowledge (147). To illustrate
the mutability of human reason, Montaigne writes, “My horses’ gait seems sometimes rough,
sometimes gentle” (145). Swift agrees, using the words “passion and interest,” when Gulliver
informs the reader that the Houyhnhnms have no such flaws in their reason (225). “[H]uman
reasonings and concepts” are like “matter, heavy and barren,” says Montaigne, characterizing it
as a plague-infected invalid embraced by humanity: “I make men feel the emptiness, the
nothingness of Man, wrenching from their grasp the sickly arms of human reason” (11-12). In
his attack on reason, he issues a second challenge: “Let man make me understand, by the force of
discursive reason, what are the grounds on which he has founded and erected all those
advantages which he thinks he has over other creatures…” (13). To lower human pride in reason,
Montaigne canvasses many examples of animal ingenuity in addition to animal semiosis. He
discusses the fox who “ratiocinates” when the Thracians entrust him to test the thickness of river
ice and the pure “dialectic” of the dog deciding which of three crossroads to take in pursuit of his
master or prey (26, 28).
For Swift, who was “troubled by the flaws of verbal communication,” language is as
imperfect as reason (Kelly 33). Schemes for repairing a faulty post-Babel human language were
topical in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For example, John Wilkins in An Essay
Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language (1668); John Locke in An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (1690); projectors in the Royal Society; and others such as
Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz made proposals on the topic. Leibniz, for example, wrote several
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treatises on language. In On the Universal Science, he postulated that symbols could be given to
primitive concepts that could be combined to form more complex concepts and in sum, the
whole would be a “universal characteristic” (Kulstad). It was believed that communication
failures due to imperfect language resulted in wars and civil strife. The English civil war, for
example, served as a recent reminder, so the thinking went, a universal language would prevent
future conflict.
Swift satirized such notions in the Laputa episode where a preposterous proposal is put
forth to concretize language, excising all parts of speech but nouns. Instead of speaking, people
would simply carry with them material examples of whatever they wish to denote (157). The
absurdity of this idea hardly calls for comment, but it’s tempting to imagine Gulliver carrying a
horse, who is usually a bearer of the human body, in his arms instead of just saying the word
“horse.” The image is hilarious because it demonstrates the impossibility of this scheme in
another parody of Cartesian reductivism that insists, not on the metaphysical, but on a strictly
material orientation to life.
On the opposite side of the spectrum, the Houyhnhnms have an impossibly ideal
language in which concepts such as lying are nearly inexpressible in the positive sense and can
only be defined in the negative as “the thing which was not” (202). This has been interpreted as
Swift’s comment on “modern-day” sophists such as “lawyers and politicians” (Rivero n. 6, 202),
but I think it’s tied to the example from Laputa to question the desirability of a strictly concrete
use of language solely for exchanging “information of facts,” as Gulliver describes the
Houyhnhnm approach (202). The Houyhnhnms have no poetry. In other words, Swift is wary of
the usurpation of scientific discourse as the one and only true description of reality. The idea is
that the Houyhnhnms are so pure that they cannot conceive of a “lie,” but even a negation of a

37

positive is still a positive.
In sum, Swift perceived human language as flawed, but he would have taken this
observation to a different conclusion than the language projectors: the lesson to be drawn is that
to privilege the human species over all others based on this fallen endowment is tenuous at best.
He was not an idealist and recognized the improbability of these universal language proposals,
understanding that even if external signs could be universally agreed on, their signification
would be problematic due to the inherently symbolic nature of language itself.
Montaigne also commented on the inadequacy of language. He describes as “irreverent”
religious cant such as “God cannot die” and “God cannot change his mind” (99). The problem
with these statements, he says, is that they attempt to circumscribe divinity with “the rules of
human language” (99). He claims that “our speech, like everything else, has its defects and
weaknesses. Most of the world’s squabbles are occasioned by grammar!” (99). In reference to
divine attributes, he writes, “we utter words, but our intelligence cannot grasp the sense. Despite
that, we, in our arrogance, want to force God through human filters” (101). Here, he alludes to
the concept of ineffability, arguing that human language cannot, even should not, attempt to
describe something as incomprehensible as the divine, connecting efforts to do so to the human
sin of “arrogance” (101). There is a connection here between the challenge presented in reading
creatures and the divine since human language acts as “filter” or limit on both (101). The human
“intellect” can go no further than making “analogies,” and it must be understood that the
relationship between signifier and signified is not absolute but an approximation (105). Since
language is flawed, the implication goes, humans should no more pride themselves on it than
reason. In conclusion to these arguments, Montaigne writes:
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As for the power of speech … if it is not natural, then it cannot be necessary. And
yet I believe … that if a child before learning to talk, were brought up in total
solitude, then he would have some sort of speech to express his concepts; it is
simply not believable that Nature has refused to us men a faculty granted to most
other animals (23).
His summation is noteworthy for it subtly reverses the assumption that it is humans who are
endowed with reasoned speech and that animals can only vocalize passions by suggesting that
animals naturally possess speech and that humans are privileged to share in the capacity.
Swift proposes, nonetheless, that humans strive for meaningful dialogue. In Hints
Towards an Essay on Conversation, he discusses the value of exchange and observes that all
people are capable of being “agreeable.” He applies again the strategy of definition ex negativo,
comically cataloguing many misuses of conversation. For example, humans converse solely for
displays of self-importance such as their talent for wit or for “making a vanity of telling …
faults.” Conversation for Swift is an art the purpose of which falls under the Horatian dictum to
delight and instruct. In the concluding paragraphs, he writes, “thus we see how human nature is
most debased, by the abuse of that faculty which is held the great distinction between men and
brutes.” Ostensibly, this is an allusion once again to Aristotle, but in this context, Swift seems to
say that dialogue rather than speech is the “great distinction.” Moreover, he hints that this view
is a prosaic opinion “held” by others and not necessarily himself. He goes on to acknowledge
gender implications, attributing the “degeneracy” of conversation to the “custom … of excluding
women from any share in our society, further than in parties at play, or in dancing, or in the
pursuit of an amour,” suggesting that he perceives the shared oppressions of women and animals
in terms of voice; both are precluded: one due to gender and one to species.
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This theme of conversation arises in Houyhnhnm-land where Gulliver is a “humble
auditor” (233). Even though he has learned the language of the land, Gulliver’s role as an
interlocutor rather than speaker womanizes/animalizes him. Positioned as the animal, Gulliver is,
in effect, silenced. Houyhnhnm conversation, like their reason, is ideal and includes “no
interruption, tediousness, heat or difference of sentiments” (234). The horses believe that “a short
silence doth much improve conversation” (234). Swift’s ironic view of the vapidity of human
conversation is to say that silence is better. Yet, the placidity of Houyhnhnm conversation, while
desirable in one sense, nevertheless implies that a dialogue with pure abstract reason would be
extremely lifeless.
The Houyhnhnms cast Gulliver out, he says, because the horse master is “known
frequently to converse with me, as if he would receive some advantage or pleasure in my
company: that such a practice was not agreeable to reason or nature, nor a thing ever heard of
before among them” (235). This prohibitive intermingling at the level of discourse includes
species, implicitly comparing taboos on intra-human communication, such as those involving
race, class, and gender, to interspecific communication—all of which transgress social and
political boundaries.
Conversation is an enduring theme once Gulliver returns to England. Gulliver’s
subsequent avoidance of his family after his time with the horses, is only a partial rejection, and
a measure of realizing the primary incongruity of the human—an animal “capable of reason,”
which pridefully takes advantage of reason to increase vice (262). Upon his return, he initially
speaks neither to his wife, representing the prideful blind human, who has had no such epiphany,
superseding gender here, nor to his children, to whom human pride is imputed via fiat. However,
Gulliver’s aversion is temporary, and his connection to his own species is not irreparably severed
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in favor of horses. It is imperative to read Gulliver’s statements about his wife and children in
context since his partial estrangement from his family is as foundational to the insanity
interpretation as his amicable relationship with his horses. He says, “I began last week to permit
my wife to sit at dinner with me, at the furthest end of a long table, and to answer (but with the
utmost brevity) the few questions I ask her” (249). These statements are shortly thereafter tied to
Gulliver’s conclusive view of the human as a prideful animal filled with vice. By the end of the
novel, Gulliver is taking steps, albeit small, towards reopening dialogue with other humans. In
this case, verbal language, however imperfect, does have the potential to mediate, and he speaks
of his “reconcilement to the Yahoo-kind in general” (250). He distinguishes between humanity’s
everyday vices, which “nature hath intitled them to,” and arrogance, which they are not “intitled
to” (250). What he finds intolerable is that these same people remain blind to their status as an
“animal” and are “smitten with pride” (250). Gulliver demonstrates difficulty adjusting to his
new self-knowledge. Neither Swift nor Montaigne propounded idealistic perspectives on reason
or language, and they questioned the long-standing imbrication of animals in human
philosophical/theological debates that chew on them, so to speak, to serve metaphysical theories
that sometimes have devastating real-life consequences, such as the denial of feeling pain to
animals.
If Montaigne’s lesson in natural theology maintains that similarities with animals should
give the human a humbler view of himself, the question remains, what are those similarities?
Montaigne makes a case for embodied semiosis. In Gulliver’s Travels this translates to both intra
and interspecific communication where gestural and vocal, as opposed to verbal, communication
is a salient motif. In a pioneering study of gestures in Gulliver’s Travels, John Sena claims that
Swift presents gestures as “superior to written and spoken language” (146). Of Gulliver’s first
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encounter with the horses, he writes, “[t]he initial effect of the gestures in this scene is to bridge
the gap between humans and nonhumans, to establish a context in which we are able—even
invited—to make the practices of horses applicable to humans,” but argues that ultimately, the
horses are “humanized” through gesture (Sena 161). Another way of looking at this, however,
is that just as gestures work to “humanize,” they animalize Gulliver, for they are a form of
embodied expression which humans and animals share (Sena 161).
Several scenes involving gestural communication occur in initial encounters between
Gulliver and the “creatures,” “monsters,” “people,” “animals,” “Yahoos,” and “Houyhnhnms” he
meets. For example, as Gulliver lies tied down on the Lilliputian beach, one citizen “lift[s] up his
hands and eyes by way of admiration” (18). Shortly thereafter, Gulliver turns to observe the
“person and gesture” of a Lilliputian speaker, alluding to the importance of nonverbal
communication even as it accompanies language (19). “I replied," says Gulliver, in “a most
submissive manner, lifting up my left hand and both my eyes to the sun, as calling him for a
witness” (19). Gulliver also successfully communicates hunger through gesture putting his
“finger frequently” to his “mouth to signify . . . food (19).” (19). In Brobdingnag, when an
“enormous Barbarian” picks him up, Gulliver says, “[a]ll I ventured was to raise my eyes
towards the sun, and place my hands together in a supplicating posture, and to speak some words
in a humble melancholy tone” (72-73). In Laputa, Gulliver waves his hat as a signal, and the
Laputans point to acknowledge him (132-133). When the flying island is lowered close to him,
Gulliver says, “I then put myself into the most supplicating postures and spoke in the humblest
accent … [t]hey made signs for me to come down from the rock…” (133). In these examples,
Gulliver and the strangers demonstrate successful gestural communication, and Gulliver makes
use of paralanguage, “humblest accent,” a nonverbal communication technique which includes
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volume, pitch, and tone (133).
Even after Gulliver learns their language, the Houyhnhnms speak in embodied “signs”
and vocalized “words,” emphasizing the multiple communicative strategies that humans often
exercise in combination. (196). When Gulliver first encounters a Houyhnhnm, gestural
communication is once again the initial mode of contact, and he describes an extended nonverbal
exchange which I partially reproduce here:
We stood gazing at each other for some time; at last I took the boldness, to reach
my hand towards his neck, with a design to stroak it, using the common style and
whistle of jockies when they are going to handle a strange horse. But this animal
seeming to receive my civilities with disdain shook his head, and bent his brows,
softly raising up his right fore-foot to remove my hand. Then he neighed three or
four times, but in so different a cadence, that I almost began to think he was
speaking to himself in some language of his own. (190)
This segment is replete with interspecific gestural communication; despite this, the horse, in the
human position, chooses, as Montaigne argues, to ignore the implications and has a
condescending attitude of “disdain” (190). This first exchange with the horse reinforces a second
Montaignian argument: the issue is not a lack of language in animals, but a “defect” in the
human preventing full comprehension of animal language even though humans and animals can
communicate to a degree (17). Interestingly, the horses do not speak a human language such as
the animal narrators of fable. Gulliver makes the very Montaignian observation that the horse has
“some language of his own” (190). This language of their own is represented through
onomatopoeia, that is, equine vocalizations such as “Hhuun, Hhuun” (193). Gulliver attempts to
communicate nonverbally by whistling, and he translates the Houyhnhnm language for the
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reader—a precursor to the narrator who understands, unlike other humans, animal language in
late-century didactic stories for children.19 Montaigne observes that humans change “idiom”
according to the species spoken to, indicating the very real phenomenon of interspecies
communication (23). Swift’s deployment of onomatopoeia in the Houyhnhnm episode suggests
that Gulliver’s English horses are speaking, but not in the English language.
Gulliver’s inaugural encounter in book four, however, is not with a horse, as one might
expect, but a Yahoo. In this scene, Swift explores the significance of the embodied
communicative technique of vocalization. Gulliver reveals an anthropocentric attitude in his
description of the Yahoo as a “disagreeable animal,” a “monster” for which he feels “antipathy
… contempt and aversion” —an inverse parallel of a Brobdingnagian who views him as a
“hateful little animal” (190, 73). When a Yahoo approaches him and lifts his “fore-paw,”
Gulliver strikes him with his sword (190). He reports, “When the beast felt the smart, he drew
back, and roared so loud, that a herd of at least forty came flocking about me from the next field”
(190). This exact language appears in a previous incident in which Gulliver is positioned as a
strange animal. When the Lilliputians shoot him with arrows, he says he “roared so loud” they
shrank from him (18). In this “roar” of trauma described as “the smart,” Swift challenges
Descartes’ claim that an animal’s pain is merely mechanical and not really felt via his identical
wording, “roared so loud.” Normally “roar” is associated with the vocalizations of large animals
such as the lion, but here it works to suggest that the experience is the same for each species, and
it emphasizes pre-verbal modes of expression. Like animals, humans use vocalizations to
communicate, and moreover, appropriate their own terms for animal vocalization, “roar,” for
themselves. At the same time, Cartesians would deny that animals who “roar” can signify
anything but mechanistic reflex.
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The Yahoo’s response demonstrates the vocal aspect of animal semiosis that forms the
basis of Montaigne’s empathy in “Of Cruelty,” which Philip P. Hallie calls the “living nerve of
Western ethics” (156). Montaigne finds, he admits, a “violent pleasure” in the chase during the
hunt but is greatly disturbed by the “cry of a hare” in his “dog’s teeth.” Evidently, Montaigne
touched a nerve in Descartes, who had his own definition of feeling in his use of “sentire” which
requires conscious thinking, which animals, according to him, do not do, as opposed to passions,
such as fear and hunger which are involuntary (Harrison, “Descartes” 224). As Erica Fudge
observes, this implies that animals do not feel or experience corporeal suffering as humans do, so
it does not qualify as such (154). The Cartesian theory allows humans license to inflict suffering
on animals without compunction (154).20
Both the Yahoo and Gulliver roar, and Gulliver is effectively animalized in this sort of
primal scream which precedes verbal language. Yet, he is deaf to the Yahoo’s semiotic display.
Even a horse can distinguish between the menacing bark of a dog and some other “meaningful
cry” that a dog makes, says Montaigne (18). Gulliver’s lack of sympathy dehumanizes him
briefly making him lower than a horse, for even animals demonstrate humanity for each other
forming “alliances” for “mutual succor” (Montaigne 44). “Oxen, pigs and other animals can be
seen rushing in to help when one of their number is being attacked and rallying round in its
defence,” observes Montaigne (44). Gulliver himself comments that a “common hound … has
judgment enough to distinguish and follow the cry of the ablest dog in the pack” (222). At this
point in the narrative, Gulliver is an ontological blank, and the incident with the Yahoo forms
what might be called the climactic nadir of Gulliver’s Travels. Because he does not yet see his
own animality, Gulliver does not sympathetically identify with the Yahoo, and in that sense,
Gulliver is lower than both human and animal. The Yahoos who respond to the distress of their
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fellow are more fully human than Gulliver.21 When he finally sees his reflection like Narcissus
or like Eve in Paradise Lost, he will not become enraptured with himself, but shrink in horror
like Frankenstein’s creature when the epiphany hits. Shortly thereafter, in a reversal of the Yahoo
scene, the horses examine Gulliver with fascination. When one unintentionally injures his hand
he admits, “he was forced to roar” (191). The horses understand his roar and alter their manner
of touch.
Swift’s exploration of embodied communication positions Gulliver’s Travels as a
harbinger of the novel of sensibility that would reach full foment in the late eighteenth century.
Writers of sensibility viewed the “pre-linguistic semiosis” that humans and animals share as an
“unequivocal expression of … a condition of ontological equivalence” (Menely 10). For
example, Rousseau explored ideas of sympathetic identification with the animal based on
embodied semiotic exchange. “Man’s first language,” he writes, “is the cry of nature” (58). This
“cry” represents the non-discursive ability of the majority of species to communicate through
vocalization. The human, according to Rousseau, is at least partially defined in response to this
cry through a feeling of “pity” (63). He writes:
In fact, commiseration will be all the more energetic as the witnessing animal
identifies itself more intimately with the suffering animal. Now it is evident that
this identification must have been infinitely closer in the state of nature than in the
state of reasoning. Reason is what engenders egocentrism…. (63)
One creature in distress causes another to identify with him, and this is a natural response
independent of rational thought (in many ways, Rousseau echoes Montaigne). This “cry” is the
foundation of creaturely identification, and Rousseau sounds like a theriophilist in his conflation
of reason and egocentric pride. Even though Gulliver is dehumanized due to the absence of
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sympathy, Swift challenges the reader to recognize the semiotic import of the Yahoo “roar.” He
asks the reader to consider just what animal cries signify.
Even though they don’t speak verbal language, the Yahoos are semiotic beings; they
“roar” in bodily distress; they surround Gulliver “houling” and “making odious faces” (190).
While the incident with the Yahoo contains pathos, Swift enhances the meaning through his
favorite comic mode, adding an additional facet to his deployment of the scatological to
Gulliver’s Travels where he associates it with the embodied communication of the Yahoos. That
is, for Swift, even defecation can be a form of gestural communication. The Yahoos
communicate collective disapproval of Gulliver’s violence by climbing a tree and “discharg[ing]
their excrements” on Gulliver’s head (190). Inverting the chain of being, they sit, so to speak, on
the seat of reason and defecate—a disgustingly uproarious comment on the so-called superiority
of human rationality.
This theme has been foreshadowed by the “most ancient student” in the academy of
Lagado, the city below Laputa, who has been trying for years to reduce excrement to its original
form of food—a hilarious parody of Cartesian reductivism (152). Swift bleeds the
communicative import of these corporeal animal functions, employing satirically these forms of
animal communication, which he also foreshadows in Lilliput where Gulliver, like a gargantuan
canine, puts out a fire in the royal palace by urinating on it. His waggish agency in this scene had
a heroic effect, and no doubt functions as political commentary, but the intended message of the
Yahoo feces is lost on Gulliver, for he makes no comment except to say that he was nearly
“stifled with the filth” (190).
Montaigne also forayed into the scatological, proclaiming the human’s proper place in
the cosmos the “mire and shit of the world” (16). Swift no doubt had to negotiate his fair share
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walking the streets of London as his speaker does in a “Description of a City Shower.” He
describes a “confluence” near the market of “dung, guts and blood, / Drowned puppies, stinking
sprats all drenched in mud, / Dead cats, and turnip tops…” (60-62). He represents the “world,”
like Montaigne, as one of “mire and shit,” which he terms “mud” and “dung,” a revolting street
stew including “puppies” and “cats.” The addition of animals, semiotically referred to as “pets,”
to animals considered “food” raises an interesting question about the different categories within
the term “animal.” Gulliver himself refuses the “asses flesh” offered to him by the Houyhnhnms,
perhaps hinting at an unease with the body’s capability to transform animal flesh to human flesh
(195). This depiction of life’s interconnectedness is beautifully Swiftian in its repulsiveness. For
Swift, carnivorism, blood, urine, and feces serve as reminders to the human, who would often
rather ignore the messy implications of corporeality, that is, the reality of the corpus, of his
mutual embodiment with animals. Swift’s exploration of gestural language, I am arguing, adds
another facet to his emphasis on the body.
Gulliver will soon acknowledge the efficacy of Yahoo communication. The “roar” will
return and is of great import in finally identifying him as a Yahoo, but Swift has been building
up the narrative tension with hints at this throughout the Houyhnhnm episode. For example, the
horses are eager to classify Gulliver and perform a side by side visual comparison with a Yahoo:
“The beast and I were brought close together; and our countenances diligently compared, both by
my master and servant, who thereupon repeated several times the word Yahoo” (emphasis in
original 194-195). The horses here recognize the human face as a species identifier. Gulliver says
of the Yahoo that he feels “horror and astonishment” at seeing in “this abominable animal, a
perfect human figure” (195). Ironically, Gulliver recognizes the Yahoo animal as human, but
does not yet recognize himself as a Yahoo animal.
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Not until the often-discussed scene in which the young female Yahoo makes amorous
overtures to Gulliver “embrac[ing him] in a most fulsome manner” will he avow his own animal
status (225). In response to this embrace, he exclaims, “I roared as loud as I could” (225).
Gulliver’s animal identity is finally established via embodied communication, not the face, not
verbal language: the female deploys the embrace and Gulliver the roar. In this instance,
Gulliver’s roar is like a double-edged sword at once an abject pre-verbal denial of animal status,
and a confirmation of it. The experience has the effect of killing Gulliver’s previous conception
of his human “self.” He describes it as a “mortification to myself,” continuing, “[f]or I could no
longer deny, that I was a real Yahoo, in every limb and feature” (225). Swift treats Gulliver’s
anagnoristic recognition comically in a sort of reversal of a bungled seduction scene, but there is
a weighty subtext here because he has recognized his animality. In his later remembrances,
Gulliver literally faces or humanizes his own animality: “When I happened to behold the
reflection of my own form in a lake or a fountain, I turned away my face in horror and
detestation of myself and could better endure the sight of a common Yahoo, than of my own
person” (234-235). Swift turns the reflector on Gulliver and it is not a human artifact made of
glass, but nature itself in the form of a “lake” or a “fountain.” Ingeniously, Swift connects the
pedagogical technique of natural theology, which teaches through the observation of nature, to
his satiric mirror. This dramatic realization is a watershed, demanding an alteration in the
character. Gulliver finally admits that he is a Yahoo; the human animal has a face, but only after
he faces the animal.
When he is rescued after his exile from Houyhnhnm-land and brought aboard the
Portuguese ship, Gulliver describes his reaction to hearing the sailors speak: “it appeared to me
as monstrous as if a dog or a cow should speak in England, or a Yahoo in Houyhnhnm-land”
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(241). Gulliver is perhaps not too swift, but he clearly understands that in the world turned right
side up, animals do not use verbal language. How then should we read the controversial
statements of Gulliver with which this essay began? There are two ways that do not necessarily
negate each other but illustrate once more the complexities of Swift’s text which, I have been
arguing, deliberately challenge finality. We can read Gulliver’s statements allegorically as
symbols for his sympathetic identification with his horses based on his new self-knowledge of
himself as a human animal, and we can read more closely by investigating historical meanings.
To revisit, in the novel’s concluding paragraphs, Gulliver says, “my horses understand
me tolerably well; I converse with them at least for hours every day” (244). One eighteenthcentury meaning of “converse” is the “interchange of thoughts other than by speech” (OED). In
addition to writing, this could, of course, mean gestural communication. “Converse” could also
mean a “manner of life” while “conversation” could mean “the action of consorting or dealing
with others; living together; commerce, intercourse, society, intimacy” (OED). Gulliver’s
conversations might refer to nonverbal communication with his horses such as the “whistle” that
he has already mentioned (190). It also suggests that he is speaking about living in close contact
with his horses, spending time with them. But does four hours a day necessarily indicate
unreasoned mania? Have we been reading Gulliver too restrictively with an anthropocentric
predisposition to think of conversation solely in terms of verbal exchange? Perhaps the critical
conundrum is based on an erroneous assumption that Gulliver claims his horses speak English
instead of a language of their own as they did in Houyhnhnm-land.
Gulliver intrudes on his own narration alluding to the present stating: “By conversing
with the Houyhnhnms, and looking upon them with delight, I fell to imitate their gate [sic] and
gesture, which is now grown into a habit, and my friends tell me in a blunt way, that I trot like a

50

horse (235). Sena notes that this is the final “significant gesture” of the novel, indicating that
Gulliver has “confused form with substance and wishes to be literally like a horse” (165). Sena’s
is a soft school reading; Gulliver is the butt of Swift’s joke, for he fails to realize that
Houyhnhnm rationality is far from ideal. “Gate” can mean “a way, manner, or method of doing
or behaving, a peculiar habit” and not necessarily a walking style (OED). The word “trot” can be
“applied to a similar gait in a man [to a horse] (or other biped), between a walk and a run”
because all feet are briefly and simultaneously off the ground (OED). Since at least 1416, “trot”
was used to refer to humans who moved quickly as in this example from 1704: “If you’d have
me trot it to the East Indies, … ‘tis no sooner said than done” (OED). I sense that Gulliver’s
friends, like Swift, are milking the metaphor, horsing around.
Swift’s exploration of interspecific communication presents the reader with a
representation of the use of the kinesthetic imagination in our relationship with animals that may
have a basis in lived experience. Gulliver’s animal movement is suggestive of contemporary
zoosemiotic theories of human and horse communication, namely the “symbolic interactionist”
theory, which “create[s] a model of the self that allows animals’ subjective presence to become
visible through interaction” (Brandt 302). According to this theory, a horse trainer or rider
communicates through subtle changes in his or her body movement and can read the horse
through positioning of the horse’s body such as the ears (Brandt 306). In other words, “the body
can be a site for symbolic interaction,” which creates “kinesthetic empathy” (Brandt 304). This
theory of human-horse communication rings distinctly with the eighteenth-century definition of
“converse” as the “interchange of thoughts other than by speech” (OED). After he finally admits
his Yahoo identity, Gulliver indicates that he has learned to read the animal in himself, which
opens his imagination into such “kinesthetic empathy” with his horses when he returns to
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England (Brandt 304). Gulliver’s empathy is allegorized as movement—as if he has imagined,
like a shaman or animal trainer, his way into the animal’s mind by imitating the semiosis of a
horse’s motions.
Gulliver might still uphold the “accomplished Houyhnhnms” as exemplars of reason, but
like any student, he can’t learn everything at once, and Swift did not have a negative view of
reason itself (247). Despite their faults, the Houyhnhnms are nevertheless capable of virtues such
as “friendship and benevolence,” which gestures toward an answer to what I believe is the
implicit question of Gulliver’s Travels mentioned above: What is the reasonable use of reason?
(226). Swift’s answer, I am arguing, lies in Gulliver’s relationship with animals once he returns
home. In praxis, this translates to humane treatment: they are “strangers to bridle and saddle” and
live in “amity” with him (244). This is in direct contrast to his description of the human abuse of
horses in England to the Houyhnhnm master. After being treated with “kindness and care,”
English horses are eventually sold into “drudgery” until death and obscenely “left as carrion for
birds and dogs,” a displacement of so-called ontological inferiority onto the animal body (203).
Our current ecological predicament, to which the factory farming of Western capitalism, for
example, contributes greatly to climate change in terms of greenhouse gasses, suggests that longstanding assumptions about the human and animal relationship still obtain and to a degree that I
can only describe as irrationally suicidal. Bovine excrement produces extraordinary amounts of
methane, a greenhouse gas with graver consequences even than CO2. What Swift would have
made of this, I can only imagine. Thus, the questions that Gulliver’s Travels raises are perhaps
more relevant than ever as we approach the 300th anniversary of its publication.
Gulliver says he plans to “apply” what he has learned of Houyhnhnm “virtue” to teach
his family and “to behold my figure often in a glass, and thus if possible habituate myself by
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time to tolerate the sight of a human creature: to lament the brutality of Houyhnhnms in my
country, but always treat their persons with respect…” (249). Gulliver takes on the responsibility
of holding the mirror to himself as a constant reminder. He views the horses as “persons” (249).
When we call an animal a “person,” writes Barbara Smuts, we do not “attribute human
characteristics to them. It has to do, instead, with recognizing that they are social subjects …
personhood connotes a way of being in relation to others” (118). In other words, Gulliver’s
approach to animals is one of relational ontology.
On a personal level, too, Swift had intimations of the implications of animal semiosis; he
cared for his horses deeply, writing about them to two very close women friends named Esther
whom he gave the nicknames Stella (Esther Johnson) and Vanessa (Esther Vanhomrigh) and
evidently spent many hours in “conversation” with them (Kelly 333-344). He seems to say since
we can’t know the workings of animal minds beyond a reasonable doubt, we should extend them
the benefit of the doubt. Isn’t this what we mean by “healthy skepticism” in the colloquial and
philosophical sense? Against the Stoics, he implies that ethics should extend to animals. This is a
reasonable use of reason and a reasonable imbrication of animals in human concerns, facilitating
the “companionship” spoken of by Montaigne (51). As for Gulliver, could we extend him also
the benefit of the doubt? Whatever his remaining faults, he no longer abides in the “insane
arrogance” with which humans repudiate animals; thus, his love of horses is the very
embodiment of sanity (Montaigne 51).
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Chapter Two

“He Worships in His Way”: Feline Kinesis and the Topos of the Writer’s Cat in Christopher
Smart’s Jubilate Agno
As surely as there is an animal body, so there is also a spiritual body.
— I Cor. 15: 44
In Frances Burney’s 1796 novel Camilla, a young beauty attempts to wrap a cat around
her neck all the while oblivious to the lacerations she is receiving from its claws. Dropping the
cat, she folds her face in cloth, mummy-like, shrieking and striking her head violently. This
scene unfolds during the Tyrold family’s propaedeutic excursion to the estate where the young
woman resides. Mr. Tyrold instructs his daughter Eugenia, crippled and severely disfigured by
smallpox, that “beauty, without mind, is more dreadful than any deformity” (310-311). It’s
unsettling, associating madness with cats. It’s also mildly evocative of Christopher Smart’s
piteous predicament as he immortalized his pet cat, Jeoffry, in Jubilate Agno while confined to
an insane asylum on the charge of improper public prayer. Unlike Burney’s beauty, however,
Smart had a beneficial relationship with his cat, and Jubilate Agno may contain the first poetic
description of pet therapy in English. “Jeoffry,” a variation of “Godfrey,” means “God’s peace”
and could not have been lost on a poet of such semantic sensitivity as Smart whose own
cognomen was “Kit.”
Burney was personally acquainted with Smart, writing about him with humor and
compassion in her diary ca. 1768-1769, about ten years before his death in debtor’s prison: “Mr.
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Smart the poet was here yesterday … He is extremely grave, and has still great wildness in his
manner, looks, and voice… I felt the utmost pity and concern for him” (ED 29). A year later, she
writes, “Mr. Smart presented me this morning with a rose. ‘It was given me,’ said he, ‘by a fair
lady—though not as fair as you!’ I always admired poetical license!” (ED 60). Did she have him
in mind while writing Camilla? Although it is very unlikely that she would have read Jubilate
Agno—it was not published until 1939—she could have known of Jeoffry’s existence. The
evidence strongly suggests that her father and mutual friends such as Samuel Johnson, who was
very fond of his own cat Hodge, visited Smart while he was confined, and Smart remembers him
in the poem, praying, “God be gracious to Samuel Johnson” (C 74).22
A direct connection between Smart and Camilla is all highly speculative, of course, but
there is a link between the Burney and Smart in terms of their representations of animals. In their
writing, both Smart and Burney self-represent as vulnerable animals, compelled by situational
similarity to both identify with and establish communication with their pets. I open with the
subject of Smart’s madness because it is as inseparable from his critical history as Swift’s. The
two shared more than a charge of insanity, however. Both were Anglican, had a gift for writing
in the satiric mode, and displayed similar sensibilities towards animals. Smart admired Swift,
implying in Jubilate Agno that the great satirist’s writing is authentic and bears the stamp of
divine approval, saying, “bless the Lord Jesus for the memory of … Swift / For all good words
are from God and all else is cant” (B 84).
In chapter one, I positioned Gulliver’s Travels in relation to the Montaignian-Cartesian
controversy. I claimed that Swift’s exploration of the human animal as a creature of semiosis
engaged in embodied communication with other animals, derived from Montaigne’s An Apology
for Raymond Sebond, challenges Enlightenment assumptions of language-based human
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superiority, arguing that Gulliver’s equiphilia can be understood allegorically as an avowal of
and subsequent sympathetic identification with the animal. In broad strokes, this chapter draws a
parallel between Smart and Swift in terms of their self-positioning within eighteenth-century
debates concerning animals, reason, and language, and their strategic reinvestment in older
literary forms and sources to recoup a mythopoeic interpretation of the natural world in an age of
scientific discourse. While Swift deploys allegory and fable, Smart, in his effort to demonstrate
that “nothing is so real as that which is spiritual,” emulates the antiphonal structure of Hebrew
poetry (B 258).23 He also borrows from commonplace books, ancient authors such as Pliny, and
the shared tradition of the medieval bestiaries. For instance, the entry for cat in the Second
Family Bestiary reads as follows:
People call this animal cat (catus), from prey (captura): some say because it seeks
(captat), that is, it observes. For it sees so keenly, that it overcomes the darkness
of night with the brightness of day. Wherefore, “cat” comes from the Greek, that
is talented. (Clark 161)
Compare the above with these lines from the Jeoffry passage:
For he keeps the Lord’s watch in the night against the adversary. / For he
counteracts the powers of darkness by his electrical skin and glaring eyes. / For he
counteracts the Devil, who is death, by brisking about the life (B 718-720, 88).
Both authors seem intent on shoring up the cat’s positive valence. The author of the bestiary cites
one possible etymology of cat related to prey, and therefore, death, but follows it with an
emphasis on the cat’s ability to overcome darkness. Jeoffry not only fights darkness, but
“counteracts” the devil conflated by Smart with death. Compare the passage above with these in
which Smart puns on the Greek preposition κατ and cat:
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For the power of some animal is predominant in every language. / For the
power and spirit of CAT is in the Greek. / For the sound of a cat is in the
most useful preposition κατ’ ευχην. / For the pleasantry of a cat at pranks
is in the language ten thousand times over. (B 625-628)
The authors connect “cat” to the Greek language etymologically. Smart says elsewhere in the
poem, “I have glorified God in Greek,” which he calls a “consecrated” language because it was
the language of the New Testament (B 6). The phrase κατ’ ευχην means “as planned.” But “κατ”
can also mean “downwards.” (83). Karina Williamson notes that Smart is punning on metrical
feet when he writes, “For the Greek is thrown from heaven and falls upon its feet” (83, B 632).
However, Smart was probably also referring to “downwards.” His wording evokes the thunder
bolt thrown down by Zeus, which he cleverly associates with the lightning speed with which a
falling cat will right itself and land on its feet. This is supported by several lines in proximity that
conflate Greek with cats, including the passage quoted above. For instance, the line “For the
sleekness of a Cat is in his αγλαιηφι,” which Williamson notes means “splendour” or “beauty”
directly precedes it (B 631, PW 1, 83).
Like Swift, Smart is working within the tradition of natural theology, particularly
Montaigne’s brand of Christianized classical skepticism. Both authors portray animals through
kinesthetic imagery. Animal kinesis, according to Montaigne, is evidence of reason and
tantamount to a type of language (18). If animals have their own language, the argument goes,
then humankind is not exceptional in terms of intelligence and reason. Smart’s 1754 An Index to
Mankind, published six years before he commenced Jubilate Agno, features a conclusion
entitled, “An abstract of curious and excellent Thoughts in Seigneur de Montaigne’s Essays.”
Although none of the included quotations mentions animals, Smart includes this from An
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Apology for Raymond Sebond: “Human reason and discourses are like confused and barren
matter, until the grace of God puts them in form, which alone gives them shape and value” (174).
Smart’s choice suggests that he, too, was cautious regarding the possibilities of human reason,
preferring to frame it within a biblical perspective as a corrupted faculty. His skeptical bent is
evident in Jubilate Agno: “I rejoice that I attribute to God, what others vainly ascribe to feeble
man” (B 97). As a disciple of Montaigne, one of his aims is to circumscribe human pride,
especially as it manifests in relationships with animals. This is evident in his early poem, “On an
Eagle Confined in a College-Court,” in which the speaker mourns the bird’s “cruel fate,”
designating it a “wrong” (11, 33). The eagle possesses a “type of wit and sense,” says the
speaker, but it is “confin’d” and “cramp’d by the oppressors of the mind” (35-36). The bird’s
imprisonment is motivated by “scholastic Pride” (25). Smart characterizes the academic
tradition, emblematic of human reason, as arrogantly suppressing nonhuman intelligence,
imprisoning the eagle literally and figuratively. Years later, in Jubilate Agno, Smart would
mourn his own unjust incarceration.
Broadly speaking, Jubilate Agno, like Gulliver’s Travels, belongs to the literature of the
sensibility movement, itself part of a wider eighteenth-century cultural response to the
Enlightenment’s de-animation of nature, epitomized by the Cartesian beast machine and the
Latinate nomenclature of scientific taxonomy. The magnitude of the Enlightenment’s
paradigmatic shift has been articulated by Eric Miller as the “evacuation of the figurative” and
by Matthew Senior as the “extradition” of animals “from human consciousness and speech” (99,
62). Smart engages heavily with Enlightenment ideas in Jubilate Agno. For example, he
appropriates the language of taxonomy, “quadruped,” for his own purposes writing about
Jeoffry, “he is the cleanest in the use of his fore-paws of any quadruped” (B 731). Punning on
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“fore” and “four,” Smart winsomely refers to the way a cat will clean its face with its front paws,
perhaps referring also to the superb dexterity, “cleanest,” of the feline species.
Smart’s engagement with the Scientific Revolution is much more expansive than the
appropriation of Latinate taxonomy, however. Scholars have written extensively about his
explicit refusal of Newton’s materialism, but in this chapter, I wish to qualify this hermeneutic
by observing that behind Newton lies the specter of Descartes.24 In the previous chapter, I
described a specific quarrel between Descartes and Montaigne regarding animals as outlined by
Hassan Melehy. In this chapter, I introduce the “Cartesian-Newtonian conflict” identified by
Bryce Christensen (154). In doing so, I stress an over-arching argument of this dissertation—that
a viable interpretation of the literary animals of the long eighteenth-century cannot be divorced
from the historical debate involving Descartes and Montaigne. Christensen explains that in a
misappropriation leading to widespread misapprehension, writers such as Voltaire and John
Toland “stole Newton’s apple from his spiritual universe and made it a cog in their world
machine” for their own purposes (152). What is little known, and certainly wasn’t known to his
contemporaries, is that Newton attacked Descartes in his unpublished writing for his “worldmachine philosophy” and intentional “infidelity” but himself “rose to raptures of poetic
transport” based on a view of nature presided over by providence (Christensen 148-149). In
response to Descartes, Newton appended the Principia with the “General Scholium,” which
contained a brief discussion of religion. He hoped his own ideas about space, time, and motion
would support “the veracity of biblical claims” about the workings of nature (Janiak 93). He built
on Descartes’ ideas regarding space and motion while rejecting his separation of theology from
natural philosophy (Janiak 89).
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According to Moira Dearnley, Smart’s “garbled expression” of Newton’s laws in Jubilate
Agno offers internal evidence of his insanity (151). This is just one of several examples she
marshals to support a view of Smart as mentally ill. But Smart was not interested in writing
accurate scientific discourse—even the unicorn makes an appearance in Jubilate Agno (A 26).
Was he truly insane? His medical diagnosis is uncertain and fraught with conspiracy. Chris
Mounsey observes “something distinctly dubious about the lack of information surrounding the
confinement” when compared to other cases, and he identifies two possible “villains” in the
drama: an MP whom Smart had satirized in print and his own father-in-law, publisher John
Newbery, the same Newbery of the prestigious award for children’s literature (195, 200).25
Newbery, probably over money matters, launched a thinly-veiled public smear campaign shortly
before Smart was confined, and religious mania, the given justification, was a “catchall reason
for disposing of annoying relatives” at the time (Mounsey 181, 200). According to his own
description of himself as having “a greater compass both of mirth and melancholy than another,”
Smart was posthumously diagnosed with cyclothymia or what is now called bipolar disorder by
one Russell Brain [sic], twentieth-century psychiatrist (B 132, Mounsey 209).
William Force Stead, discoverer and first editor of Jubilate Agno, reinforced the insanity
myth, publishing Smart’s manuscript as Rejoice in the Lamb: A Song from Bedlam. Stead writes
that the poem, consisting of four fragmented folios labeled A-D for editorial purposes, contains
“plenty of rubbish,” “frequent intrusions of the meaningless and grotesque,” “questionable
theological statements,” and perhaps nothing but “moonshine and madness” (Bedlam 13, “Cat”
685, 681). Of this line in the Jeoffry section, “For in his morning orisons he loves the sun and the
sun loves him,” he says, “It is reasonable to say that the cat loves the sun, but what rational man
would say that the sun loves the cat?” (B 721, “Cat” 684).26 Quoting the same line, Dearnley
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dismisses Smart’s descriptions of Jeoffry as “reckless statements” (155). Such comments are
perplexing. On the one hand, Stead accedes that felines feel. On the other hand, he implies that
Smart’s deployment of prosopopoeia is irrational. He seems not to appreciate the pun on sun/son,
echoed further in “orisons,” reminiscent of John Donne in “A Hymn to God the Father.” This
suggests to me that his analysis was haunted by the notion of the poète maudit, a classification
later given Smart by Northrup Frye (Greene 329). Stead, however, when he confronted the poem,
found a manuscript in the form of a literary puzzle, and he did not have the benefit of decades of
careful scholarship to build on.
Despite critical misgivings, Stead recognized the affective power of the Jeoffry passage,
the final seventy-three lines of Fragment B’s 768, writing, “Every animal-lover will be moved by
the long tribute” (Rejoice 47). Stead was accurate; since his public debut, Jeoffry has “moved”
readers, critics, and other poets, inspiring many tender tributes such as Hunt Hawkins’ 1978 “My
Cat Jack.” For Stead, the value of Smart’s “sympathetic feeling for dumb creatures” was its
potential to rehabilitate his reputation from that of a man drunk with wine and religion to man of
“fellow-feeling” (“Cat” 681, Rejoice 47). But if earlier critics were on the lookout for internal
evidence of insanity, one wonders why none chose this gem: “For to worship naked in the rain is
the bravest thing for refreshing and purifying the body” (B 384). As this chapter will show, this
seeming throwaway holds an interpretive key when paired with this line about Jeoffry: “he
worships in his way,” to which I will return below (B 697).
In addition to discussions of insanity and Smart’s engagement with the Scientific
Revolution, the subject of communication has been a significant avenue of scholarly inquiry in
the critical history of Jubilate Agno. Rosalind Powell argues that in emulation of biblical models
such as the burning bush, Smart explores communicative “modes” besides language that “might
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reflect divinity,” creating “his own system of signs,” to “overcome the paradox of
communication in religious poetry” (“Towards” 117). Powell overlooks Jeoffry’s semiosis (the
cat is not even mentioned) as a potential “system of signs” (“Towards” 117). Harriet Guest
contends that Smart’s linguistic playfulness “reanimates the figurative elements of speech,”
arguing that Smart presents a “significant distinction between the self-expression of men and
animals… it is only man that is made in God’s image, and whose language and breath are
therefore the image of that living soul which is the breath of God” (175, 194). Clement Hawes
observes the theme of “interspecies communication” in Jubilate Agno but cautions that Smart
only “celebrates the possibility” of it, interpreting his representations “as a remarkable attempt to
reimagine bourgeois domesticity” (200). None of these critical assessments, as astute as they are,
fully account for the connection between Smart’s catalogue of Jeoffry’s behaviors and the cat’s
meaning, if they mention him at all. Except to say that Jeoffry is “surpassing in beauty,” Smart
does not describe the cat’s appearance (B 68). There is no indication of the color or length of his
coat etc. Smart focuses on Jeoffry’s maneuvers. Why write seventy-three lines listing the actions
of a cat?
Recently, Tobias Menely’s ardent work has begun to fill the gap. He argues that the
“somatically legible body” of the animal includes the idea of a “prior voice,” which is an
“address” to which the human (poet) responds as an animal advocate (6).27 Smart’s project, says
Menely, is to advocate for Jeoffry by transforming his “living being into written verse, to ‘raise’
animate expressivity into the realm of social meaning by translating it into conventional
language” (Menely 144). Menely’s argument is based on Smart’s prayer for God “to translate”
his “MAGNIFICAT into verse and represent it,” which puns on both his cat and the Christian
extraliturgical prayer the Magnificat or Song of Mary (B 43).
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I would augment Menely by drawing a few fine distinctions. I contend that Smart’s
project is to read Jeoffry’s movements and articulate their spiritual meaning. Smart is an
interpreter, not just in the sense of translating one language or form into another, but in glossing
meaning. In Jubilate Agno, he refers to reading and interpreting animals writing, “Let Joseph,
who from the abundance of his blessing may spare to him, that lacketh, praise with the
Crocodile, which is pleasant and pure, when he is interpreted, tho’ his look is of terror and
offence” (A 46). Against humankind’s misinterpretation of the crocodile as malevolent, Smart
re-interprets the crocodile as “pleasant and pure,” revising a traditional view of nature as hostile
(A 46). I would emphasize the connection between the “somatically legible body,” to use
Menely’s highly apt phrase, and the concept of reading animals in the Montaignian tradition of
natural theology (6). The animal, as a chapter in the lex naturae, is a theological advocate, and
by demonstrating its divine purpose advocates, in a sense, for itself. The poet’s task is to
illuminate this for the reader by writing criticism, if you will, of the book of creation.
Smart interprets meaning by writing a lexicon of feline kinesics. He constructs many of
the lines in the Jeoffry passage in the simplicity of the copular formation of x equals y,
describing the cat as this or that. For example, “he is the quickest to his mark” (B 723). He adds
a gloss to other lines by constructing them with an adjective clause beginning with “which” such
as “he can fetch and carry, which is patience in employment” (B 746). Within these rather
pedestrian declarative sentence structures, the reader finds embedded the rhetorical devices of
poetry such as alliteration, allusion, association, assonance, paronomasia, prosopopoeia, and
syntactical variety, making Jubilate Agno, especially the Jeoffry section, a truly unique
contribution to British literature. What I find most striking, however, is that Smart presents the
cat predominantly in terms of his actions, which are glossed in sum as forms of worship, and
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which I reproduce here for emphasis: Jeoffry “worships,” “leaps,” “rolls,” “performs,” “looks,”
“kicks,” “works,” “sharpens,” “washes,” “fleas,” “rubs,” “goes,” “meets,” “takes,” “plays,”
“keeps,” “camels,” “counteracts,” “loves,” “purrs,” “knows” and “suppresses.” In addition,
Jeoffry can “quest,” “brisk,” “set up” “fetch,” “carry,” “spraggle,” “clamber,” “tread,” “swim,”
“consider,” “jump,” “stretch,” “catch,” “toss,” “spit,” “hiss,” “learn,” “kiss,” “kill,” and “creep.”
Finally, he is figured as “serving” and “dallying” (B 697-768). This is an impressive repertoire of
forty-four verbs distributed in well over half of the passage’s seventy-three lines. It attests to the
acuity of Smart’s observational skill and poetic imagination, as well as the wonder of feline
locomotion. Of over one hundred animals mentioned in Jubilate Agno, only Jeoffry, the cat,
receives such an extended treatment.
In this chapter, I shall argue that Smart deploys what might be called the topos of the
philosopher’s, scholar’s, or poet’s cat, but which I will call the writer’s cat for broadest
application, to work out his cultural and personal purposes. Taking a cue from Montaigne who
writes that the “very movements” of animals “serve as arguments and ideas,” Smart represents
Jeoffry’s “ritual calisthenics,” which have received no critical emphasis in themselves, as an
extended argument for the spiritual significance of animal semiosis (18).28 Montaigne implies
that animals can participate in spiritual activities (13). Smart follows presenting Jeoffry’s
movements as the “way” in which the cat “worships” (B 697). At the macro-level, Jeoffry’s
spiritualized motions form a resistant reading of Newtonian mechanism and Cartesian beast
machines. Smart appropriates Newton’s concepts of motion and refigures them as a form of
feline devotion. While Guest argues that Smart’s project “reanimates the figurative elements of
speech,” I contend that Smart reanimates the Cartesian beast machine, restoring the motionless
and language-less animal of the dissecting table back to poetry where his behaviors speak a
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spiritual language (175).
At the micro-level, Smart, I posit, identifies with his pet cat in terms of situational
similarity; both are captives in the asylum and both suffer corporeal injury. Smart will selfrepresent as a vulnerable animal in solidarity with his cat. His representation seeks to
compensate for his own spiritual suppression by visualizing Jeoffry as a symbol of unfettered
religious expression. Smart’s inclusive vision imagines the animal body within the religious
body. Jeoffry’s spiritual movements, then, are an indemnification of Smart’s literal and
figurative immobility. It is Jeoffry, the writer’s cat, who advocates for Smart, atoning for his
exclusion from the human community (6).
In the section that follows, I elaborate on the topos of the writer’s cat, providing several
examples including Montaigne’s. Then, with additional ideas from Montaigne and from Smart’s
era, I briefly examine the topic of religious devotion as it relates to the capacity of animals to
engage in the practice. I do so in order to foreground my discussion of Smart’s response to
Newtonian and Cartesian concepts as they are registered in his interpretation of Jeoffry’s
movements as a form of worship. After, I investigate Smart’s more personal intimations of his
predicament as a prisoner in solidarity with Jeoffry, which I frame with a second, and to my
knowledge, overlooked utilization of the writer’s cat topos in An Apology for Raymond Sebond.
Many authors have utilized the animal encounter as a narrative strategy, but there is
something about the lithe mysteriousness of the cat that seems to elicit speculative thought.
Smart interrupts the Jeoffry passage with a self-reflexive comment on this, saying about his cat,
“he is good to think on if a man would express himself neatly” (B 755). The writer’s cat has
many precedents. For example, the fourth-century historian and biblical translator St. Jerome is
often depicted in Renaissance art accompanied by a lion. The ninth-century Irish poem, “Pangur
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Ban,” a sort of mock heroic written by a monk about a cat named Pangur Ban (white pangur
meaning white textile worker), depicts a “scholar” who analogically compares his work: thought,
to his cat’s: mice.29 And a portrait of Sir Walter Scott depicts him at his writing desk with his
beloved tabby, Hinx, nearby. In a more recent instance, American author Annie Dillard opens
her 1974 Pulitzer Prize-winning eco-philosophical novel, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, with a
meditation on her cat, a “tom,” fresh from the hunt, who paints her nightgown in bloodied paw
prints, “roses,” that soak to her skin (1). She wonders in the rhythm of poetry: “The sign on my
body could have been an emblem or stain, the keys to the kingdom or the mark of Cain. I never
knew” (2). Aye, there’s the rub. She never knew. Dillard employs the cat encounter to know
what she doesn’t know, a Montaignian move. She represents her cat as a semiotic being, writing
on her body, leaving a “sign,” a trace of itself—a use of language that is beyond human
understanding (2). This cat encounter sets the stage for and instantiates Dillard’s spirituallyinflected ruminations on nature.
Perhaps the most discussed example of the writer’s cat, however, belongs to Montaigne.
In An Apology for Raymond Sebond, he employs the topos to ask what might be the most
effective rhetorical question in Western literature—at least in terms of the human and animal
relationship. “When I play with my cat,” he conjectures, “how do I know that she is not passing
the time with me?” (17). In this cat encounter, Montaigne experiences an epistemological rupture
that destabilizes his identity as human subject and the cat’s as object, between perceiver and
perceived, precipitating a moment of uncertainty to which he responds later in the text in his
well-known summation of skepticism: “Que sçay-je?” (What do I know?) (100). This brief
aporia allows Montaigne to consider whether a cat possesses subjectivity. Yet the serious
implications of Montaigne’s question are in tension with the situation: he is at play with his cat
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and implicitly asking if he is not then the mouse. This rhetorical situation is paralleled between
Montaigne and the reader, and he speaks not with a roar, but a … meow. In this context,
Descartes’ quarrel with Montaigne becomes more accessible—the gadfly has stung while his cat
looked on. Aware of the latitude of signs, Smart compares language to “a cat at pranks,” seeming
to share the rather Derridean (and Montaignian) insight that, like a cat, language is a playful
animal, inherently symbolic, resisting certainty (B 628). Jeoffry, I submit, belongs to this longstanding tradition of writer’s felines. In fact, the figure of the cat as a writerly strategy is found
elsewhere in Jubilate Agno. More than any other single mammal, the feline makes an appearance
in the poem as “leopard” (A 9), “lion” (A 13), “pard” (A 30), “panther” (A 31), “Cat” (A 57),
“civet” (A 77), “tiger” (B 403) and arguably the “little Owl, which is the wingged [sic] Cat” (B
68).
Whereas Newton and Descartes theorized about the movements of the heavenly bodies in
terms of physics, Smart presents the movements of the feline body in terms of worship.
Montaigne broaches the topic of worship in the Apology in order to criticize human pretentions
to exceptionalism, writing, “Man claims the privilege of being unique in that, within this created
frame, he alone is able to recognize its structure and beauty; he alone is able to render thanks to
its Architect” (13). Montaigne’s use of “privilege” and “unique” encapsulate the stance of
Renaissance humanism. However, figuring God as an architect, he implies that animals, like
humans, can acknowledge their creator in gratitude, making the rather unorthodox suggestion
that animals can appreciate the aesthetic and engineering complexities of their own bodies or
“created frames” (13).
Belief that animals cannot engage in religious activity was commonplace, even topical, in
Smart’s era. Thomas Seaton (1684 –1741), clergyman and religious writer, for example, asserts
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that reason as evidenced by the faculty of speech was a prerequisite for praise, writing in the
epigraph of his hymn forty-two that “no visible creatures have reason and speech to praise God
but we” and he asks, “why is all nature dumb but we? / A base, ungrateful train” (qtd. in
Mounsey 211). Admirably, Seaton proposes to praise in their stead, but his emphasis on “reason
and speech” demonstrates the prevailing view that excludes animals from communication with
the divine (qtd. in Mounsey 211). His reasoning itself is odd, implying that animals are willfully
ungrateful even though they are created without verbal speech.30 In direct opposition, Smart will
present Jeoffry as a cat who “purrs in thankfulness” (B 726). This is important to Smart since
“the sin against the HOLY GHOST is INGRATITUDE” (B 306).
Jubilate Agno commences with an invocation for humans and animals to praise God
together: “Rejoice in God, O ye Tongues; give glory to the Lord, and the Lamb. / Nations, and
languages, and every Creature, in which is the breath of life” (A 1-2). Fragment A presents over
one hundred human and animal pairings worshipping God in a spirit of gratitude. For example,
“Let Mahol praise the Maker of Earth and Sea with the Otter, whom God has given to dive and
to burrow for his preservation,” Smart exhorts (A 48, 40). As in the case of the otter whose
defense mechanisms include diving to escape predators, Smart will refer to Jeoffry’s many cat
characteristics as God-given blessings worthy of praise. In one of his most poignant lines, for
example, he writes, “the dexterity of his defence is an instance of the love of God to him
exceedingly” (B 733). Smart’s interpretation emphasizes the function of the cat’s claws as a
defense, rather than offense, mechanism expressly given through divine compassion. The line is
highly affecting because it presents divine love as a gift that extends to all of creation, echoing
Psalm 145:10-11: “The Lord is good to all: and his tender mercies are over all his works. All thy
works shall praise thee, O Lord.” The placement of the adverb “exceedingly” at the end of the
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line reinforces the idea of God’s love as transcendent, going beyond the boundaries of the earthly
(B 733).
In Smart’s view, human language is not requisite for expressing gratitude to the creator,
only life itself. His perspective may be based on biblical Hebrew. He emulated the structure of
Hebrew poetry, so it’s plausible that he was attentive to the semantics as well. In Genesis, both
humans and animals are called nephesh, translated as “living being” or “living soul” and always
coupled with the physical sense of basar meaning “flesh” (Anderson 83). Both are given the
divine in-breathing or ruach, often translated as “spirit” (Anderson 83). According to Genesis
1:20-21 and 24, humans and animals became nephesh, or “living souls,” when God breathed his
spirit into them. Thus, the same breath of life animates both humans and animals. Smart alludes
to this in the invocation writing, “in which is the breath of life” (A 2). As Chris Mounsey has
observed, the sentiment is profound: according to Smart, only life itself is required for partaking
in worship; therefore, animals are included in spiritual activity because they too possess the
divine ruach or spirit (212).
I disagree, then, with Guest’s contention that Smart distinguishes “between the selfexpression of men and animals” because he believes that only human “language and breath” bear
“the image of that living soul which is the breath of God” (194). If that were so, why would he
invoke all “in which is the breath of life” to praise the creator (A 2)? Smart makes a comparison
in terms of function between the verbalization of the human and the vocalization of the animal.
“A man speaks HIMSELF from the crown of his head to the sole of his feet,” and a “LION roars
HIMSELF compleat from head to tail,” he proclaims (B 228-229). Both require air or the “breath
of life” passing over the vocal organs. The result is a self-conferral of subjectivity.
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Smart’s exploration of the religious communication of animals presents God and animals
as both speakers and interlocutors, suggesting the two-way sense of community inherent in the
word “communication.” For example, he presents God listening to a wolf, writing, “Let Lemuel
bless with the Wolf, which is a dog without a master, but the Lord hears his cries and feeds him
in the desert” (A 76). He interprets the wolf as a misunderstood dog, outside the human
community. It was generally acknowledged at the time, theologically speaking, that God hears
the vocalizations of animals, but not that animals could know or praise divinity. For example,
theologian and founder of Methodism, John Wesley writes, based on the Apostle Paul’s teaching
in the book of Romans, “their groans are not dispersed in idle aire, but enter into the ears of him
who made them,” but then hedges it with, “we have no ground to believe that they are, in any
degree, capable of knowing, loving, or obeying God” (qtd. in Menely 135). In contrast, Smart
presents Jeoffry as a being aware of his creator, writing, “he knows that God is his Saviour” (B
737).
Smart also makes the unorthodox claim that the creator speaks to animals as a human
would a pet. He writes that Jeoffry responds by purring “when God tells him he’s a good Cat” (B
726). Thus, both the creator and his creation engage in similar activities, listening, speaking, and
offering reciprocal praise. The sounds of Jeoffry’s purring are a type of language that has
supplicative efficacy, suggesting that animals have a communication-based relationship with
their creator that qualifies as worship.
“Worship” is the first action verb of about forty-five that describe Jeoffry’s daily
devotional. At dawn, Jeoffry “worships in his way” (B 697). The remainder of the passage
describes what his “way” entails. Several of these actions rewrite Newton’s discoveries in
physics, reassociating his laws of motion with divine laws. Smart perceived Newton as
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espousing a doctrine of crude materialism and individually responsible for the paradigmatic
cleaving of theology from epistemology fundamental to the Scientific Revolution. This is evident
in lines such as, “Newton is ignorant for if a man consult not the WORD how should he
understand the work?” (B 220). For Smart, the book of creation and the book of scripture are
interdependent, and he characterizes Newton as no less than “ignorant” for omitting scripture
from his understanding of nature (B 220). He compares his own allegiance to revealed truth to
Newton’s falsity by claiming, “Newton nevertheless is more of error than of the truth, but I am
of the WORD of GOD,” emphasizing his own belief in scripture as an epistemological basis
about the nature of the cosmos (B 195).
Newton made great contributions to theories of motion, which is of great concern to
Smart. Newton expanded on Galileo’s work to establish his three laws of motion: inertia, force,
and equal and opposite reactions. He inferred that the principles governing the movement of the
heavenly bodies would be universally applicable to earthly bodies since the same creator was
responsible for both. Smart presents Jeoffry’s movements as evidence of perpetual motion,
which was an Enlightenment debate, going back at least to the Middle Ages, and which Newton
thought hypothetically possible. Perpetual motion is the idea that unless an outside force acts on
something in motion, such as a machine, the machine would never deviate or cease from its
present motion. Many have tried and failed to construct perpetual motion machines. “[A]t the
word of command,” says Smart, Jeoffry can “spraggle upon waggle” (B 748). Williamson notes
that “spraggle” is a “dialect word meaning to ‘sprawl’ or ‘clamber,’” but provides no gloss on
“waggle” (89). To “waggle” is to “shake or wobble while in motion” and was defined in the
1706 edition of Phillips’s New World of Words as “to be always in motion” (OED). Smart
supports the idea of perpetual motion writing, “For the PERPETUAL MOTION is in all the
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works of Almighty GOD” (B 186). Smart’s belief stems from John Hutchinson, whose own
refutation of Newton entitled Moses Principia (1724) supported the idea of perpetual motion as a
divine law (Williamson PW Vol. 1, 43). According to Smart, Jeoffry’s movements are perpetual.
This idea is given an additional emphasis in Smart’s rendering of Jeoffry in the hyperbolic: the
cat responds to Smart’s command, not with motion alone, but motion (spraggle) within motion
(waggle)! Strangely, this line seems to anticipate Seth Chandler’s nineteenth-century discovery
that the earth “wobbles” several degrees on its axis over a period of six years, all of which occurs
within another wobble taking place over a year for a total seven year “wobble” cycle. The mystic
in Smart would not attribute this to mere coincidence. The greater point here, however, is that the
preponderance of Smart’s representations gives the reader the summative impression of a frisky
feline whose mode of being is expressed in constant locomotion. Jeoffry’s only “rest,” itself a
type of stative action, fittingly appears at the midpoint of the passage (B 738).
Newton also supported Keppler’s theory of the heliocentric universe. Smart appropriates
this notion for his own purposes, presenting Jeoffry as a sort of heliocentric kitty (perhaps even
attempting to redefine pagan practices of sun worship, for he tells us that Jeoffry “made a great
figure in Egypt,” alluding to the cat’s long-standing religious associations B 756) whose day
begins by acknowledging the sun, an emblem of the creator. Jeoffry’s first movement or act of
worship is enacted by “wreathing his body seven times round with elegant quickness” (B 697698). Thus, at dawn, Jeoffry “worships in his way” by “wreathing” or symbolically orbiting the
sun (B 697). The cat’s “wreathing” or circular motion evokes planetary orbit, especially when
coupled with the fact that he performs this action at sunrise, mimicking the daily revolution of
the earth. He makes seven revolutions symbolizing the days of the week. The number seven has
long been associated with divinity and is an image of completion or perfection. For instance, in
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Genesis, God rested on the seventh day after creating the universe. Smart’s use of “elegant” as an
adjective is rich with allusion. It could describe a well-written literary turn of phrase but was also
used to describe scientific theorems that have an “ingenious simplicity” (OED). Jeoffry’s simple
movements are like a scientific theorem manifesting the creator’s, not Newton’s, genius.
Jeoffry’s heliocentricity is also evident in the line that Stead and Dearnley stumbled over:
“in his morning orisons he loves the sun and the sun loves him” (B 721). Here, Smart is punning
on “sun,” presenting a cat who communicates with the divine, loving and being loved by the
“son” of God (B 721). This pun is doubled in “orisons,” meaning prayer. Jeoffry’s recognition of
the “the first glance of the glory of God in the East,” referring to the first light of dawn,
metaphorized as a look from the eyes of God and perceived as an indication of divine “glory,” is
in distinction to humans. Smart claims, “For the Glory of God is always in the East, but cannot
be seen for the cloud of the crucifixion … For due East is the way to Paradise, which man
knoweth not by reason of his fall” (B 697, 167-168). In Smart’s view, postlapsarian human
reason, on which he puns with “reason,” meaning a cause, obscures religious insight like a cloud
covering the sun. Smart implies that in his way, Jeoffry is a better “servant of the Living God
duly and daily serving him” than humankind (B 696).
Smart’s figuration of Jeoffry alludes to Newton’s theories of gravity and inertia.
“Gravity” appears twice in the Jeoffry passage alone. In characteristic punning, Smart playfully
explains that Jeoffry is a “mixture of gravity and waggery,” which he says of himself in an exact
replica of wording earlier in the poem (B 736). Newton’s theory of gravity explained the cause
of elliptical orbits and why, for example, the moon does not move away from the earth but stays
in its present trajectory. Newton also inferred that gravity is a force that operates between all
earthly bodies as well as the heavenly. Thus, Jeoffry’s “gravity” keeps him on his present
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trajectory of motion, while “waggery” or playfulness comes from “wag” in the sense of
movement as in the wagging of an animal’s tail. In Smart’s vision, affect between himself and
Jeoffry operates in a sort of friendly gravitational, that is, emotional tug of war, like the earth and
the moon. Jeoffry “can set up with gravity which is patience upon approbation” (B 745). Punning
on “gravity” meaning serious and a physical force, Smart presents Jeoffry defying earth-bound
characteristics, “for he can jump over a stick which is patience upon proof positive” (B 747).
Proof positive simply means the absolute assurance of something that exists. Jeoffry waits
patiently for Smart to produce the stick which is a proof of his master’s love. When he defies
gravity by jumping, he receives Smart’s “approbation” (B 745). In this instance, his emotional
connection to Smart compels him to the gravity, or seriousness, associated with patience, a
Christian virtue, while his jumping antics connote the pranks of a cat at play (B 736).
Newton’s law of inertia states that bodies in motion will stay in motion, or more
specifically, at their present velocity, or stay at rest unless acted on by an outside force. Smart’s
loving production of the stick, which, Jeoffry “can fetch and carry” functions causally, as an
outside compulsion, compelling Jeoffry to movement. Similarly, Smart’s “command” also spurs
Jeoffry to motion where he “can spraggle upon waggle,” as discussed above (B 748). Alluding to
the states of bodies either in stasis or in motion, Smart writes of his cat, “there is nothing sweeter
than his peace when at rest” and “there is nothing brisker than his life when in motion” (B 738739). Coupled with “nothing” Smart’s comparatives “sweeter” and “brisker,” become
superlatives, superseding cosmic examples.
Descartes had his own theories of planetary movement; however, he also commented on
the significance, or perhaps non-significance would be more accurate, of animal movement in his
reply to Montaigne. In the Discourse, he writes that “speech must not be confused with the
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natural movements that are signs of passion and can be imitated by machines as well as by
animals” (47). Descartes is arguing that body language is not a form of speech and cautioning
against the belief that animals “speak although we do not understand their language,” referring to
Montaigne and some of the “ancients” (47-48). Descartes defends the view that any use of
language by animals, such as parrots, is mere mimicry devoid of understanding.
In his “Second Meditation,” Descartes articulates his theory of radical dualism by
distinguishing between the res extensa, sometimes translated as res corporeas or corporeal
substance and the res cogitans or mental substance, translated as “thinking thing,” and often
synonymized with consciousness or the soul (par. 8). Animals, according to Descartes, do not
possess the res cogitans, and are instead solely composed of the res corporeas (par 9). In short,
animals, according to Descartes, do not have immortal souls. Smart answers the idea of the res
cogitans by describing Jeoffry as possessing a “spiritual substance” (B 762). In his mythopoeic
vision, Smart describes the phenomenon of static electricity that he experiences when petting the
cat as “God’s light” an “Electrical fire” that “is a spiritual substance which God sends from
heaven to sustain the bodies both of man and beast” (B 760- 762). Jeoffry’s electricity reinforces
what Smart says earlier about humans: “For the breath of our nostrils is an electrical spirit” (B
265). Smart here appropriates his era’s fascination with galvanism, evident in the frequent use of
the Leyden jar at eighteenth-century salon gatherings, for example. One person touching the jar
could send a wave of electrical charge through a circle of people holding hands. These types of
exhibitions thrilled the public with a taste of the era’s many scientific discoveries. In Smart’s
view, both humans and animals share the mystery of electricity, which is explained as the divine
spark or the animating principle, equalizing humans and animals by demonstrating that what
makes humans animals, or those who are animated, is divine causation.
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Smart’s use of “brisk” in association with Jeoffry not only reimagines Newton’s theories
of motion, as discussed above, but reanimates the Cartesian beast machine, reimbuing the animal
with the res cogitans. “To brisk” means “to freshen, enliven, animate, exhilarate and quicken,”
(my emphasis OED). Descartes performed his own dissections, even vivisections. His conclusion
that animals are beast machines followed viewing dead and mechanical ones, making a horror
out of logical deduction (Senior 62). Smart says of Jeoffry “there is nothing brisker than his life
when in motion,” and he “counteracts the Devil, who is death, by brisking about the life” (B 739,
720). As an adjective “brisk” means “sharp or smart in regard to movement (in a praiseworthy
sense) quick and active, lively” (OED). In Smart’s post-Cartesian moment, his use of the word
“brisk” carries significant weight, reinvigorating the beast machine with God-given animation,
the same in both human and animal as depicted in Genesis. In the first example, Jeoffry’s
animate motion is qualified once again in the superlative: “nothing brisker,” meaning that
Jeoffry’s creaturely vitality is most apparent, most lively when he is in motion, echoing
“spraggle upon waggle” (B 739, 748). In the second example, Jeoffry himself is ontologically
endowed with the power to “animate” or to “quicken.” There is the suggestion here that Smart is
referring to the way Jeoffry’s presence, accompanied by his feline hijinks, functions
therapeutically as a balm for his own spirit. Jeoffry’s movements are nothing short of an antidote
for death since he “counteracts the Devil, who is death” (B 720). In opposition to the Cartesian
view that animals are language-less automatons consisting of physical matter only, Smart’s
feline ethology represents Jeoffry, who is imbued with the divine spark, speaking a spiritual
language through kinesis. He attributes Jeoffry’s marvelous variety of movements to the “divine
spirit” which “comes about his body to sustain it in compleat cat” (B 742). Here again, in
“compleat,” is an image of perfection like the number seven. Smart’s view of animals renders
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them perfect as created and not lacking in so-called superior human attributes.
Smart spiritualizes feline kinesis throughout the entire passage. In a delightful example,
Jeoffry “leaps up to catch the musk, which is the blessing of God upon his prayer” (B 699).
Instead of a leap of Newtonian induction, this cat performs a leap of feline faith. In the most
obvious sense, “musk” may refer to the tendency of some cats to spray their scent for territorial
marking. However, musk has spiritual associations. It is known for its use in perfume and can be
used as a transitive verb meaning “to perfume.” In the bible, perfuming is analogous to
anointing; Mary, the sister of Lazarus, perfumed Christ’s feet and then wiped them with her hair.
In this sense, God would “musk” or anoint Jeoffry with perfume, which is a “blessing” (B 699).
To represent the creator anointing a cat is an extraordinary use of the imagination, demonstrating
Smart’s inclusive vision of animals within the divine portion.
Having completed his morning devotional forming his spiritual “work,” Jeoffry “begins
to consider himself” in behaviors that represent cat consciousness. (B 698, 701). This line is
foreshadowed in the opening of the passage in which Smart’s own devotional consists of his
meditation on Jeoffry: “For I will consider my Cat Jeoffry” (B 695). Thus, the cat’s worship,
which is rendered in orbital images, is itself encircled by the human’s devotional. Smart presents
the activities of his cat in terms of spiritual performance. In a type of circular Decalogue evoking
his “wreathing” motion, the cat “performs” his consideration of himself “in ten degrees” (B 702).
A degree is one three hundred and sixty-sixth of the measured angles of a circle, and like the
number seven, a circle represents completion or perfection. Smart transforms these “ten degrees”
of motion into ten laws of cat ablution, analogous to the moral cleanliness associated with the ten
commandments (B 702). For instance, Jeoffry “looks upon his fore-paws to see if they are clean”
and “secondly he kicks up behind to clear away there” (B 704). In delightful syntax, Smart refers
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to the space behind the cat with the pronoun “there,” which is positioned at the end or rear of the
poetic line and makes playful reference to the species’ remarkable preference for self-disposal of
feces (B 704). Moreover, “behind” can refer specifically to the rear of anything moving, which
certainly applies to Jeoffry (OED).
In addition to clever syntax, Smart employs anthimeria in a wedding of whimsy and
sublimity, one of the most compelling aspects of this poem because it manages to move away
from the flatness of empirical observation towards transcendent meaning. Smart writes, “he
camels his back to bear the first notion of business” (B 754). Here, Jeoffry is represented in
terms of another animal whose name, the noun “camel,” is transformed into a verb in order to
stress action and which so cleverly describes the way a cat will arch its back to stretch after a
period of rest. Smart puns on the word “business” which also carries a meaning of movement.
For example, the “business” of a dog’s tail refers to its wagging, which I discuss in greater detail
below (OED).
In the seventh commandment of the feline Decalogue, Jeoffry “fleas himself, that he may
not be interrupted upon the beat” (B 709). According to William H. Bond, Smart’s use of “beat”
implies that Jeoffry “will not have to interrupt his activities” with “scratching,” a very plausible
explanation (116). I would like to add to another gloss. By 1721, “beat” could refer to the
activities of a night watchman or constable (OED). Jeoffry is figured as a spiritual watchman
who “keeps the Lord’s watch in the night against the adversary” (B 718). Here, Smart is referring
to “beat” in the sense of policing. Smart invests the human instrumental use of the cat for
protecting the home from rodents with a new meaning: he guards against the devil and prepares
himself by getting rid of his fleas so they will not distract him on his night watch. Moreover, his
night watch is when “his business more properly begins” (B 717). Earlier definitions of
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“business” included “briskness,” “motion,” “work done by an animal” (OED). Thus, Jeoffry’s
motions are a form of “business” or the spiritual work he performs overnight. The lexical
connections of a number of these words with movement demonstrate how Smart marshals his
extensive knowledge of the English language to associate the animal’s vitality with spirituality.
In the final lines of fragment B, Smart qualifies Jeoffry’s motions once again in the
superlative: “God has blessed him in the variety of his movements” and “his motions upon the
face of the earth are more than any other quadruped” (B 763, 765). In the language of taxonomy,
he presents the species of cat as the most dexterously communicative of God’s creatures. Perhaps
it’s an overstatement to say that in Jeoffry, Smart collapses the cosmic wonder of Newton’s
planetary motion into the quotidian form of a cat, but Smart’s purpose is to demonstrate just how
far from ordinary the cat really is. He aims to show the spiritual, not mechanistic, workings of all
of nature.
I have been arguing that at the macro-level, Smart’s spiritual interpretation of Jeoffry’s
maneuvers as a form of worship can be understood as pushing back against the Scientific
Revolution, mainly in terms of Newtonian theories of motion, and Cartesian views of animals.
Far from an automaton devoid of language and therefore reason, Jeoffry speaks a language of
spiritual kinesis, making the rather iconoclastic argument that animals can participate in religious
activity. I turn now to the micro-level of Smart’s more personal deployment of the writer’s cat as
a response to his religious suppression and imprisonment. I frame my analysis with Montaigne’s
redeployment of an earlier example of the writer’s cat topos, Apion’s story of Androdus and the
lion.
While Montaigne’s encounter with his cat, discussed above, is well-known to scholars of
literary animals, a second cat encounter in An Apology for Raymond Sebond is also useful for

79

illuminating Smart’s employment of the trope. In the Apology, Montaigne retells the story of
Androdus and the lion. This narrative by Apion, the first-century historian, describes a human
and lion encounter he claims to have witnessed during a day of Roman blood sport. Apion
reports that a slave named Androdus was pitted against an “unusually big” lion with a “terrifying
roar” (42). Upon recognition of his former benefactor, the lion stopped short as if “struck with
wonder” and began “to wag its tail as dogs do when fondly greeting their masters” (42).
Androdus in turn recognizes him as the injured lion he had tended while concealing himself in a
cave, attempting to escape slavery. As a result of this mutual recognition, mortal violence is
avoided. A sentimental crowd pleaser, this remarkable event is the impetus behind Androdus’
release, and he is granted permission to keep the lion as a pet. He later explains that when he was
hiding in the cave, the lion “came gently up to me and showed me its wounded paw, as though
asking for help” (43). The lion’s gesture of offering his paw, like a handshake, has
communicative efficacy and is interpreted as a form of speaking. In addition, the lion’s tail
wagging is interpreted as a self-evident sign of affect. The tale of Androdus and the lion was
revived in the Middle Ages and attributed to Aesop. Later, it was grafted onto the history of St.
Jerome, mentioned above, who was said to have removed thorns from a lion’s paw forever
befriending him. Near the end of his life, long after Jubilate Agno was written, eighteenthcentury English poet William Cowper translated Vincent Bourne’s Latin version of Apion’s
story as “Reciprocal Kindness: The Primary Law of Nature.”31 These examples of the
extralinguistic communicative abilities of animals explain the story’s attraction for Montaigne.
The political implications of Androdus and the lion, however, go far beyond the standard
fabulistic interpretation of mutual kindness, presenting a human and an animal recognizing each
other in solidarity as captive victims of Roman hegemony and utilizing interspecies
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communication as a site of resistance. The narrative implications resonate with Smart’s
predicament. It is evident that Smart viewed himself as a victim both of malicious relatives and
the eighteenth-century medical establishment, and he forged his own bond with a feline while
imprisoned. To set up this important theme, he commences fragment B with, “For I am not
without authority in my jeopardy,” meaning “captivity” (B 1, Williamson PW Vol. 1, 12).
According to the Bestiary quoted above, the word “cat” or “catus” derives from the word “prey”
or “captura” (Clark 161). Thus, the word “cat” has the sense of captive tied to it etymologically.
Throughout fragment B, Smart will represent himself as an animal subjected to both corporeal
and semiotic vulnerability and in solidarity due to situational similarity, he will identify with
Jeoffry.32 As a person of sensitive intelligence, Smart would have recognized the inherent
incongruity of the status of pets: cherished, but kept, in a sense, as domestic captives.
I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter that Smart was committed to the asylum
for committing an error of worship. He was known to enlist others to pray with him, vociferously
and spontaneously. In the poem, he explicitly refers to this ostensible reason for his
incarceration: “For I blessed God in St James’s Park till I routed all the company” (B 89). Smart
figures his predicament as a case of misreading. He registers the semiotic error of others writing,
“I am under the same accusation as my savior—for they said, he is besides himself” (B 151).
Accused of being possessed by demons and therefore of mental disturbance, Christ was misread,
that is, misunderstood, he implies. Many of Smart’s lines suggest that he felt religiously
persecuted. For instance, a more oblique allusion to Christ says, “they lay wagers touching my
life,” evoking the casting of lots for Jesus’ clothing by the Roman soldiers at the crucifixion (B
92). As a composite Androdus-Christ figure, Smart connects his own prosecutors to Roman
political power.
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Many other lines refer to familial persecution, hinting at what was most likely the real
motivation behind his incarceration. He draws a comparison between strife in the family of
European nations and his own writing, “I meditate the peace of Europe amongst family
bickerings and domestic jars” (B 7). He hints that he is a victim of jealousy saying, “I preach the
very GOSPEL of CHRIST without comment and with this weapon shall I slay envy” (B 9). He
says that “malice” has “been multitudinous” and that “there are still serpents that can speak” (B
17-18). Here, family members are figured as snakes in the Garden of Eden. He comments, “they
have separated me and my bosom, whereas the right comes by setting us together” perhaps
alluding to Newbery, his father in law, by mentioning separation from his wife, Newbery’s
daughter (B 59). In what is perhaps another reference to his family, he says, “my brethren have
dealt deceitfully as a brook” (B 74). One of the most compelling examples hints at the possible
damage to his reputation caused by incarceration: “my existimation is good even amongst the
slanderers…” (B 3, Williamson PW Vol.1, 12). As mentioned above, Newbery damaged Smart’s
public reputation and could likely be one of the “slanderers” (Mounsey 181). These lines and
others offer strong evidence that Smart was aware that his imprisonment was not truly for his
idiosyncratic religious habits but due to far more nefarious family-instigated reasons.
Smart’s semiotic vulnerability, being misread as insane, or guilty of religious enthusiasm,
often translated to corporeal vulnerability in the asylum, and he represents himself as an abused
animal. Corporal punishment, or therapy, as it was sometimes considered, was standard practice
in eighteenth-century mental institutions. He laments, “they work on me with their harping-irons,
which is a barbarous instrument, because I am more unguarded than others” (B 124). Like a
hunted whale, Smart is susceptible not only to the slings and arrows of scheming relatives, but to
the disciplinary instruments of the medical establishment. He describes himself as “unguarded,”
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meaning expressive of his inner life, his faith, his thoughts, and emotions. He puns, even in this
painful example, on the word “barbarous,” meaning barbed and uncivilized. He represents
himself as a “frog in the brambles,” unable to escape and susceptible to the intrusive puncturing
of the thorns like the barbs, evoking Christ’s crown of thorns (B 95). He speaks of being beaten,
“the officers of the peace are at variance with me and the watchman smites me with his staff” (B
90). He writes, “they pass by me in their tour, and the good Samaritan is not yet come,” perhaps
alluding to the added cruelty of being on display, like a circus animal, for aristocrats who would
visit asylums for amusement (B 63). Smart compares himself to a worm writing, “I rejoice like a
worm in the rain in him that cherishes and from him that tramples” (B 37). The lowliest of
animals, the worm is the most vulnerable to those who trod on the downtrodden. The negative
emotional associations of “rain” are counterbalanced by “rejoice,” since worms seem to
appreciate this weather phenomenon more than humans, however, and in a spirit of Christian
resignation, Smart seems willing to accept both cherishing and trampling. In a final example,
Smart prays “to be accepted as a dog without offence, which is best of all” (B 155). Like the
wolf mentioned above, Smart figures himself as a misunderstood dog. Like cats, dogs have had a
variable symbolic currency, revered as companions, reviled as symbols of immorality, and often
abused like scapegoats. This prayer for “acceptance” suggests that Smart felt he was
misunderstood and therefore rejected.
Smart’s melancholia is hinted at earlier in the poem in relation to cats. Smart describes
the purring of a cat as his “murmur” and his cry as one of “woe” (B 634-35). The description
underscores the apostle Paul’s observation that due to human error in the fall “all creation
groaneth” in “its bondage to corruption” (Romans 8:21-22). The implication is enormous:
animals are vulnerable to death because of human error. Jeoffry is not immune to injury, and
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commiserating, Smart writes, “For he is of the Lord’s poor and so indeed is he called by
benevolence perpetually—Poor Jeoffry! poor Jeoffry! the rat has bit thy throat” (B 740). Smart’s
self-representations as a whale, frog, worm, and dog, demonstrate how he identifies with the
susceptibility of Jeoffry the cat. The presence of rats suggests a perilously unhealthy living
situation in which humans and animals engage in mortal struggle. While rats would have been
endemic to such places as the asylum, their agency presents a real danger to Jeoffry. Deploying
interspecific communication in a move of solidarity not unlike Androdus and the lion, Smart
verbally sympathizes with Jeoffry, speaking to him with compassion. And when the cat’s health
improves, Smart gives God the credit saying, “I bless the name of the Lord Jesus that Jeoffry is
better” (B 741). A resuscitative antidote to the power of death and an emblem of religious
expression that substitutes for Smart’s religious oppression and physical restriction, Jeoffry’s
feline kinetics are freighted with a rich symbolic currency. Smart’s portrait of his cat interprets
feline movement as a type of language that can communicate with both his master and the
divine. Like Smart, the “worm in the rain,” who says, “to worship naked in the rain is the bravest
thing for refreshing and purifying the body,” Jeoffry, too, “worships in his way” (B 384, 697).
Hence, Smart draws a comparison between his unorthodox mode of religious expression and the
actions of the cat. Both are imbued with spiritual significance.
Cats are apposite as writer’s muses for many reasons such as their playful
mysteriousness. According to Bruce Boehrer, however, more than any other animal, cats have
been subject to “literal and symbolic violence during the course of their history with human
beings” (271). In some places in Britain during Smart’s lifetime, cats were still being burned
alive in religious rituals or added as sound effects in burning effigies. Perhaps this is another
incentive behind Smart’s intent to shore up the symbolic valence of the cat in positive spiritual
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terms rather than, say, as a witch’s familiar or demon.
The topos of the writer’s cat is still deployed and rhetorically powerful. It functions
through paradox, aiding the writer to know what he doesn’t know. Evoking Smart’s statement,
“he is good to think on if a man would express himself neatly” (B 755), Jacques Derrida
observes, “thinking about the animal, if there is such a thing, derives from poetry” meaning, I
think, that only the language of poetry can say what can’t be said about an animal’s life (7). In
the process, this paradoxical function of poetry can articulate aspects about human life, about the
human spirit, that neither philosophy nor science can. Derrida describes an uncanny encounter
with his own cat in his lectures first published in 2006 as L’animal que donc je suis, or The
Animal That Therefore I Am, the title of which is an allusion to Descartes’ rationalist proposition
“Je pense donc Je suis” (I think therefore I am). Naked in his bathroom, Derrida experiences a
moment of “absolute alterity” as he suddenly realizes that his body is under his cat’s gaze (11).
His experience of the “seeing animal,” which according to him, Western philosophy has never
accounted for, functions as a springboard for speculation, leading to his insight that “animal” is
an umbrella signifier, “an appellation that men have instituted, a name they have given
themselves the right and the authority to give to the living other,” and under which humans
categorize “an irreducible living multiplicity of mortals” (14, 23, 41). The last two centuries of
unprecedented industrialized exploitation of animals in the West is, according to Derrida, a
symptom of this semantic disease (26). With this insight, the animal, Derrida suggests, like the
human, is a creature subject not only to corporeal but to semiotic vulnerability.
Derrida describes Montaigne’s An Apology for Raymond Sebond as “one of the greatest
pre- or anti-Cartesian texts on the animal that exists” (6). He insists, though, that his cat is no
trope, not Montaigne’s, and not to be read allegorically as a mere rhetorical device. His cat “does
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not appear here to represent, like an ambassador, the immense symbolic responsibility with
which our culture has always charged the feline race” (9). By insisting on his “real cat,” Derrida
acknowledges what he calls its “unsubstitutable singularity” (9). His cat, he affirms, is
“irreplaceable” (9). “Nothing can ever rob me of the certainty that what we have here is an
existence that refuses to be conceptualized,” he says (9).
Paradoxically, though, Derrida arrives at “certainty,” the very problem of the Cartesian
cogito (9). But Derrida, I think, is fighting fire with fire, and it’s not a matter of playful signifiers
or punning around, but of life and death. He writes, “[n]o one can deny the suffering, fear, or
panic, the terror or fright that can seize animals and that we humans can witness” (28). Yet,
Derrida understands that as he speaks about his cat, he is translating it into language,
representing it, and that he can’t fully escape figuration as a function of language just as
Christopher Smart knew when he asked God to “translate his MAGNIFICAT” in one of his most
unorthodox puns straddling the line between sacred and profane (B 43). Nevertheless, Derrida is
asking the West an implicit rhetorical question: If you had to, which “certainty” would you
choose: “irreplaceable living being” or “beast-machine”; “What do I know?” or “I think
therefore I am”?
Derrida’s phrase “unsubstitutable singularity” is highly felicitous for describing Smart’s
portrait of Jeoffry. The preponderance of evidence indicates that Jeoffry was a “real cat,” as real
as Derrida’s. As a “real cat,” sharing Christopher Smart’s space in Potter’s asylum, Bethnal
Green, East End, London, England, AD 1759, Jeoffry embodies such an “unsubstitutable
singularity,” historically, corporeally, ontologically (Derrida 9). And this Derridean insight
speaks to the incredible pathos of the Jeoffry passage. Behind the levity of Jeoffry, lies the
gravity of the human condition, which is, ultimately, the animal condition. The reader soon
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recognizes the similar situation of the poet and his cat, caged animals suffering injury.
However, Jeoffry’s liberty of movement, even within his restricted environment,
functions as an emblem of spiritual freedom, and Smart’s ability to find solace in the cat despite
the bleakness of his situation is compelling. Notwithstanding his imprisonment, Smart did have
the privilege of the pen, and his figuration of Jeoffry’s dynamism educes the motion in emotion.
The reader is “moved,” as Stead so long ago predicted, by Jeoffry’s moves (Rejoice 47). Jeoffry
is poetry—in motion (B 740).
There are those who argue that figuration of animals does them a disservice because it’s
not real.33 But all language is inherently symbolic, and to say that meaning is deferred is not to
say that meaning is impossible. What Smart has done in Jubilate Agno is sacralize a cat’s life.
And to sacralize animal life is to do so for human life. The poem is an affirmation, insisting on
meaning. The miracle is not just that the poem survived, but that it registers Smart’s sense of
faith despite his ostracization. Jeoffry kept Smart sane. Only through poetry could Smart
approach the ineffable mystery of feline kinesis; animals are such stuff as poems are made on.
The question, then, is not which one is real, but which one is ultimately more meaningful: “For
in his morning orisons he loves the sun and the sun loves him” or felis catus?
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Chapter Three

Talking the Dog: Communicating with Canine Characters in the Writing of Frances
Burney
How many ways we have of speaking to our dogs and they of replying to us!
— Michel de Montaigne

Dogs were of topical interest in eighteenth-century popular and private discourse. For
instance, Thomas Bewick, in his 1790 General History of Quadrupeds, notices the “surprising”
agentic capacity of dogs and claims that canine history is human history, attesting to the longstanding partnership of the two species. (Wyett 276). British MP and author Horace Walpole,
who is credited with inaugurating the gothic novel with The Castle of Otranto (1764), once
expressed anxiety over the protracted illness of his pet dog Rosette in a letter to Lady Ossory
dated August 13, 1773. After receiving her response, Walpole replied, “You don’t flatter me,
Madam, by being more concerned for me than for Rosette. She is still alive, but I despair of her
recovery; however, you have so little dogmanity, that I will say no more about her” (139).
Walpole’s sentimental neologism, “dogmanity,” aptly expresses an available eighteenth-century
attitude towards the canine species, splicing “dog” and “humanity” in a linguistic hybrid that
suggests humans and animals can have intersubjective affective relationships based on a sense of
benevolence, a prized virtue. The eighteenth-century “sentimental idea of the dog” was often
expressed with the less original yet poetically inflected phrase “unswerving servant” (Wyett
276). These types of dogs, such as those used for hunting and guarding, were especially valued
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for their service. Scenes of affect between humans and canines have been represented in the
literature of sensibility since its inception. The prime example, written just two years before
Walpole wrote of Rosette, is the lachrymose scene over the death of the dog named “Trusty” in
Henry Mackenzie’s 1771 seminal novel of sensibility The Man of Feeling (180-181).
Dogs were not always sentimentally represented in eighteenth-century discourse,
however. Views of the lapdog were rather polarized; either they were fawned over as pets or
vilified as symbols of luxury. Recent scholarship on the representation of dogs in eighteenthcentury British literature has focused primarily on the “misogynist trope” (Ellis 97), an
expression of eighteenth-century anxieties in which “the woman and her lapdog were common
tropes for the evils of eighteenth-century acquisitiveness” (Wyett 283-84).34 Perceived as a
“sexual rival,” the lapdog threatened entrenched patriarchal hierarchies and “embodied the
increasing tensions between categories such as nationality, race, class, gender—indeed even
species (Wyett 286, 290). In sum, the lapdog carried “subversive symbolic potential” against
patriarchy and could be a “disturbing transgressor” of entrenched hierarchy (Wyett 281).35
Jodi Wyett argues that Burney’s lapdogs symbolize “folly,” “vanity,” and “the immoral
consequences of valuing a relationship with a dog over human connections” (291). For example,
in The Wanderer (1814), the snobbish aristocrat Mrs. Ireton transforms her lapdog Bijou into a
vicious little toady who terrorizes her nephew, her black male child slave, and her hired female
companion, the novel’s heroine, Juliet. In this case, the lapdog is raised in social status above
other humans to the “level of its mistress” (Wyett 293).
Burney’s representations of dogs, however, are far from monovalent even within the
same novel, and Wyett, focusing on the lapdog, overlooks Burney’s representations of the loyal
service dog. Other scholars have commented on Frances Burney’s animal representations. For
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example, Barbara Seeber argues that they function as a feminist critique of patriarchy, observing
that her “novels … repeatedly make parallels between the fate of women and animals,”
specifically in terms of “entrapment” (101,100). Yet, Seeber glosses over Burney’s canine
representations in her 1782 novel Cecilia, simply noting that the dog is a source of comfort for
the heroine, and about Burney’s male characters, she claims, “sensibility does not bring with it
kindness to animals” (Seeber 106, 109 ). Patricia Meyer Spacks views Burney’s representation of
dogs as mere comic plot devices necessary for the external revelation of interior thoughts (99100). Finally, Julia Epstein, in her analysis of Burney’s diary description of a near drowning
incident in which she was accompanied by her husband’s dog, Diane, observes dramatic tension
between Burney’s self-representation as a heroine who overcomes peril through her own
presence of mind and the trope of the damsel in distress (37-38). Epstein subtly implies that the
diary account may be an overdramatization since it closely mirrors Burney’s previous fictional
representations, and she overlooks the dog’s crucial role in the heroine’s survival (34-35).
This chapter will suggest that instances of interspecific communication in Burney, like
those of Swift and Smart, may be understood in the context of the sensibility movement’s debt to
Michel de Montaigne, which in Burney’s historical moment—the last quarter of the eighteenth
century—was at its height. Writers of sensibility reacted to Descartes’ assertion against
Montaigne that humans are categorically superior to animals and ontologically separate based on
the human endowment of reason as evidenced in the use of verbal language (Menely 9).
Developing a “novel conceptualization of the significance of vocal and bodily expressivity, the
prelinguistic semiosis humans share with other animals,” they were concerned with
“communication” in what Tobias Menely calls a “semiology of creaturely affect and address”
(Menely 21, 3, 20). In their view, humans were defined as fellow creatures who respond to the
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voice of the animal based on an “ontological equivalence” predicated on “a shared susceptibility
to injury” (Menely 10, 15). To summarize, the philosophy of sensibility might be
understood as an attempt to suture the mind/body split of Cartesian dualism.
Sarah Ahmed’s nuanced discussion of affect, an essential concept of the sensibility
movement as discussed by Menely above, is useful here for illuminating the episodes of
embodied communication discussed below. Rather than a cognitive state that can be separately
located somewhere in the mind, she describes affect as an extralinguistic phenomenon which
carries “the messiness of the experiential” and operates by “the unfolding of bodies into worlds”
through “the drama of contingency, how we are touched by what comes near” (33). Burney’s
heroines and heroes are affected by the canines who share their lives in extraordinary ways.
In the previous chapter, I argued that Christopher Smart’s representations both of self
and cat demonstrate his awareness of their mutual corporeal and semiotic vulnerability as
captives in an asylum. Smart’s presentation seeks to compensate for his own religious
suppression by visualizing his cat as a semiotic being whose movements have spiritual
significance. This animal representation also functions as part of a broader cultural critique of the
Scientific Revolution. Jeoffry’s spiritual kinesis challenges mechanistic views of animals and
serves as a reading lesson in the book of nature, emphasizing the divine inspiration common to
both humans and animals. Both authors discussed in the first two chapters of this dissertation,
Swift and Smart, build on Montaigne’s empirical observation that when it comes to animals,
“from similar effects we should conclude that there are similar faculties” (25).
In this chapter, I argue that Burney, empowering her female characters, challenges the
misogynist lapdog trope by appropriating the “unswerving servant” dog normatively associated
with men and aligning it with women (Wyett 276). Her heroines’ intersubjective relationships
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with canines comment on the intersection of shared oppressions based on gender and species
while interrogating long-standing cultural assumptions about animals, language, and reason.
Burney not only aligns feminine virtue with the capacity for sympathy for animals, a cultural
standard of the time, but the reverse, making the very Montaignian suggestion that animals are
endowed with the capacity for sympathy towards human beings. She explores the animal
recognition of human signs as well as the human recognition of animal signs. Thus, she
underscores the agency of dogs, creating canine characters who are semiotically empowered with
a profound ability to impinge on human outcomes. Her representation of canines as interlocutors
of human speech and speakers of embodied language renders them active participants in the
discourse of sensibility. Her unique positioning of both human readers and canine characters as
the intended recipients of the heroine’s discourse imaginatively deploys narrative to equalize
human and animal, one within and one without the fictional world, offering intimations of the
way fiction, or representation, can construct bridges over perceived ontological and social gaps.
Her work thereby resists views of animals as language-less automatons, and her representations
of interspecific interactions expand the already broad scope of human character in her novels,
offering a model of positively charged human and animal relationships based on communication.
As they did in Swift and Smart, shared forms of embodied expressivity in Burney’s work resist
the radical discontinuity between the human and animal of Cartesian dualism. Her depictions of
situational similarity between heroine and canine resonate with Smart’s sense of vulnerability
and self-identification with his cat as a mutual prisoner.
In the section that follows, I offer preliminary evidence of Burney’s posture towards
animals discovered in a diary account, and then I substantiate her familiarity with Montaigne. To
reiterate the philosophical underpinnings of my reading of human and canine encounters in
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Burney, I summarize just a few of his several exempla portraying the singularity of the human
and canine relationship in An Apology for Raymond Sebond. A second purpose is to reemphasize
my contention, raised in the Introduction to this dissertation, that eighteenth-century attitudes
towards animals represent less “changing attitudes,” as it is so prevalently argued in the extant
historiography, than reclaiming attitudes that have been available in the West, at least since
ancient times, in Greco-Roman writing.
Burney’s positive fictional representations of human and canine interaction adapt the
Montaignian tradition to rewrite the misogynistic narrative of eighteenth-century representations
of women and their pet dogs. The evidence indicates that Burney was familiar with the sensitive
skeptic. Writing to “Daddy” Samuel Crisp, a close family friend, in a letter dated April 5, 1776,
Burney conveys that she has previously sent him a selection of books and is anxious to learn of
their fate. “I would have sent Montaigne,” she writes, “but was afraid the parcel would have been
too heavy to be safe only packed in paper so they must wait till the next opportunity” (ED vol. 2,
137). Of course, Burney here refers to the logistics of shipping the physically voluminous writing
of Montaigne with other ponderous books secured only in paper. But this innocuous statement
provides unintentional commentary on the sometimes-weighty subject matter of Montaigne
found in An Apology for Raymond Sebond, for example, in which he interrogates human
presumptions of superiority over animals. Burney’s diary reference is yet another indication of
the pervasive influence of Montaigne on the early modern imagination. His Essays were widely
read and part of the standard curriculum for the educated.36
Montaigne’s writing about dogs in An Apology for Raymond Sebond is an illuminating
digest of anecdotes from the Western classical era, derived mostly from Plutarch, that
demonstrate, he claims, canine loyalty, intelligence, ethics, reason, “loving affection” and
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“greatness of spirit” (36, 45). For example, he recounts a story of the third century B.C.E. Stoic
Chrysippus, “as scornful a judge of the properties of animals as any philosopher there ever was,”
in which he was “forced to admit” that the dog he observed “reasoned” when it came to the
intersection of three crossroads and chose one over the other two. Montaigne imagines the dog’s
inner dialectic: “‘I have tracked my master as far as these crossroads; he must have gone down
one of these three paths; not this one; not that one; so, inevitably, he must have gone down this
other one’” (28). As a second example, he speaks of the actions of guide dogs for the blind. He is
“moved to wonder,” he says, because they will “choose” an uneven path over a smooth one to
keep their masters from the gutter (29). He asks, “How does it know that a path might be wide
enough for itself but not wide enough for a blind man? Could all that be grasped without thought
and reasoning?” (29). If canines have no reasoning powers whatsoever, these questions are
difficult to answer.
Thespian canines are an absolute marvel. One such dog belonged to a juggler who served
in the Marcellus theatre during the reign of Roman emperor Vespasian the elder. The dog “had to
pretend, among other things, to swallow some poison and to lie dead for a while” (29). The dog
began to “shake and tremble” before it “lay down and stiffened as though it were dead,” and after
being dragged all over the stage, the dog somehow knew “when the time was right” and “it
began to stir very gently, as though awakening from a deep sleep and raised its head, looking
from side to side in a way which made the audience thunderstruck” (29). Montaigne’s
description indicates that the dog’s understanding goes beyond that engendered simply by
training, suggesting instead a metacognitive grasp of the difference between appearance and
reality, no small feat even where humans are concerned. “What is that” Montaigne queries, “if
not the actions of a very subtle intelligence?” (31).
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He talks about dogs who appear to dream such as watchdogs who “can be found growling
in their sleep … as though they saw some stranger coming” (47). Dreams, of course, have a host
of associations that connect the human to the transcendent. The ability of a dog to dream
threatens notions of human superiority as summarized, for example, in Hamlet’s famous
monologue in which he claims, “What a piece of work is man, how noble in reason, how infinite
in faculty, in form and moving how express and admirable; in action how like an angel, in
apprehension how like a god, the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals” (2.2.327-331).
This speech articulates the early modern commonplace that humans have superior endowments,
likened to angels and gods, that place them above other animals in the hierarchy of being with
the “man” at the earthly apex.
Montaigne attributes a sense of ethics to dogs, particularly justice. In a story that
anticipates the work of contemporary law enforcement K9 units, Montaigne says, “Our history
books tell of certain dogs which vigorously reacted to the murders of their masters” like
witnesses at a police lineup (41). He writes, “If justice consists in rendering everyone his due,
then animals who serve, love and protect those that treat them well and who attack strangers and
those that do them harm show some resemblance to aspects of our own justice” (36). The
emphasis, as always throughout the extended animal argument in the Apology, is on
“resemblance” between the human and animal (36).
In the tradition of theriophilic inversion, Montaigne represents canine loyalty as superior
to the human’s: “As for faithfulness, there is no animal in the world whose treachery can
compete with Man’s” (41). Dogs are also superior in emotional endowment. The “loving
affection of dogs,” says Montaigne, “is incomparably more lively and consistent than men’s”
(36). He then relates, as proof, the heart-wrenching story of a dog named Hircanus who belonged
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to King Lisimachus, the successor of Alexander the Great. When Lisimachus died, Hircanus
went on a hunger strike and would not budge from the dead king’s bedside until the day of
cremation when he threw himself on the pyre (36).
In addition to sagacity, loyalty, justice, and affection, Montaigne argues that dogs are
capable of sympathy and speaking. These last two attributes most clearly illustrate the
connection between the preoccupations of the sensibility movement and Montaigne’s ideas.
“There are also inclinations where our affection arises not from reasoned counsel,” he argues,
“but by that random chance sometimes called sympathy. Animals are capable of it too”
(emphasis in original 36). In this statement, he emphasizes the nonrational side of human
emotion—that aspect of the human spirit which cannot be explained by logical deduction or
expressed in conventional language.
Although Aristotle recognized that both humans and animals can communicate vocally,
he denied that animals can express their emotions to humans (Menely 2, my emphasis).
Montaigne counters Aristotle and illustrates animal sympathy in terms of grief: “We often shed
tears at the loss of animals which we love; they do the same when they lose us” (43). In terms of
speaking, “Horses, dogs, cattle, sheep, birds and most other animals living among men recognize
our voices and are prepared to obey them,” writes Montaigne, arguing for the presence of
interspecific communication (32). Emphatically, he comments on the ability of humans and dogs
to communicate with each other writing, “How many ways we have of speaking to our dogs and
they of replying to us!” (23). Montaigne’s dog stories offer a brief compendium of positive
canine attributes. In her fiction, Burney capitalizes on these historical observations, updating the
highly gendered associations of these stories with men and aligning them with women to
associate the loyalty of the “unswerving servant” dog with female character.
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Burney’s personal writing indicates that she had a sympathetic mindset towards animals.
Her diary entry for August 19th, 1773, written a mere six days after Walpole’s letter concerning
his ailing dog, when she would have been about twenty-one, describes her reaction to two animal
races she witnessed while visiting Teignmouth. She finds that the donkey race, in which “sixteen
of the long-eared tribe ran extremely well,” is “diverting,” but her brief reflection on the pig race
lends additional insight into her attitude toward animals (ED vol. 1, 234). She opines: “the poor
animal had his tail cut to within the length of an inch, and then that inch was soaped” (ED vol. 1,
234). The object of the game was to force the pig to run and to challenge a man to catch it by the
tail and thereby receive it as a prize. She finds the entire spectacle, including unnecessary human
modification of the animal body for sport, “ridiculous” and “cruel” (ED vol. 1, 234). This is
especially true when this change guarantees that the object of the sport can never be
accomplished; the pig suffers in vain. She also says such games put humans into “ridiculous”
positions, perhaps as a result of economic need, which adds a second layer of gravity to the
spectacle and imbricates both lower-class humans and animals as instrumental objects of disdain.
This diary scene parallels, and is perhaps the source for, an unforgettable scene of
deliberate cruelty in her first novel Evelina (1778). For upper-class amusement, two lower-class
elderly women are tethered together and forced to run a race. Due to their advanced age and
frailty, they suffer physical injury. The narrator, Evelina, uses the same word as Burney in her
description of the pig race, “ridiculous,” i.e., objects of ridicule, to characterize the situation
(311). The gendered association of lower-class women and animals in these parallel scenes
addresses the shared oppressions of both, and ageism adds to an already troubling instance of
social inequity.
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Burney’s entire oeuvre aligns with her sympathetic disposition regarding animals in her
description of the pig race, especially her representations of dogs. In the next section of this
chapter, I offer close readings of scenes of intersubjective human and canine communication in
Cecilia, The Wanderer, and Burney’s lived experience of it as recounted in her diary. For further
illumination, I engage additional philosophical ideas both close to and far flung from Burney’s
time, such as the thinking of Scottish philosopher of sensibility David Hume, French philosopher
of sensibility Jean Jacques Rousseau, twentieth-century French philosopher and critic of Western
ontology Emmanuel Levinas, and contemporary French philosophical ethologist Dominique
Lestel.
Burney’s first alignment of the loyal servant dog with a female character occurs
in Cecilia (1782). As the novel opens, the reader meets Cecilia Beverley, an orphaned heiress,
who must learn to negotiate the complicated social mores of London; the attentions of several
suitors, some of whom are purely mercenary; the trials and tribulations of falling in love; and her
personal longing for purpose. A clause in her uncle’s will stipulates that Cecilia’s husband must
take her surname if she is to keep her inheritance. This proves doubly difficult when she falls for
Mortimer Delvile, whose father is obsessed with the patriarchal traditions of nobility
emblematized in the family name.
At the novel’s midpoint, Cecilia stays at Delvile’s ancestral castle, unaware of his
conundrum. His eventual revelation that he cannot marry her due to his family’s pride
precipitates a crisis for which there is no foreseeable resolution, and he decides that the only
possible remedy is separation, hastily departing. Heartbroken, Cecilia seeks the comfort of the
castle’s environs where she can indulge her emotions without the fear of social censure but finds
she is not alone. Delvile’s pet dog, Fidel, “now always accompanied her” and “ran by her side”
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(520). Fidel embodies the trope of the loyal service dog. The loyalty of the dog signifies both his
positive attributes and the depth of the heroine’s virtue, and he might be viewed as an eighteenthcentury version of a therapy dog. Cecilia talks to the dog, “lamenting that he had lost his master”
and touches him, “caressing her faithful favourite,” all which “soothed her own tenderness”
(Burney’s emphasis, Cecilia, 520). This deceptively simple scene is packed with significance in
terms of its representation of an intersubjective human and animal communicative encounter and
its narrative strategy. It demonstrates the signification of animal movement as language and
agency and operates within the affective register, representing shared emotional states between
human and animal based on situational similarity and communication.
One premise of the philosophy of sensibility is that the human responds to the animal
following its prior address (Menely 6). Often, this is characterized as the animal “cry,” which is a
vocalization. Prominent examples occur in both fiction and nonfiction such as Jean Jacques
Rousseau’s novel Émile (1762) and John Oswald’s The Cry of Nature or an Appeal to Mercy and
Justice on Behalf of the Persecuted Animals (1791). In Burney’s scene, Fidel has not barked,
whined, or vocalized, but I submit that in the Montaignian tradition, animal kinesis functions
here as a form of address. Montaigne, the reader will remember, asserts that the “movements” of
animals “serve as arguments and ideas,” implying that they are a form of kinesthetic
communication (18). This idea is predicated on the connection between outward action and
internal intention. Montaigne reminds his reader that we can never know for sure what the “inner
motivations” of animals are which leaves the possibility open, of course, that they don’t have
them, in a human sense, but equally so that they do (16). He makes this point to interrogate
human presumptions about animals, and to emphasize possibility, not certainty, as the bedrock of
his skeptical philosophy.
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The heroine and the dog are in similar situations, and Burney structures their affective
relationship as a shared experience of grief in their loss of Delvile. Cecilia talks to the dog,
“lamenting that he had lost his master” (Burney’s emphasis 520). And commiseration with the
dog, helps to alleviate her own suffering (520). According to the doctrine of sensibility, Cecilia’s
attribution of grief to Fidel would not be understood as anthropomorphic projection. Writing
about the emotional sophistication of animals in his 1739 Treatise on Human Nature, eighteenthcentury philosopher David Hume says, “Grief likewise is received by sympathy, and produces
almost all the same consequences, and excites that same emotion as in our species. The howlings
and lamentations of a dog produce a sensible concern in his fellows” (345). Hume, here, follows
Montaigne who observes that “Oxen, pigs and other animals can be seen rushing in to help when
one of their number is being attacked and rallying round in its defense” (44).
According to both authors, the faculty of sympathy operates identically in both humans and
animals. The vocalized expression of grief elicits sympathy in the hearer, who responds as the
intended recipient.
The second encounter between the heroine and the dog even more clearly illustrates
Burney’s contribution to the discourse of sensibility vis `a vis animals by developing the theme
of interspecies sympathy begun in the above example. In the tradition of Montaigne, Burney
suggests that animals are “capable,” to use his wording, of sympathy (36). Other writers of
sensibility were also concerned with the idea of sympathy. For Hume, sympathy, as opposed to
reason, is the measure of the human. He writes that the “most remarkable” “quality of human
nature” is “that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive communication by
their inclination and sentiments” (276). He defines “sympathy” as the “communication of
passions” and asserts, as did Montaigne, that it “takes place among animals, no less than men”
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(345). He continues: “Love in animals, has not for its only object animals of the same species,
but extends itself further, and comprehends almost every sensible and thinking being,” claiming
that animals are capable of cross-species affect (345). Moreover, this statement from Hume
approaches theriophilic inversion, subtly implying that animals are superior to humans in their
capacity for love. If sympathy is the sine qua non of the human, and animals are capable of it, the
moral implications are enormous, which Hume recognized; sensibility is the foundation of his
moral philosophy, predicated on “‘sympathetic’ knowing mediated by the affect sign” and based
on the corporeality which humans and animals share (Menely 58-59). The diametrical opposition
between Hume’s and Descartes’ view regarding the defining characteristic of the human cannot
be overstated: Descartes worshipped reason while Hume privileged sympathy.
Rousseau argued, based on their semiotic displays, that animals were capable of “pity”
(62). In the Discourse, Rousseau wrote that it was pity that “carries us without reflection to the
assistance of those we see suffer” and it is a “virtue so natural that even the beasts sometimes
show evident signs of it” (64, 62). He writes, “the mournful lowing of cattle entering a
slaughterhouse voices the impression they receive of the horrible spectacle that strikes them,”
implying that the cattle are lowing not in fear for their own lives but in sympathy at the sight of
their fellows suffering (62). Rousseau was interested in a political philosophy revolving around
right and responsibility and was one of the first to extend the idea of natural rights to animals. He
drew on the ideas of Étienne de Condillac, a French philosopher, who, like Montaigne, observed
a relationship between the affect sign and conventional language (Menely 71). Here, outward
affect “signs” indicate the faculty of sympathy (Rousseau 64, 62).
The second scene of interspecific communication in Cecilia takes place in the garden
summerhouse at Mrs. Charlton’s. As a practical joke, an acquaintance, the frivolous and ill-
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mannered foil of Cecilia, Lady Honoria, dognaps Fidel and sends him to Cecilia there. Cecilia
learns that Delvile is literally lovesick, and worried, she consequently becomes even more
attached to Fidel. The narrator says, “while sometimes she indulged herself in fancifully telling
him her fears, she imagined she read in his countenance the faithfullest sympathy” (my emphasis
541). Burney’s scene has overtones of natural theology, a biblical doctrine in both the old and
new testaments in which the book of nature is read to gain insights into the divine and which
Montaigne defended in the Apology. In the Introduction to this dissertation, I characterized
Raymond Sebond as positioning himself as a sort of “theological reading instructor” (9). While I
do not mean to imply that this passage has any overt religious content, it does present a human
“reading” an animal and drawing an inference about his emotional state. Burney closely aligns
reading and imagination, which can be defined as “to form an idea or notion with regard to
something not known with certainty” (OED). Thus, in this instance, imagination precludes
“certainty” and would therefore accord with skepticism. Hume argued that all formation of ideas
in the human imagination ultimately derive from empirical observation and sensory impressions
(Morris). Thus, for Hume there is no such thing as pure imagination as a faculty that has no basis
in the external world. Thus, while imagining emotional states in animals might seem
anthropomorphic or fanciful, in the philosophical sense of the discourse of sensibility, it
represents a valid inference based on external data.
The interspecific exchange is communicated through facial expression. Like language,
the human face is sometimes thought of as the defining characteristic of the species. However,
twentieth-century French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, critic of Western ontology, has
questioned this belief. In his compelling essay entitled “The Name of the Dog,” Levinas
describes his experiences in a Nazi P.O.W. camp in which he and his fellow prisoners are
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reduced to a “gang of apes” who were “beings without language” (48). One day, a stray dog
appears in the camp and starts an embodied conversation with the men through vocalization. For
a few weeks, he meets the prisoners in the morning and awaits their return in the evening
“barking in delight” (49). The men in the camp call the dog “Bobby,” conferring subjectivity
with a name (49). For the men, Bobby quickly becomes “a cherished dog” because, Levinas
says, “For him, there was no doubt that we were men” (48-49). The daily appearance and
barking of the dog restore human identity to the prisoners and giving the dog a name is to accept
him within the human community, celebrating this profoundly meaningful interspecific
relationship. In contrast to a human having “dogmanity,” Bobby, the dog, demonstrates humanity
(Walpole 139).
In an interview published with “The Name of the Dog,” Levinas speaks about the
significance of the face in delineating ontological identity, expressing doubt over the notion that
human difference can be distinguished solely by the face saying, “One cannot entirely refuse the
face of an animal. It is via the face that one understands, for example, a dog” (49). For Levinas,
the face is the marker of individual subjectivity and the conduit through which the human
“understands” the animal. That is to say, the face, even a dog’s face, can communicate in ways
inaccessible to conventional language, and which a human being can comprehend. The ethical,
he says, “extends to all living beings” because humans know what suffering is (50). For Levinas,
ethics start by a human putting another ahead of its own life, which he says is “unreasonable,”
and he concludes the interview saying that his whole philosophy might be summarized as
follows, “Man is an unreasonable animal” (50). In other words, biological survival at all costs
would seem to be “reasonable,” but the human has this “unreasonable” sense of ethics (50).
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Burney portrays Fidel as a semiotic being, capable of expressing emotion via movement
of the facial muscles, which is also the method by which the human face expresses feeling. By
reading the communication of emotion in the dog’s face, Cecilia positions Fidel as a participant
in the discourse of sensibility. Even though the dog may not understand the semantics of her
verbal lament, although dogs can learn to attach actions to specific verbal commands, he clearly
understands its emotional import. The scene demonstrates how the human and animal co-create
subjectivity via semiotic exchange. In other words, in Burney’s novel of sensibility, the human
and animal relationship is structured as one of intersubjective communication and is not,
therefore, qualitatively different than interhuman relationships.
Burney’s third and final scene of human and animal communication in Cecilia expands
her representation of the human and canine relationship beyond the gendered alignment of
distressed women and animal allies, portraying a man in an affective relationship with a dog. It
includes a dense layering of meaning involving the relationship between the communication of
signs and sympathetic response. Cecilia mourns her loss of Delvile to Fidel in the summerhouse:
her sorrow found here a romantic consolation, in complaining to him of
the absence of his master … calling on him to participate in her sorrow, and
lamenting that even this little relief would soon be denied her; and that in losing
Fidel no vestige of Mortimer, but in her own breast would remain; ‘Go then,
dear Fidel,’ she cried, ‘carry back to your master all that nourishes his
remembrance! Bid him not love you the less for having some time belonged to
Cecilia; but never may his proud heart be fed with the vain glory, of knowing
how fondly for his sake she has cherished you!’ (546)
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Pat Rogers has characterized this scene as having “the air of a Schubert song” (qtd. in Doody FB
404). In recognizing the musicality of the scene, scholars may have been attuned, no pun
intended, to the etymology of semiotics. It was English philosopher John Locke who adapted
séméiotkè, meaning musical notation, to semiotics or the doctrine of signs (Sebeok 78). Indeed,
one can view this exchange between Cecilia and Fidel as a melancholy duet of signs given
emphasis in the words “complaining,” “participate,” “sorrow,” and “cried” (506). Perhaps no
scene more clearly illustrates Burney’s inclusion of animals as semiotic participants in human
lives. Cecilia issues an invitation to the dog to “participate” in her personal sadness (506). In
short, Cecilia asks the dog for his sympathy, now that she has read the signs of that faculty in the
expressivity of his face: “she imagined she read in his countenance the faithfullest sympathy”
(541).
Cecilia finds “romantic consolation” in the expression of the dog’s face (546).
“Romantic” can mean impractically imaginative, which would normally have pejorative
connotations. But “romantic” functions here in the person of sensibility as a way into the
language of the other. The OED gives “sentimental” as a synonym for “romantic,” which is
related etymologically to “sensibility,” citing Burney’s Evelina as an example. As shown above,
in the philosophical sense, the use of the imagination does not represent silliness, but a response
of the mind to the perception of external evidence. In other words, imagination mediates between
the senses and the mind, phenomena and noumena, and the evidence here is canine facial
expressivity. In broad strokes, this portrayal repudiates the Cartesian denial of language to
animals by imagining a broader definition of language or communication itself as the sending
and receiving of signs.
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This exchange in which the human addresses the dog evokes Montaigne’s exclamatory
statement, “How many ways we have of speaking to our dogs and they of replying to us!” (23).
This will be even more apparent in The Wanderer, where gesture as an extralinguistic mode of
communication is primary, but here Cecilia is speaking to Fidel, “‘Go then, dear Fidel,’ she
cried,” in direct address using the vocative case (546). In terms of grammar, “the vocative posits
a relationship between two subjects … to constitute encounters with the world as relations
between subjects” (Culler 156). Culler is speaking about the function of apostrophe in poetry,
which often addresses an inanimate object, but the vocative is also used between persons. When
humans speak to animals in the vocative, they are creating subjects linguistically. By this
definition, the vocative is related to “linguistic instrumental action,” by which the “agent
expresses her intention linguistically, and where doing so is also a means of achieving her goal”
(Gustafsson 232). Through her verbal address, Cecilia puts Fidel in the subject position rather
than his subject status being an apriori given. The implication is that there is not a radical
difference between a human speaking to a human and a human speaking to an animal; in both
cases, it establishes a relationship between two subjects, meaning persons. This would suggest,
according to the discourse of sensibility in which the animal voice addresses the human, that the
communicative modes of animals create human subjectivity itself. In other words, the preverbal
vocalizations that humans and animals share precede human verbal language. Rousseau presents
this idea in Émile wherein the character is awakened to his own humanity when he witnesses the
cries of a suffering animal (183-184). In the Apology, Montaigne claims that humans have a
proclivity for rejecting animal “companionship” due to “insane arrogance” (51). But Cecilia’s
address to Fidel signifies her acceptance, rather than repudiation, of the dog into the human
discourse community. In short, it signifies her “dogmanity” (Walpole 139).
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Burney expands her representation of the human and canine relationship in this scene
beyond the gendered alignment of distressed women and animal allies by portraying a male
character in an affective relationship with a dog. Like Levinas’ Bobby, Fidel signifies Delvile’s
presence with a “loud barking” (546). Having overheard the entire previous exchange between
Cecilia and the dog, he is temporarily “speechless,” which puts him in the both the normative
female and animal place as voiceless, and the scene positions the woman and dog as speaking
subjects first: the human via language and the dog via vocalization (547). The man’s subject
status follows both the woman and animal in Burney’s rewrite, implying that it is not inherently
gendered or self-conferred, but given through communicative interaction with other beings.
Cecilia, in turn, is so surprised, she, too, is then rendered “mute” (547). As the situation has
evolved, it is finally only Fidel who is capable of vocalization, and the humans have no language
but that of the body, which responds by going
silent.
Delvile and Fidel proceed to engage in an emotionally charged kinesthetic exchange,
interlinking affect for animals with a masculinely gendered sensibility. Fidel in “rapturous joy”
displays his emotional state communicating with Delvile, by “jump[ing] up to him” and
“lick[ing] his hands,” and the hero “return[s] his caresses” (547). Delvile deploys both verbal and
nonverbal communication saying, “Yes, dear Fidel, you have a claim indeed to my attention, and
with the fondest gratitude will I cherish you ever!” (Burney’s italics 547). Out of the mouth of
Delvile, Burney has articulated a foundational premise of the philosophy of sensibility as
articulated by Tobias Menely in the title of his study The Animal Claim: Sensibility and
Creaturely Address (my emphasis).37 Menely draws on Humphrey Primatt’s 1776 Dissertation
on the Duty of Mercy and the Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals in which Primatt writes, animals
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have a “right to happiness” based on their vocalizations (qtd. in Menely 10). Primatt compares
animal signification to a foreign language, in which an animal’s “cries and groans, in case of
violent impressions upon his body, though he cannot utter his complaints by speech or human
voice, are as strong indications to us of his sensibility of pain, as the cries and groans of a human
being, whose language we do not understand” (emphasis in original, qtd. in Menely 10).
Primatt’s discussion is significant when juxtaposed against Descartes’ notion that animals feel
pain but at the same time can’t perceive or experience it consciously as humans do. In other
words, animals don’t know that they are experiencing pain, they only feel it. This assertion is
nothing short of a Gordian knot. How can a sentient creature feel pain but not experience pain? It
baffles the human mind to try to distinguish the difference, to understand how this is possible or
what purpose it serves if the animal does not have some level of consciousness.
Burney and Levinas use the word “cherish.” For both authors, this word could mean to
“cling to feeling,” but it also has a historical meaning. In Burney’s time, according to the OED,
“cherish” also referred to the expression of feeling through physical gestures such as caress.
Touching the dog and speaking to him, Delvile deploys both nonverbal and verbal
communication in his interaction with Fidel. To be human, then, in both the examples from
Burney and Levinas, is inextricably bound up in human and animal interaction. As opposed to an
ontological demarcation between human and animal predicated on the presence or absence of
verbal language, nonverbal language works to establish ontological continuity.
In Burney’s fiction, animal semiosis not only communicates affect and co-creates
subjectivity, but it functions as a form of agency that can impinge on human outcomes. Up until
now, Delvile has misinterpreted Cecilia’s behavior, speaking to the potentially damaging effects
of eighteenth-century standards of female propriety, which nearly forbade communication of
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authentic thought or feeling. Delvile exclaims, “I see what I took for indifference, was dignity; I
perceive what I imagined the most rigid insensibility, was nobleness, was propriety, was true
greatness of mind” (549). Cecilia’s sympathetic communication with the dog demonstrates
another facet of her virtue and is just as meaningful in revealing her worth to Delvile as her
expression of feelings for Delvile himself. In this case, Delvile has mis-imagined Cecilia’s signs,
but this is not due to his defect but because Cecilia has not had the freedom to communicate
authentically.
Positioning the animal as a human advocate, rather than the reverse, is another of
Burney’s unique contributions to the discourse of sensibility. Many eighteenth-century literary
representations of animals are structured in such a way that the human is understood as speaking
for the animal by imagining the animal’s perspective. For example, Anna Laetitia Barbauld’s
poem “The Mouse’s Petition” presents the reader with a monologue spoken by a mouse who is to
be the object of a scientific experiment. The function of the poem is to speak for the vulnerable
creature who has no verbal language with which to self-advocate. However, Burney
imaginatively reverses this situation and thereby not only expands, but in a sense, redefines this
aspect of the discourse of sensibility by positioning the animal as a human advocate. In the scene
quoted above, she enlists Fidel as an envoy who will speak to Delvile for her. Burney repeats this
redefinition: After being highly embarrassed by her “unguarded folly” in the revelation of her
feelings for Delvile, Cecilia tries to break away (548). It is Delvile who now entreats Fidel, using
the vocative, to act as an advocate and to speak for him: “‘Come, dear Fidel!’ cried he… “come
and plead for your master! Come and ask in his name who now has a proud heart, whose pride
now is invincible!” (Burney’s emphasis 548). These scenes are extraordinary since the human
outcome, in which the hero and heroine are reconciled, is predicated on the communicative
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agency of the dog, which has been rendered in his extralinguistic capacity to signify. Here, Fidel
is a conduit through which the characters speak to each other. More than a mere plot device,
Burney gives Fidel is representation as a character, who engages in dialogue through
vocalization, movement, shared situation, and emotion with other characters, impugning
language-based claims of human exceptionalism.
Burney’s depictions of the canine character Fidel in Cecilia hold a trove of meanings that
nuance the discourse of sensibility. Her work demonstrates how animals in the eighteenthcentury imagination can be participants in the discourse of sensibility as speakers of embodied
language in intersubjective encounters. Such instances of animal semiosis are an additional
extralinguistic “mode of communication,” such as crying, blushing, or gesturing, represented by
the writers of sensibility in their effort to emphasize the “faculty of feeling” as an antidote to
rationalism (Todd 5, Tague 182). In The Wanderer, Burney will rework these relatively short
scenes, giving human and canine communication an extended treatment that relies heavily on
gesture, evoking Gulliver’s Travels.
Gender, class, and species oppression intersect in The Wanderer, published in 1814, and
set in the 1790s, directly preceding the French Revolution. In the Dedication, Burney states that
she cannot ignore the political ramifications of this momentous event (6). Even though she
makes no patent mention of contemporary politics, the content of the novel is politically charged.
Margaret Doody observes that Burney’s portrait of the English aristocracy’s treatment of the
poor is paralleled with the concept of tyranny (xix). In Burney’s fictional world, the upper-class
women are interpolated within the system desiring to oppress lower-class women whom “they
can patronize” or treat as proteges in order to “show off superiority” (Doody xvii). Burney’s
depictions of human and animal encounters in The Wanderer, though, work to interrogate such
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notions of hierarchy.
Juliet, the novel’s heroine, is an English aristocrat returned from France who must hide
her identity, for reasons eventually revealed to the reader, until her personal circumstances prove
less perilous (she has been blackmailed into an unconsummated marriage of convenience with a
revolutionary, who is later executed as a traitor, to save her guardian, a bishop). Devoid of
money and identity, she must rely on the kindness of strangers, who at times use her to assert
their own superiority as described above. Eventually, she tries to negotiate making a living for
herself doing a series of odd jobs such as milliner and hired companion but with little success.
Her failures are the result of the system of oppression in which affluent members of society often
create pretexts to justify withholding wage compensation.
Late in the narrative, Juliet takes drastic measures when she thinks her identity is about to
be exposed, and she literally wanders through the “New Forest” to conceal herself. In this
portion of the novel, Juliet anticipates Jane Eyre, who flees Rochester’s deception to wander. She
is a complete outcast without even a society of strangers. This female wanderer is noteworthy,
for she complicates the Romantic trope at its very inception by demonstrating how a vulnerable
female exposes the gendered assumptions built into the conceit itself. Juliet is a premonition of
Frankenstein’s creature, friendless, like an animal in the woods (102). However, another animal
will use communicative agency to shore up, like Bobby in the prison camp, Juliet’s humanity,
and ultimately, their meeting will have lasting consequences for the heroine’s outcome.
As she walks, Juliet’s thoughts turn to the natural variety of animals:
The remark and attention of a few days, sufficed to shew her, not only as much
difference in the interior nature of the four-footed and of the plumaged race, as
there is in their hides or their feather; but nearly, or perhaps, quite as much
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diversity, in their dispositions, as in those of their haughty human masters….she
found that though the same happy instinct guided them all alike to selfpreservation, the degrees of skill…were infinite; yet not more striking than the
variety of their humours; kind, complying, generous; or fierce, selfish, and
gloomy. (695)
This passage reads like a page straight out of Montaigne, and describes the diversity of animals,
which Juliet likens to the multiplicity of human attributes such as “kind” or “gloomy” (695).
Juliet’s attribution of an “interior nature” to animals directly opposes the Cartesian view of
animals as mindless machines.38 It evokes Montaigne’s overarching war on human pride,
especially in terms of how it manifests in relationships with animals (695). Her view of human
masters as “haughty” employs the exact wording as the speaker of Smart’s “On an Eagle
Confined in a College Court.” She observes that animals have “degrees of skill,” putting
attributes such as intelligence and the possession of culture on a horizontal rather than vertical
continuum.
Juliet’s naturalistic reflections follow a carefully choreographed communicative
exchange with a vicious dog named Dash, whom she has previously encountered. Dash is usually
accompanied by two woodsmen, who have intimated, but not carried out, violence against her. In
this scene, Juliet and the dog briefly face situational similarity and are wandering alone. When
the dog lunges to attack, Juliet turns to “face him; holding out her hand in a caressing attitude” as
a “manifestation of kindness” because she understands that “flight, to the intelligent, though
dumb friend of man, was well seen to be cowardice, and instinctively judged to be guilt” (686).
Although the dog is considered “dumb,” a commonplace indicating that he does not speak verbal
language, Juliet, nevertheless, demonstrates that she believes that humans and animals can
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communicate in nonverbal modes; she deploys gesture or nonverbal address, “facing him,” and
using hand signals (686). She considers the dog’s intelligence, which is tied to his ability to
discern human character. In this case, the dog would read “cowardice” as “guilt,” like one of
Montaigne’s police dogs (686). Juliet views “instinct” as a form of intelligence which also aligns
with the discourse of sensibility. Hume, as opposed to Descartes, did not distinguish between the
faculties of reason and instinct, used to make arguments about human and animal difference. He
thought that “reason” was merely another word for “instinct,” an artificial distinction for
propping up notions of human superiority (160).
Juliet’s sign of holding out the hand as a “manifestation of kindness” illustrates
the significance of the hand in nonverbal communication, which is foundational to Montaigne’s
claim that sign language, and not verbal language, is the fundamental basis of human
communication (686). In the Apology, he remarks that humans speak with the hands in ways that
“rival the tongue” (18). Extralinguistic communication, of course, is Montaigne’s primary
observation of human and animal similarity. Following, Burney’s depiction implies that the dog
can read human sign language.
In response to Juliet, Dash “abruptly stopped, to look at and consider his imagined
enemy; and from a barking, of which the stormy loudness resounded through the forest, his tone
changed to a low though surly growl in which he seemed to be debating with himself” (687).
Montaigne asserted that dogs can engage in such examples of dialectic (28). The additional
qualitative aspects of Dash’s vocalization display a variety of expressivity that uses
paralanguage, or tone and volume, which Gulliver also deployed as a communicative strategy in
his initial encounter with the Brobdingnagians (133). This is a rather sophisticated and multilayered portrait of a dog painted in strokes of intelligence, imagination, internal conflict,
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consideration, interpretation, decision, and response to human gesture. In other words, Burney’s
description is that of canine reason. The dog signals his alarm and intent to attack both through
his vicious barking and his physical motion. Juliet responds to the animal by turning and
showing him her face. The dog in turn reads her as “caressing” and kind and his response is to
stop his motion and to change the “tone” of his bark altering the meaning.
Juliet’s turning to face the dog brings Levinas’ ideas to mind once again. In contrast to
Cecilia reading Fidel’s face, here Dash reads Juliet’s face. Both examples illustrate a mode of
extralinguistic communication emphasized by the discourse of sensibility. Levinas acknowledges
that animals have faces but hedges when it comes to the serpentine species. The interviewer asks
if the subject must possess speech to have a “face” in the ethical sense (49). Levinas is reluctant
to make definitive pronouncements but believes that the ethical extends to all life whether it has
a human face or not. When Juliet turns to face Dash, showing her face to him, she literally faces
her fear—putting a face on the animal much as Gulliver did to the animal in himself. She
positions herself to see and be seen by the animal, and to read the attendant body language
bringing them into relation with one another.
In inverse relation to the definition of sensibility as human response to the prior address
of the animal, Burney characterizes Juliet’s behavior toward the dog as a form of “address”
which takes both verbal and gestural forms (687). Juliet speaks to the dog, “bending forward”
“calling to him with endearing expressions” (687). Burney subverts the idea of human
exceptionality based on language by showing that animals respond to the prelinguistic semiosis
legible in tone of voice and gesture. The woman and dog engage in a complex semiotic exchange
that strains credulity if simply reduced to a strictly Cartesian explanation of mechanism. Dash
understands Juliet and “caught by her confidence, made a grumbling but short resistance; and,
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having first fiercely, and next attentively, surveyed her, wagged his tail in sign of
accommodation, and, gently advancing, stretched himself at her feet” (my emphasis 687).
Burney’s use of the word “sign” here is monumental in terms of the overarching argument of this
dissertation as an explicit example of the Montaignian assertion that animals engage in embodied
forms of semiosis. A “sign” presupposes a sender, an intended message, and a receiver. The dog
signifies his readiness to befriend Juliet with gestural signs, such as wagging the tail and
prostration.
Juliet now “repaid his trust with the most playful caresses” (687) using body language to
signify. She then, speaks to Dash exclaiming, “Good and excellent animal …what a lesson of
mild philanthropy do you offer to your masters! The kindness of an instant gains you to a
stranger, though no unkindness, nor even the hardest usage, can alienate you from an old friend!”
(687). Juliet delineates her own version of the “unswerving servant” dog who can respond both
to the “kindness” of a “stranger,” as she herself has had to do, and who remains loyal even if
mistreated (687). The canine heart is represented as having an immense capacity for affective
response and is therefore also a model for human instruction. This scene renders interspecific
communication as a “lesson” of “philanthropy,” which recalls the hard school belief that
Gulliver’s human-horse communication was meant to be a demonstration of Swift’s
misanthropy. Could the human and animal relationship based on friendship referred to in Swift
also be a “lesson” of “philanthropy” instead (687)?
The next human and animal encounter in The Wanderer is more even complex. After
Juliet befriends Dash he runs off “but, in a few minutes, greatly to her satisfaction, her new
friend re-appeared; wagging his tail, rubbing himself against her gown, and meeting and
returning her caresses” (688). However, Dash is not alone, and Juliet soon realizes that “her
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intended protector belonged to the young men whom she had been endeavouring to avoid” (688).
When they see her, one says, “Why t’be a girl!” and the other answers, “Be it? Why then I’ll
have a kiss” (688). The men’s comments are fraught with potential brutality. Aware of the
danger, Juliet attempts to escape, but realizes the futility and instead relies on her own clever
resourcefulness, employing the same technique that she used with Dash by turning to face the
men. Meanwhile, Dash “jumped and capered from his masters to his new associate, from his new
associate to his masters, with an intelligent delight, that seemed manifesting his enjoyment of a
junction which he had himself brought about” (690). Dash’s behavior signifies the emotion of
“delight” qualified as “intelligent,” attributing a cognitive capacity to the dog for recognizing
cause and effect. His jumping and capering between them signal his self-positioning as an
intermediary bringing about a “junction” (690). Burney reverses the human and animal
categories in this scene with a depiction of human dogs and animal men, but the potential
violence of the situation, which would also animalize Juliet is avoided through the agency of the
“unswerving servant” dog and transformed into one in which human beings enter benevolent
relation with each other.
Juliet’s reaction to the kindness of the dog, inspires the men to emulate him. Suddenly
full of pride in their dog, the woodsmen command Dash to “fetch, carry, stand on his hinder legs,
leap over their hats, caper, bark, point, and display his various accomplishments” (690). Juliet
“encouraged this diversion … till the youths, charmed by her good fellowship, were insensibly
turned aside from their evil intentions; and soon, and in perfect harmony, they all arrived at a
considerable farm, upon the borders of the New Forest” (690). Dash’s capacity for
communicative semiosis is displayed as an impressive repertoire of movements and behaviors
reminiscent of Smart’s representations of Jeoffry. They give him the agency to prevent a sexual
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assault, transforming a dehumanizing situation into one of intersubjective encounter. Juliet
speaks the language of the woodcutters by “stimulating a repetition of every feat,” bringing them
all into “good fellowship,” meaning not only are they on friendly terms, but fellows or equals,
which has the power to overcome “evil intentions” (690). The men are in turn given a measure of
dignity by displaying their communicative skills as animal trainers. The democracy of voices in
this scene is extraordinary, precipitating an egalitarian moment that suspends gender, class, and
species distinctions.
The intersubjective exchange between Dash and Juliet, and his agency in helping her to
escape danger, is the foundation of their affective bond and pivotal to the novel’s denouement.
Dash, at least indirectly, has an agential part in the final revelation of Juliet’s social identity. He
is bought “at a high price” from the woodsmen and is brought to live with Juliet and the hero
Harleigh after their wedding (872). By bringing Dash into their domestic sphere as a pet,
Harleigh and Juliet acknowledge the efficacy of his singular agency. The dog and humans are
now part of what philosophical ethologist Dominique Lestel calls a “hybrid community,” which
is a phrase that attempts to encapsulate “the wealth and diversity of human/animal relations,
relations that are built on a sharing of meaning and interests” (62). Juliet and Dash have shared
semiotic meaning that is shown to influence human and animal outcomes.
The scenes with Dash complicate the association between women and animals as one of
“entrapment” noticed by Seeber (100). Rather than a dashing young man, it is Dash the dog,
working in tandem with the damsel in distress, who orchestrates her release from danger. Thus,
the seriousness of the incident with the woodsmen is given another layer of complexity because
it also incorporates a mild satire of chivalry, suggesting that women and animals are capable of
heroism. Ironically, the dog helps to liberate Juliet from the lumberjacks only to be involved in
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her domestication through marriage, but by including Harleigh in the purchase of Dash, Burney
aligns men as well as women with animals in affective relationships as she did with Fidel,
Delvile, and Cecilia. Margaret Doody suggests that Henry Mackenzie’s hero Harley of the
seminal sentimental novel The Man of Feeling may be the inspiration for The Wanderer’s
Harleigh (Introduction xxv). Harley cries over the death of a beloved dog. Their relationships
with canines demonstrate, contrary to Seeber’s claim, that the sensibility of Delvile and Harleigh
includes “kindness to animals” (106).
I have been arguing that in Cecilia and The Wanderer, Burney creates scenes of human
and canine communication that challenge or rewrite the misogynist lapdog trope by aligning the
“unswerving servant” dog with women, creating a narrative of woman’s best friend as Juliet calls
Dash her “new friend” (688). In her diary, which I will examine next, Burney paints a sublime
tableau involving the forces of nature that literally places human and animal on the same level.
In this instance, she will represent the dog as her own best friend whose communicative agency
and affect impinge on her own experience.
In July of 1817, three years after the publication of The Wanderer, Frances Burney had a
harrowing experience in which she nearly drowned while collecting rocks for her husband, an
amateur gemologist, at Ilfracombe on the Southwest coast of England. Accompanied by her
husband’s “favorite little dog, Diane,” Burney became trapped in an ocean-flooded cave and
clung to a rock for ten hours before a search party found her (DL vol. 2, 484). Her account must
be one of the most extraordinary, yet little known, portrayals of human and animal
communication on record. It pales, in terms of Burney’s oeuvre, only to her terrifying account of
undergoing a mastectomy for breast cancer before the advent of anesthesia. If he had followed
instead of preceded Burney, Montaigne would have included the Ilfracombe incident in his
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catalogue of uncanny canine tales as an example of a dog’s loyalty. The Ilfracombe incident does
the same work as her fictional examples, further challenging the lapdog trope in two primary
ways: the dog, described as “little,” is likely a lapdog, but belongs to Burney’s husband, and is
his “favourite,” indicating that doting on lapdogs was not a strictly gendered activity in the
eighteenth century; and the lapdog in this instance is reconfigured as the “unswerving servant”
dog who is loyal to a woman. It serves as an eerie real-world instance of the alignment of women
and animals in terms of what Seeber (following Epstein) has observed as Burney’s primary
theme: “entrapment” (100).
Epstein writes that “what is striking about this narrative … is its rhetorical insistence on
the physicality of the experience,” and she claims that Burney “asserts through this account that
women experience oppression, fear, and danger with their bodies” (37-38). What I find most
striking is the parallel that Burney draws between her experience and the dog’s, showing that
corporeal vulnerability literally positions the human and animal on the same physical level. The
Ilfracombe incident, which I summarize in detail, highlights human and animal situational
similarity and provides a rich evidentiary basis for the claim of human and animal continuity
based on “pre-linguistic semiosis” and shared “susceptibility to injury” that are the hallmarks of
the discourse of sensibility (Menely 15). Rousseau’s assertion that “commiseration will be all the
more energetic as the witnessing animal identifies itself more intimately with the suffering
animal” is borne out in Burney’s representation of herself, not as a damsel, but as an animal in
distress, who witnesses the suffering of another animal (63).
Burney foreshadows the danger of the cave with a preliminary incident. She says that she
and Diane are walking on a “promontory” high above the water when “a sudden gust of wind
dashed so violently against us, that in danger of being blown into the sea, I dropped on the turf at
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full length, and saw Diane do the same, with her four paws spread as widely as possible, to
flatten her body more completely to the ground” (DL vol. 2, 484). The identical response of
human and animal to “flatten” the “body” to avoid being swept by the wind over the side of a
cliff is both poignant and strangely sublime. Human and dog are in an equal position, prostrate,
in the face of nature. Is Burney acting out of “animal instinct”? Is Diane acting out of “rational
deduction”? This description is intriguing because their equal and instantaneous actions belie any
easy distinction. Writers of sensibility emphasized the liminality between reason and instinct in
contradistinction to Descartes, and Burney portrays nature itself as the great equalizer here.
Burney and Diane descend and enter a cave-like recess fittingly named “Wildersmouth”
(DL vol. 2, 485). At the top of the cavern, Burney sees something gleaming and hopes for a good
rock find, only to discover the “jawbone and teeth of some animal” (DL vol. 2, 486). This relic
does not bode well. Diane disappears while Burney continues her search for rocks. She reports
that Diane reappeared “with an air so piteous, and a whine so unusual, that, concluding she pined
to return to a little puppy of a week old that she was then rearing, I determined to hasten” (DL
vol. 2, 486). The dog’s importuning grows more emphatic, and she pulls on Burney’s dress.
Finally relenting, Burney descends to discover that the bottom of the cave is flooding (DL vol. 2,
486). This has been, it turns out, an instance of human and animal miscommunication; Burney
has misinterpreted Diane’s “unusual” vocalization which was meant to be a warning (DL vol. 2,
486). Burney attempts to find a way out, and she observes the dog as she does so: “Diane looked
scared; she whined, she prowled about; her dismay was evident, and filled me with
compassion—but I could not interrupt my affrighted search to console her” (DL vol. 2, 487). For
Burney, this is not a case of anthropomorphism. She states the dog has successfully
communicated evidence of “dismay” (DL vol. 2, 487). The dog’s distress must have been acute,
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for even in her own fright, Burney feels sympathy for her. Not unlike Burney’s heroines, she and
the dog are in a position of mutual vulnerability due to situational similarity. Not unlike her
response to the pig race described above, a distressed animal elicits “compassion” (DL vol. 2,
487). In a reversal of the scene between Fidel and Cecilia, it is the human who would comfort the
animal, emphasizing emotional interdependence. According to writers of sensibility, we become
human and experience our better angels, so to speak, such as our faculty for compassion, when
we respond to an animal and recognize our similarity to them.
Diane climbs to the top of the cave and finding an exit barks, Burney says, “triumphing in
her success and calling upon me to share its fruits” (DL vol. 2, 487). Burney represents the dog’s
barking as signifying emotion and invitation. But the exit proves too small for a human, so
Burney continues her search while the dog disappears a second time. Burney continues to climb
as the waves rise, cutting her hands and feet while bruising her knees in the process “for I could
only scramble up,” she writes, “by clinging to the rock on all fours” (Burney’s emphasis DL vol.
2, 489). Burney’s emphasis on “all fours” underscores her self-representation as a vulnerable
human animal susceptible to the harshness of the environment. This is the second time that
nature has animalized her, as she must repeat the position she had to take on the promontory in
the high wind. She finds that her only option is to cling to the rock wall as the waters rise.
Without the dog, she feels “wholly alone—wholly isolated” (DL vol. 2, 490).
When Diane reappears in the “aperture in the rock,” Burney reports that the sight fills her
with “joy” (DL vol. 2, 490). Burney does not state why the dog returns, but there is the
implication here that Diane embodies the sentimental idea of the “unswerving servant” dog. With
difficulty, Diane makes her way to the flat slab that Burney is holding onto. Burney uses her
parasol to hook the dog’s collar and bring her near, risking her own hold on the rock. She
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declares that the comfort the dog has brought her no other can “conceive” (DL vol. 2, 491). The
dog responds in her own language characterized as “cries of joy” (DL vol. 2, 491). Burney
clearly indicates that the animal’s presence helps to alleviate her tremendous sense of fear, but
even her writerly imagination is put to the test, for she can only articulate the experience through
a hyperbolic negative: no one can “conceive” (DL vol. 2, 491).
Burney’s recollection begins to take on a more retrospective literary flavor as she
endeavors to shape meaning. In distinct political overtones that evoke Christopher Smart’s
situation, she writes, “Oh well can I conceive the interest excited in a French prisoner, by a
spider, even a spider! … To see my little companion was an occupation that for awhile kept me
from seeing after myself” (DL vol. 2, 491). Burney compares herself to a political prisoner able
to control her own fears by focusing on the suffering of an animal who is her “companion” (DL
vol. 2, 491). She says that she would have been “subdued” by the “awful” situation if she had
“not been still called into active service in sustaining my poor Diane” (DL vol. 2, 492). In other
words, the presence of the dog helps Burney keep her presence of mind. Her construction of the
scene mirrors the premises of sensibility in terms of responding to the prior address of the animal
which she articulates as being “called” and is communicated through Diane’s embodied signs
(DL vol. 2, 492):
No sooner were we thus encompassed than she was seized with a dismay that
filled me with pity. She trembled violently and rising and looking down at
the dreadful sight of sea, sea, sea, all around … she turned up her face to me, as
if appealing for protection; and when I spoke to her with kindness, she crept
forward to my feet, and was instantly taken with a shivering fit. (DL vol. 2, 492)
The animal’s fear is communicated in bodily signs such as “trembled violently” and “shivering
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fit” (DL vol. 2, 492). She “appeal[s]” to Burney, intersubjectively through her facial expression,
indicating that she too comprehends the perilousness of the rising sea. In the language of
Rousseau, Burney describes her response as “pity.” In turn, she speaks to the dog and the dog
responds by moving closer, demonstrating how humans and animals have what we might call
hybrid conversations that include verbalization, vocalization, and gesture.
Burney tries to comfort her: “I dropt down as children do when they play at hunt the
slipper, for so only could I lose my hold of the slab without falling, and then I stroked and
caressed her in as fondling a way as if she had been a child … she then looked up at me
somewhat composed, though still forlorn, and licked my hands with gratitude” (DL vol. 2, 493).
For the third time, Burney is leveled with the animal dropping on all fours. She represents the
relationship in terms of mother and child, humanizing Diane, tenderly making a “cushion” for
her from the items in her bag. She efficaciously communicates her compassion to the dog
through the language of touch, and the dog responds, calming down, and expressing thanks
through the gesture of touching her tongue to Burney’s hand. Burney and Diane wait together for
ten grueling hours, when famished and exhausted, they are finally located by a search party. Like
Cecilia, Burney consoles herself by consoling the dog.
Burney’s representation of human and canine communication at Ilfracombe is textbook in
terms of the claims of writers of sensibility: The animal applies to the human who responds in
sympathy due to her awareness of shared vulnerability. This incident refigures the lapdog as the
“unswerving servant” dog who remains with Burney when she could have escaped. Burney’s
compassion for the suffering of the dog, despite her own mortal danger, is an exemplary portrait
of a woman of sensibility. Moreover, it presents an interesting tension not just between the
heroic self and the damsel in distress, as Epstein has observed, but between Burney as a heroine
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who consoles the dog and the dog as a heroine who paradoxically rescues the human through her
animal vulnerability (34-35). In this case, situational equivalence constructs ontological
equivalence.
While the scene as a literary representation might be artificially heightened due to
Burney’s artistic skill, there is no reason to dismiss her belief that she was in mortal danger. At
one point she graphically writes that falling on the rocks below would have “inevitably dashed
out my brains,” and she was trapped for ten hours (JL vol. 10, 695). Her facility with words lends
insight into aspects of experience that are not easily accessed through language—to the realm of
affect which humans share with animals—to “the messiness of the experiential” which operates
by “the unfolding of bodies into worlds” through “the drama of contingency, how we are touched
by what comes near” (Ahmed 33). The Ilfracombe incident illustrates just how much Burney was
“touched,” or affected, by Diane’s “com[ing] near” to her (Ahmed 33). That Diane was a female
dog adds a poignant element of gender solidarity to this scene, illustrating that a female dog can
be a woman’s best friend. The diary incident, with its intimate portrayal of human and canine
communication in perilous circumstances, retrospectively invests Burney’s fictional dogs with a
greater degree of verisimilitude beyond plot convenience, demonstrating that the line between
the actual and the virtual, between life and art, is fine indeed.
I have argued that Frances Burney’s depictions of intersubjective human and
canine conversation can be understood within the historical context of the eighteenth-century
discourse of sensibility, which was part of a larger cultural response to the divide between
Montaigne and Descartes. In the broadest sense, these scenes are exemplary in their illustration
of how human and animal communication puts pressure on notions of language-based human
exceptionality. In the narrower sense, Burney’s representations provide an alternative to the
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eighteenth-century misogynist lapdog trope by aligning women with the “unswerving servant”
dog in order to challenge negatively gendered associations between women and canines. She
shows that human and animal conversations are a hybrid discourse not unlike human
communications which often rely far more on paralanguage than speech.
Burney’s depictions suggest that when a human being speaks to an animal, it functions to
create mutual subjectivity, and thus animals, like humans, should receive ethical consideration.
Humans are compelled to talk to animals. It’s part of who we are as a species. Talking to them is
just one of a range of semiotic options we have for communicating with them. We also talk to
them in embodied modes such as gesture. Although Burney’s depictions speak to her own
historical moment, in some ways, they speak to our own. For example, her interest in anthropozoosemiotics, or the study of semiosis between humans and animals, resonates with work in the
field of contemporary ethology. Dominique Lestel argues that the idea of animal culture requires
attention to that of animal communication which is “‘the Pandora’s box’ of the animal subject,”
in which “questions of animal communication and culture inhere—and explode” (qtd. in
Chrulew 26). The existence of animal subjectivity is what Lestel calls “the fourth scientific
injury to human narcissism” (the previous are the Copernican, Darwinian, and Freudian) which
“raises the animal to a state jealously guarded by our species” (qtd. in Chrulew 27). Lestel, who
has studied the history of subjectivity in terms of phylogenetics and cultural evolution says, “the
science now confirms what folk knowledge has long understood: animals are intelligent
subjects” (qtd. in Chrulew 28). Citing long-term longitudinal studies in the form of “genuine
biographies” that follow individual animals, Lestel says, “It is no longer a figure of speech to talk
about subjects, it has become the expression of a strong hypothesis substantiated by reliable data
collected over months and even years in a systematic and rigorous manner” (qtd. in Chrulew
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391). Might we add literary representations of animals or literary knowledge as another
epistemology along with Lestel’s “folk knowledge”?
Despite her evident concern for animals, I would not necessarily conclude that Burney
was a champion of animal rights. I offer the following comment from an 1817 letter to her father
as a caution. Burney remarks that contemporary “manners … uphold not alone the Rights of
man, and the Rights of Woman, but the Rights of Children—and will, ere long, … include the
Rights of Cats, Dogs, and Mice” (Journals, IX, 305). It’s hard to determine if Burney is being
facetious here because examination of the context reveals little. Is she ridiculing or championing
defenders of women’s rights such as Mary Wollstonecraft? Is she scoffing at the idea of animal
rights? It’s possible that Burney is derisively alluding to Thomas Taylor’s 1792 A Vindication of
the Rights of Brutes.39 The scenes of human and animal communication that I have examined in
this chapter suggest that Burney truly felt compassion for animals and understood the
intersection between misogyny and speciesism but exactly how far this translates to her political
vision is unclear due to her sometimes-contradictory statements.
On the other hand, she was a consummate satirist, and her comment could be a mockery
of those who use reductio ad absurdum arguments against the idea of women’s rights. In the
case of the diary comment, I think it’s important to remember who Burney’s audience was: Dr.
Charles Burney, her father. Burney often had to defer, personally and in her professional
aspirations as a woman writer, to the wishes of her father, who, for example, actively suppressed
her play The Witlings, a satire on bluestocking circles. Therefore, we might infer that in her
comment on animal rights, Burney was simply toeing the party line. It’s difficult to ascertain
with certainty.
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Even though writers of sensibility depict animals participating in the human discourse
community, it’s hard to argue definitively that all these writers would support a doctrine of
animal rights. Nevertheless, by no means did they ascribe to purely instrumental views of
animals either. Mary Shelley will confront these ideas in Frankenstein, endeavoring to keep
Enlightenment debates alive as animals were increasingly deployed as narrators in children’s
fiction. Away from writers engaging with philosophy, the culture turned the animal question
over to political progressives who in 1824, for example, formed the first animal protection
agency in England, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, just six years
after the publication of Frankenstein. In its time, Frankenstein was a continuation of the
argument that literary representation has value for the lives of real animals.
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Chapter Four

“What Was I?”: The Creature, The Cat, and The Monster of Ontology in Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein

Read Montaigne—Correct Frankenstein
— Mary Shelley

Frankenstein commences at the narrative’s chronological end. The reader enters a scene
in which Victor Frankenstein chases his creature to the North Pole, vowing to destroy him in a
desire for revenge. The creature has killed Frankenstein’s youngest brother, wife, and best friend
because he has been spurned by his creator. Walton, an arctic explorer, and the novel’s first
narrator, rescues Victor, bringing him aboard his ship. He listens to Victor’s story and
subsequently preserves it in epistles to his sister. He reports first seeing Victor in a “sledge”
writing, “only one dog remained alive; but there was a human being within it” (14). The
syntactic construction of this sentence is curious. The antecedent of “it” is, ostensibly, the
“sledge,” but the referent’s distance from the antecedent and the intervening noun “dog,” creates
an alternate meaning: Victor, the sentence implies, is within the living dog. There is the
suggestion here that Victor and the dog are one being, a human and animal composite. Thus,
from their first appearance in the exposition, Victor Frankenstein and his creature are associated
with animals. They do not appear as the solitary wanderers of the Romantic trope, but as beings
imbricated with the lives of other beings, co-dependents for survival in the harsh arctic
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conditions of the initial setting. The arctic scene with the sled dogs functions as a prolegomenon
adumbrating Shelley’s exploration of the human and animal relationship in Frankenstein.
Shelley not only introduces the subject of the human and animal relationship in terms of the
entanglement of species in this scene but the subject of the human’s relationship to his own
animality.40
The imbrication of Victor and the dog suggested by Shelley’s unconventional syntax is
given full and explicit treatment in the figure of the creature. Describing his first sighting of the
creature Walton writes, “a being which had the shape of a man, but apparently of gigantic
stature, sat in the sledge, and guided the dogs” (13). From the outset, the creature is fraught with
ambiguity, “a being” that appears human but is of indiscriminate species, perhaps even
fantastical, a giant (13). Critics have viewed the creature emblematically as a stand in for other
humans, alternately suggesting the marginalized other, the colonized subject, and the oppressed
woman.41 I propose, however, to offer an interpretation based on what the text says the creature
is—a human and animal hybrid, composed of body parts and scraps obtained from “the
dissecting room and the slaughter-house” (34).42 In the figure of the creature, Shelley
ingeniously incorporates what is, arguably, the central philosophical dilemma of the
Enlightenment: the animal question. That is, do animals possess reason and language? And if
they do, are they ontologically equivalent to humans? This debate is best framed by the
disagreement between two highly influential French thinkers, Renaissance humanist and
skeptical philosopher Michel de Montaigne and seventeenth-century philosopher scientist René
Descartes.
In his 1580 An Apology for Raymond Sebond, Montaigne engaged the animal question,
debated since the classical epoch by philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, Diogenes of
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Sinope and the Stoics. Montaigne’s primary purpose is to crush modern reiterations of Stoic
pride in reason that he perceived in the Reformation’s challenge to the Catholic church.
Adopting a position of skepticism, he was wary of such radical change. His main argumentative
strategy is theriophilic, meaning that he inverts human and animal characteristics, lowering
humans by raising animals. He argues that language is neither exclusive to humans nor defined
solely as verbal speech, insisting that animals speak languages of their own and communicate
through embodied movement, which he gives as evidence of ratiocination, insisting “their very
movements serve as arguments and ideas” (18). According to Montaigne, animal movement
serves as an ever-present reminder of the potential reasoning capacity of animals, manifesting
itself in myriad forms, in innumerable temporal and topographical contexts, and outside the
human spheres of knowledge and agency. He argues that nothing, including the minds of
animals, can be known with certainty. In sum, Montaigne views nonverbal language as a marker
of liminality between species rather than viewing verbal language as evidence of absolute
disjuncture.
Descartes took umbrage with Montaigne’s argument writing in his 1637 Discourse on the
Method, a watershed in Western philosophy, that “[s]peech must not be confused with the natural
movements that are the signs of passion and can be imitated by machines as well as by animals”
(47). In the Discourse, Descartes claims to have reached an epistemological certainty,
articulated in his most famous proposition, “I think; therefore, I am,” also known as the cogito,
the foundation of modern rationalism (28). Descartes posits human consciousness as an
undoubtable foundation upon which all human gnoseological edifices may be built. He rejects
“the book of the world” as a source of wisdom, proclaiming, “I took the decision one day to look
into myself and to use all my mental powers to choose the paths I should follow” (11). He
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decides “never to accept anything as true” except “that which presented itself to my mind so
clearly and distinctly, that I would have no occasion to doubt it” (his emphasis 17). The thinking
self, then, is the measure of all truth claims for Descartes.
Victor has a similar method of deductive reasoning, believing in his own thinking as an
epistemological foundation. During the trial of Justine Moritz, the servant falsely accused of the
murder of young William Frankenstein, the first of the creature’s victims, Victor concludes that
the creature is the responsible party. He claims that thought precedes fact: “He was the murderer!
The mere presence of the idea was an irresistible proof of the fact” (Shelley’s emphasis 50). In
this case, Victor’s deduction is valid, but Shelley calls attention to the potential danger of this
methodology: it requires no proof.
The ambiguity of the creature constantly obscures the concept of Cartesian certainty. For
example, at the center of the novel, the creature tells Victor what is, essentially, a literacy
narrative, describing his acquisition of verbal language. In the early modern view, his possession
of language would demonstrate his humanity; however, in the world of Shelley’s novel, his
partial animal corporeality continually challenges this categorization. Victor, repulsed by the
creature’s appearance, refuses the implications of the interlocutory relationship within the
creature’s narrative. After experiencing momentary compassion for his alienated creature, he
pronounces with finality, “When I saw the filthy mass that moved and talked, my heart sickened,
and my feelings were altered to those of horror and hatred” (103). The creature, as a moving and
talking being, is neither fully animal nor fully human and remains in a state of ontological limbo
throughout the entire novel.
Victor’s horrified rejection of the creature represents what Jacques Derrida describes as
an “immense disavowal” of the animal, one “whose logic traverses the whole history of
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humanity” (14). Human history, according to Derrida, may be read as one of self-imposed
separation of itself from other species. In his series of lectures published under the title The
Animal That Therefore I Am, an allusion to the cogito, Derrida pauses on Descartes, who, he
says, “waits for us with his animal machines” like a monster lurking in the shadows of Western
thought (22). For Derrida, the Cartesian beast-machine hypothesis claiming that animals are
unconscious machines without language and without reason, perceiving neither being nor feeling
is the most strident example of the West’s “immense disavowal” (14). Montaigne anticipated the
Derridean thesis articulating the collective human attitude towards animals as an “insane
arrogance” (51).
Ultimately, Descartes was responsible for the concept of a purely mechanistic universe,
erroneously attributed to Sir Isaac Newton.43 The Cartesian universe included mechanistic
animals. Shelley’s father, William Godwin, belonged to the “radically idealist, rationalist
tradition,” stemming in the early modern era from Descartes (J. Williams 6). Godwin was among
the many writers including Paine, Diderot, and Buffon, who, following Voltaire,
“misappropriated” Newton into the Cartesian system (Christensen 147-48). John Williams,
applying a feminist lens to his interpretation of Shelley, writes that “Frankenstein recorded a
profound uneasiness with the intellectual tradition,” part of which stemmed from rationalism,
behind eighteenth-century politics because women were largely excluded from discussions of
individual rights (30). I would add that Frankenstein demonstrates Shelley’s apprehension of the
exclusion of animals from that same rhetoric of freedom, and that the two exclusions are part of
the same mechanism of political power.
The Cartesian beast-machine hypothesis was still being debated in early nineteenthcentury British discourse when Shelley wrote and published her 1818 masterpiece. For example,
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in The General Character of the Dog: Illustrated by a Variety of Original and Interesting
Anecdotes of That Beautiful and Useful Animal in Prose and Verse (1804), Joseph Taylor
anthologizes anecdotes about canines, mostly from the early modern period, in which one author
ponders, "I wonder … how any man alive can have the effrontery to maintain that brutes are
unintelligent machines” (132). Taylor’s author perceives anthropocentric hubris in the human
stance towards animals. A second example comes from the writing of Percy Shelley. In his
Vindication of the Natural Diet (1813), a defense of vegetarianism, Percy Shelley alludes to the
Cartesian hypothesis, writing, “the monstrous sophism that beasts are pure unfeeling machines,
and do not reason, scarcely requires a confutation” (qtd. in Rowe 137).44 He insinuates that the
theory is unnatural, a deception. Yet, despite her husband’s claim, Shelley was compelled to
provide a “confutation” in Frankenstein, the most comprehensive representation of the human
and animal relationship in literature in English.
In this essay, I shall argue that in Frankenstein, Shelley entertains the skeptical
philosophical ethos of Montaigne in her treatment of the animal question. Her contemplation is
Montaignian even in the evocation of his now famous feline, deployed in An Apology for
Raymond Sebond, as a rhetorical figure through which he explores the limits of human reason.45
Through the relationship between the creature and Victor, Shelley explores philosophical and
ethical questions vis-à-vis the animal debate, making Montaignian moves by depicting instances
of interspecific communication and creaturely kinesis to put pressure on Enlightenment notions
of a strictly language-based criterion for human exceptionalism. In distinction to Montaigne,
Shelley explores not the limits of human reason, but the tragic potential of human reason, which
can create monsters, and treat animals monstrously, unleashing causal chains of negative
outcomes. She reinvents the topos of the writer’s cat as a rhetorical strategy in order to level a
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critique of the science in her era, particularly the ethics of vivisection.46 The creature, a partially
resurrected cat, returns to torture Victor in an emotional vivisection.47
There are instances when Shelley explicitly deploys Montaignian theriophily. For
example, after the creature reads Plutarch’s Lives, a comparative analysis of paired Greek and
Roman statesmen, he begins to ruminate on the problem of human evil saying, “to be base and
vicious, as many on record have been, appeared the lowest degradation, a condition more abject
than that of the blind mole or harmless worm” (83). That is, an unethical human is lower than the
lowliest animal. After his murderous rampage to avenge Victor’s repudiation, the creature
confesses to Walton that “vice has degraded me beneath the meanest animal,” meaning that as a
result of his partial humanity, he has sunk beneath animality (160). These examples demonstrate
the inversion of human and animal characteristics deployed by theriophilists to criticize human
pride.
What I would like to emphasize, however, is that the creature himself is essentially a
Montaignian figure. Rather than assuming animals have no experience of consciousness,
Montaigne stresses that the human mind cannot know the animal mind with certitude. Animals,
especially felines, are for Montaigne inherently ambiguous beings—just human enough to
engender doubt. The creature, like Montaigne’s cat, is the antithesis of Cartesian certainty,
precipitating more questions than answers. His depiction as a hybrid who speaks like a human
but has a partial nonhuman animal body suggests that the concept of the human, for Shelley, is a
linguistic construct draped over an uncertain ontology.48 The Cartesian paradigm is the
ideological foundation of Western concepts of the autonomous self, ontologically separate from
animals, that undergirds the capitalist system. Shelley’s novel brings to light the occlusion of
animal exploitation behind human exploitation at the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution.49
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Frankenstein, then, explores the real-world impact of philosophical claims on human and animal
lives.
While Shelley was drafting Frankenstein at Bath, Percy Shelley, who heavily edited the
first edition, read Montaigne, starting in September of 1816. In her journal, Shelley records that
on Saturday the 9th of November 1816, Percy “reads Gulliver’s Travels aloud and Montaigne in
the morning” (Journals 1:145). The ambiguity of this sentence suggests that he may have read
Montaigne “aloud” also (Journals 1:145). In late November, she writes, “Shelley reads and
finishes Montaigne to his great sorrow,” indicating that the skeptic’s essays had a profound
impact on the young poet (Journals 1:145).
Shelley’s personal admiration of Montaigne is evident in her 1838-39 Lives of Eminent
Literary and Scientific Men of France. She calls him a “tranquil philosopher” who “dissected
human nature” and “one of the most delightful authors in the world” (25, 15). She observes that
his essays have been “attacked in modern times” and launches a defense writing, “[i]t requires
that the reader should possess some similarity to the author’s own mind to enter fully into their
merits” (36). According to her journal, Shelley herself read Montaigne while she revised the first
edition of Frankenstein, as indicated by the epigraph to this chapter: “Read Montaigne—correct
Frankenstein” (1: 245). Editors Paula R. Feldman and Diana Scott-Kilvert explain that “[t]he
corrections,” handwritten by Shelley in a copy of Frankenstein given to one Mrs. Thomas, “were
possibly for a new edition” (1: 245, n.3). While the 1818 version has been favored since the
textual recovery of the 1990s, some critics prefer the 1831 version, arguing that it deepens the
moral dilemma introduced in the first edition.50 In the 1831 revision, there is an increased
emphasis on Victor’s attempts to assign blame to the workings of fate instead of accepting his
own culpability. Anne K. Mellor calls this shift Shelley’s “rhetoric of fatalism” (Mary 171).
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Mellor views this as a compromised vision of the original edition. However, Victor’s view does
not necessarily represent Shelley’s. I read Victor’s attempt to blame fate as his refusal of ethical
responsibility. The 1831 Frankenstein, the only version familiar to readers for over a century and
a half, reflects an even greater debt to Montaigne than the first, positioning Shelley nearer the
skeptical end of the philosophical spectrum and revealing, in her words, her “similarity” to
Montaigne’s “own mind” (Lives 36).
In the argument that follows, I explain further the philosophical significance of felines as
rhetorical devices in Montaigne’s An Apology for Raymond Sebond, relating it to intriguing
recent scholarship concerning the creature’s corpus. This discussion foregrounds my analysis of
two pivotal sections in the novel. First, I examine Shelley’s exploration of the implications of
extralinguistic semiosis in the reanimation scene as it relates to the practice of vivisection. My
analysis enhances our understanding of Shelley’s critique of science as it intersects with her
interest in Montaignian ideas. Then, I focus on the creature’s literacy narrative, which represents
Shelley’s highly unique contribution to the animal debate. In this story forming the heart of the
novel, Shelley explores the relationship between humans, animals, language, and ontology,
positioning herself within the skeptical tradition. For further illumination, in a few places, I
discuss compelling details from Shelley’s biography.
Twentieth-century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein once famously remarked that “if a
lion could talk, we could not understand him,” meaning that the life of an animal is of such
radical alterity to human life that not even language could bridge the ontological divide (qtd. in
Levvis 170).51 Wittgenstein’s apothegm evidences an anthropocentric predisposition, however
unintentional, succinctly articulating an available viewpoint on the animal question stretching
back to ancient Greece. For example, Aristotle asserts in the Politics that “man is the only animal
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with the gift of speech” (1.1253a). At the foundation of Western civilization, humans privileged
themselves over the other animals based on a definition of language as verbal speech.
Philosophers such as Montaigne have argued that animals have languages of their own
and provocatively deployed the feline as a figure through which they articulate alternative
intellectual positions. In An Apology for Raymond Sebond, he deploys the cat twice, presenting a
domestic pet and a lion. The first instance provides a way for him to entertain the concept of
animal subjectivity. He does so by considering human and animal interaction saying, “When I
play with my cat, how do I know that she is not passing time with me rather than I with her?”
(17). In Montaigne’s view, the body is a liminal interface between internal consciousness and the
external world, and this is may be true for animals. He argues that the movements of animals
have meaning, suggesting the signification of a reasonable actor (18). Like a playful cat toying
with his reader mouse, Montaigne figures both himself and his pet comically in simian terms. He
suggests that his cat has her own form of intelligible language writing, “We entertain ourselves
with mutual monkey-tricks. If I have times when I want to begin or to say no, so does she” (17).
Montaigne represents his enjoyment of his relationship with his pet as predicated on
communication, revealing an animal-centric attitude.
The second feline in the Apology, a lion, anticipates the content of Wittgenstein’s remark,
but is its ideological opposite; in the story of Androdus and the Lion, originating in antiquity, a
human understands a lion’s language. Thrown together in the Roman circus to fight to the death,
Androdus and the lion deploy interspecific recognition (Androdus previously tended the
wounded lion) and communication to circumvent Roman authority. The lion wags his tail in
greeting like a canine, and the scene is such a crowd pleaser that both are set free. In this story,
Montaigne suggests the political implications of interspecific communication (42-43).
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As a rhetorical figure, Shelley’s creature is an early nineteenth-century version of
Montaigne’s cat. Shelley repurposes the writer’s cat in order to critique the Scientific
Revolution, especially the instrumental use of animals in scientific experimentation. Recent
scholarship has suggested that the connection between Shelley’s creature and the feline species
may be concrete. Describing the creature’s reanimation to Walton, Victor says, “I saw the dull
yellow eye of the creature open” (35). Jackson Petsche and Stephanie Rowe have each made the
provocative observation that the yellow pigmentation suggests that at least one of the creature’s
eyes is that of a cat (101, 138). Rowe explains that the bodies of dead “cats” would have been
available to Victor as part of early nineteenth-century dissecting room “remnants” (137).
The text gives a second indication of the creature’s cat corporeality, which neither
Petsche nor Rowe has commented on. Victor reports that he is equally horrified by the creature’s
“straight black lips” (35). The lips of some common breeds of cat, such as the brown tabby,
having black lips, fit Shelley’s depiction (See Appendix A). The “black lips,” and the “yellow
eye,” I submit, make a compelling argument for the creature’s partial felinity (35-36). Thus, the
haunting trace of melancholic expression on the face of the cat named “Mr. Kitty” may be, at
last, an intimation of the true face of “Frankenstein.”52
The creature’s hybridity is connected to Shelley’s exploration of the ethics of animal
experimentation as it intersects with the significance of extralinguistic semiosis, of such interest
to writers of sensibility as they pushed back against philosophies of language-based human
superiority. In addition to the cost of vivisection in terms of animal life, Shelley considers the
human emotional price of the controversial practice. Vivisection was hotly debated in the 1820s
and tied to the animal protection movement. According to Anna Guerrini, protecting domestic
animals functioned rhetorically as a positive contrast between the nostalgic pastoral of yesteryear
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and both the perceived excesses of modern science and “depraved notions of the industrializing
present” (71-72). In the early nineteenth century, the public perceived a “slippery slope” between
dissecting live animals and dead humans. People feared human beings would be vivisected soon
(Guerrini 72). By 1831, when Shelley had revised and republished Frankenstein, these issues
were even more pressing (Guerrini 73). Because the creature is part human, he brings the
disturbing implications of possible human vivisection to the fore.
In terms of experimentation with animals, the implications of the Cartesian beastmachine theory cannot be overstated. Adherence to the Cartesian hypothesis was essential to
some scientists practicing vivisection. According to Descartes, animals do not consciously
experience pain like humans; semiotic displays of agony are purely mechanistic. As Erica Fudge
explains, the Cartesian position is that “an animal can experience torture but cannot somehow
properly feel it” (her emphasis 157). In consideration of the medical benefits to humankind, it is
not difficult to understand how the Cartesian theory compensated for the current absence of
anesthesia as a matter of “convenience” (Singer 293). The Cartesian theory provided the
disavowal of animal suffering necessary to carry out the scientific research. While most scientists
acknowledged animals could feel pain despite the Cartesian hypothesis, there were instances
when Descartes’ denial of the conscious experience of it by animals was used by vivisectors as a
pretext for ignoring the obvious semiotic indications of trauma experienced by the animals. At
times, this denial seemed to manifest in a sadistic theater of cruelty. For example, this harrowing
description of a late seventeenth-century vivisection at a Jansenist seminary in Port Royal is
telling:
They administered beatings to dogs with perfect indifference and made
fun of those who pitied the creatures as if they felt pain. They said the
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animals were clocks; that the cries they emitted when struck were only the
noise of a little spring that had been touched, but that the whole body was without
feeling. They nailed the poor animals up on boards by their four paws to vivisect
them and see the circulation of blood which was a great subject of conversation.
(qtd. in Singer 293-294)
The assertion that the animals are “clocks” is a troubling usage of language for the purpose of
ontological prestidigitation (qtd. in Singer 293). It is also one of the most explicit examples of
the application of Descartes’ beast-machine theory on record. The crux of this early modern
description of vivisection is the nonverbal signification. As a demonstration of the prelinguistic
semiosis that humans and animals share, the vocalizations of the dogs must have presented a
tortuous real-time refutation of the beast-machine theory to the vivisectors, who choose not to
hear by asserting that an expression of pain given by a canine is mechanical noise. It’s a strange
sort of denial. In the reanimation scene, Victor refuses to hear the creature, which is repeated
when the creature tells his literacy narrative later at the novel’s center, presenting the refusal to
listen as a form of disavowal.
The creature’s reanimation is depicted as traumatic—a sort of vivisection in reverse,
showing the close relationship between vivisection and Victor’s reanimation enterprise. Shortly
after the process of resurrection, the creature signifies in three extralinguistic modes available to
both humans and animals. After he opens his eyes the creature vocalizes, gestures, and uses
facial expression. Victor recalls, “his jaws opened, and he muttered some inarticulate sounds,
while a grin wrinkled his cheeks … one hand was stretched out seemingly to detain me” (36). In
the image of the “jaws,” Shelley accentuates one part of the anatomical structure required to
produce human speech (36). However, the word’s visceral connotation, coupled with the
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creature’s hybrid composition, presents an animalistic image also evoking attack or eating. The
suggestions of biting, mastication, and digestion subsumed within “jaws” emphasize that speech
is not the exclusive purpose of exercising the maxilla and mandible, underscoring its situatedness
in the body (36).
The image of the “jaws” has a second and more troubling implication because of its
relationship to the word “grin,” bringing to the fore the messy ethics of Victor’s work. According
to the OED a “grin” can be performed by humans or animals and involves drawing back the lips
to show the teeth, usually to display pain or anger, and can be said of the “jaws” as well.53 This
sense of the word is available in the well-known expression “grin and bear it.”54 Moreover, well
into the nineteenth century, the word “grin” in the noun form denoted a snare for a bird or rabbit
that featured a “running noose” (OED). Both the noun and verb carry macabre denotations and
when considered with other textual evidence such as the creature’s exposed teeth, which Victor
describes as having a “pearly whiteness,” the precision of Shelley’s word choice is clear (35).
The creature’s face signifies suffering.
Victor finds the creature’s appearance repulsive, but his frenetic kinesis proves as
disturbing. After the creature opens his “yellow eye,” Victor next observes, “it breathed hard,
and convulsive motion agitated its limbs” (35). He elaborates telling Walton, “I had gazed on
him while unfinished; he was ugly then; but when those muscles and joints were rendered
capable of motion, it became a thing such as Dante could not have conceived” (36). Victor
perceives the creature’s movements as “ugly,” and the phrase “rendered capable of motion,”
suggests he recognizes he has bestowed not just biological life, but a measure of agency on the
creature (36). The creature’s agony is manifested in “convulsive” movement of the body (35). In
this scene, Victor compares animal kinesis to the writhing of the dead in Dante Alighieri’s vision
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of hell in the Divine Comedy. In Dante’s version, the movements of the condemned signify the
conscious experience of guilt and the physical sensation of various forms of tortuous punishment
such as burning, being buffeted by the wind, or even frozen. Shelley renders animal movement in
horrific images to depict the suffering of animals in scientific procedure. In other words, for
animals, vivisection is hellish, analogous to the human experience of damnation. Shelley’s
evocation of hell for an audience of mainly Christian readers is an effective rhetorical move for
convincing them of the ethical fuzziness of vivisection, rendering animal suffering in images of
human suffering associated with the religious implications of the consciousness of human
culpability.
Later, the creature comes to Victor’s room and tries to establish communication by
vocalizing and making gestures. Victor reports that the creature made “inarticulate sounds,” yet
claims that the creature “might have spoken, but I did not hear” (36). These statements are
contradictory. How can Victor say that the creature made “sounds” and simultaneously not hear
them? The creature, due to his partial humanity, may by speaking verbal language, or he may be
vocalizing as part of his animality. As Shelley presents it, Victor chooses not to “hear” (36). In
other words, to hear in this case is to listen. Victor’s refusal to hear is a form of disavowal
reminiscent of the Cartesian vivisectors, who claim the animal “cries” are the “noise” coming
from a “little spring” (qtd. in Singer 293).
Victor’s disavowal is further enacted when he flees the creature’s presence. He reports
falling into a fitful sleep full of nightmares, recalling, “my teeth chattered, every limb became
convulsed” (36). This detail echoes the reanimation scene. The creature is described a few lines
earlier with the same terminology; his “limbs” display a “convulsive motion” (35). In these
descriptions, Shelley demonstrates the similarity between humans and animals in the capacity of
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the body to signify. She blurs the line between human emotional states such as “horror” and the
response of the animal body to the experience of trauma. In other words, psychic disturbance and
physical disturbance are both realized in the body, demonstrating human and animal continuity.
Victor denies that he has heard the creature. Yet he is telling this disturbing story to
Walton who must hear him for the story to be fully communicated. Victor speaks from his
memory of the events, and Walton is positioned as the interlocutor. The whole of Frankenstein is
a story of recollection, revealing something about the function of memory; it recasts and
reinterprets the initial impressions. As the narrative progresses, Victor, it might be said, begins to
“hear,” which is connected to his remorse as a function of memory (36). Memory serves to
reframe the significance of the events for Victor, evoking the re-membering of the vivisected
creature’s corpus, re-collected from many different bodies. In retrospect, Victor experiences
regret as a feeling of horror. He speaks of the “horrors of my secret toil” and says to Walton that
he “tortured the living animal to animate the lifeless clay” (33). His present state of regret
manifests in the body. He says, “[m]y limbs now tremble, and my eyes swim with the
remembrance” (33). On the verge of tears, meaning the fluid drops released by the eyes in
response to trauma, Victor’s body shakes as he remembers harming animals. The word evokes
“to tear” in the verb form, that is, Victor’s dismembering of human and animal bodies, the regret
of which expresses itself in the body and in a semantic homonym, further enhancing the causal
relationship between vivisection and Victor’s re-membered experience. To remember with regret
indicates an evaluative interpretation of the past event. Here, the memory metaphorically remembers the humans and animal bodies that have been torn dismembered. The re-membering of
the exploited bodies as a function of memory elicits regret, which Shelley suggests is the
appropriate response to Victor’s ethical awakening. In a sense, Victor’s body is telling this story,
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acting with him as a corporeal narrator, working in tandem with verbal language (33).
In the tradition of Montaigne, writers of sensibility were interested in the semiotics of the
body. This included the semiotics of animal bodies and interspecific exchange. In order to deemphasize the philosophical preoccupation with verbal language as the criterion of an absolute
human ontology, Montaigne stresses that, like animals, humans communicate via the body
through gestures and facial expressions. He also observes involuntary forms of embodied
communication. He writes, “[t]he chameleon changes passively … We change hue as well, from
fear, anger, shame and other emotions which affect the colour of our faces … Jaundice, not our
will, has the power to turn us yellow” (34). Unconscious nonverbal forms of human
communication, such as Victor’s crying, precede language and function in Frankenstein to push
humans closer to animals in Montaigne’s vision of a human and animal continuum rather than a
human and animal aporia.
Victor’s retrospective casting of vivisection as a form of torture illustrates Shelley’s
attention to the emotional cost of the practice for humans. The association between vivisection
and torture reverberates throughout the novel.55 For example, after the creature murders William,
he frames the family servant, Justine. During her show trial, Victor says, “I suffered living
torture,” identifying himself as the “true murderer” (54, 59). Shelley represents the creature
returning like a resurrected cat to torture Victor with acts of revenge. This is presented as an
emotional vivisection, a compelling nuance of the novel’s revenge theme. As Victor
contemplates making a female companion to assuage the creature’s loneliness, he imagines being
tortured by the animals that he will use in the process: “I saw continually about me a multitude of
filthy animals inflicting on me incessant torture that often extorted screams and bitter groans”
(105). The consequences of the creature’s violent revenge put Victor in an ambiguous
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ontological position. He can only express his unbearable emotional turmoil in extreme forms of
extralinguistic vocalizations—screaming and groaning. His extralinguistic display pulls back the
curtain of his exclusively human identity, revealing the animal behind the veil of language.
One specific scenario in Shelley’s life experience may help illuminate the source of these
disturbing images of animal suffering and therefore their significance to her. Biographer Miranda
Seymour documents that when Shelley was approximately ten years of age, her family moved to
Skinner street in London where she was close enough to hear “the nightly screaming of animals
being slaughtered in candlelit abattoirs under Smithfield” (57). Seymour speculates that an
“impressionable” Shelley was probably “horrified” when she connected “the sounds of the night
to the bloody carcasses,” hanging nearby for sale by butchers like executed criminals (58).
Perhaps, I would add, Shelley also perceived a relationship between the name of her street
“Skinner” and the activity of slaughter (Seymour 57). This biographical incident haunts the
pages of Frankenstein. As a victim of emotional vivisection, Victor is so traumatized by his own
use of experimentation on animals that he cannot express his mental state in language, only in
extralinguistic signs of distress—distant echoes of the screams of slaughtered animals buried in
Shelley’s memory.
Shelley’s sympathetic portrayal of Victor’s grief for his previous exploitation of the
animals is anticipated by his grief over the death of his very young brother William. After the
creature murders William, Victor looks to the consolation of philosophy averring, “[t]hose
maxims of the Stoics, that death was no evil, and that the mind of man ought to be superior to
despair on the eternal absence of a beloved object, ought not to be urged. Even Cato wept over
the dead body of his brother” (48). Rejecting the Stoic argument, Victor acknowledges the value
of human emotion, particularly the experience of mourning as an appropriate response to the
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death of loved ones. Shelley, however, excised this entire passage from the 1831 version,
positioning Victor closer to the Stoics. Thus, while Victor’s character has elements of
sympathetic structuring in both editions, in this part of the 1831 version, his emotions are slightly
muted. This move, of positioning Victor closer to the skeptics by excising the passage in which
he disagrees with them, is related to Shelley’s skeptical position on the animal debate.
An increased alignment of Victor and the Stoics enhances the ethical dilemma presented
in the first edition. The Stoics influenced the thinking of Descartes and surpassed Aristotle’s
language argument by claiming that speech in the form of thought was the deciding demarcation
between humans and animals (Percival 57). For example, Sextus Empiricus, one of the most
well-known Stoics, alleges that “[m]an differs from the irrational animals by reason of internal
speech, not uttered speech, for crows, parrots, and jays articulate sounds” (qtd. in Percival 57).
Descartes, rehashes this argument in the Discourse writing, “we can see that magpies and parrots
can utter words as we do, and yet cannot speak like us, that is, by showing what they are
thinking” (47). Thus, according to this line of reasoning, verbal language is a criterion of the
human if it is deployed contextually and in chains of reasoning. Descartes’ well-known
proposition, “I think therefore I am,” illustrates the criterion of a preexisting inner monologue as
argued by Empiricus. Writing, like speech, is also evidence of this criterion, encoding the
thought that preceded it.
However, writers of sensibility such as Rousseau, heavily influenced by Montaigne
himself and whom Shelley revered, suggest that the human comes into being through interaction
with other beings, including animals. As Tobias Menely points out, in Rousseau’s novel Émile,
the protagonist comes into being or compassion when he hears an animal signifying suffering
(15). Shelley will demonstrate how the process of learning language is a desire to respond to the
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speakers who address the listener. In contrast, the Stoics, who did not acknowledge vocalization
or movement as a form of language denied that animals speak and believed that humans had no
obligation to extend ethical consideration to animals since they have no reason and hence no
capacity for ethics themselves.
Shelley’s portrayal of the physical and emotional trauma occasioned by the scientific
practice of vivisection suggests that she remained skeptical despite its contribution to
advancements in medicine. In a sense, Shelley’s portrait of vivisection is an intersectional case
study of philosophy and ethics, that is, the ethical consequences of the application of
philosophical ideas to the material world. At the novel’s center, she moves to a closer
examination of the branch of philosophy known as metaphysics and its further offshoot,
ontology, which investigates the nature of being. In short, ontology seeks to know what is real,
often articulated in terms of categories, such as human or animal. The creature’s hybridity
presents a constant challenge to categorical conceptions that would seek to definitively answer
the question: what is real? Yet, as a figure of ambiguity, it is his close approximation of existing
categories of human, and animal, or more specifically, feline, that pushes back against all strict
philosophies of the antireal. In the creature’s literacy narrative, Shelley intensifies the
metaphysical implications of his multi-corporeality, engaging the animal question further by
depicting his acquisition of verbal language. Shelley asks, does his acquisition of language mean
that the creature has metamorphosed into a human being or was he one prior to this? Or is there a
third term? The creature’s plasticity as a rhetorical figure like Montaigne’s cat allows Shelley to
comment on the animal debate by challenging the concept of an exclusively human ontology and
notions of how that ontology comes into being. It would be tempting to argue that the creature’s
acquisition of language indicates a transition from preverbal animal to verbal human, but one

147

point of contention for writers of sensibility is that humans not only share the preverbal state
with animals in infancy but retain it and continue to utilize it despite the acquisition of language,
contradicting a foundational proposition of Western metaphysics. Neither fully animal nor fully
human, the creature bridges the Western dichotomy.
Many critics have observed Shelley’s interest in language and discussed the creature’s
acquisition of language at length.56 For example, Peter Brooks argues that in Frankenstein, the
“problem of the monstrous is played out in the question of language” (591). “The Monster
understands,” says Brooks, that “the relationship of language” “favors him” as opposed to visual
relationships (592). The creature’s narrative moves Victor to compassion, he observes,
demonstrating “the power of language itself to link speaker and listener,” but it is only
temporary, and he is eventually excluded from the “intersubjective relations” of the “narrative
contract” (593). The conclusion derived from a view of language as purely verbal is that the
“narrative contract,” in Brooks words, is only possible between human beings (593).
I would like to suggest, however, that in Frankenstein, the question of the animal is, to
borrow Brooks’ terminology, “played out” in the “problem” of language (591). Following
Montaigne, Shelley does not define language as solely verbal. As a writer of sensibility, she
emphasizes the extralinguistic use of signs that humans and animals share and suggests that the
“narrative contract,” in Brooks’ words, should extend to animals (593). The creature’s literacy
narrative suggests that the agreement is binding when animals communicate with humans. The
creature’s literacy narrative engages the close relationship between Western ontology and
theories of language and communication. Shelley’s layering of meaning in the creature’s
narrative is masterful. The creature speaks in verbal language, telling a story about learning
verbal language, for which he must recreate his preverbal state with words. His story acts as a
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check on language-based human pride by demonstrating that so-called animal language, or
extralinguistic semiosis, precedes human language. His narrative preemptively contradicts
Wittgenstein’s remark that a human couldn’t understand a talking lion.
After Victor disavows the creature, refusing to “hear” him during the reanimation and
then abandoning him, the creature begins his pattern of murderous revenge by killing William.
He returns to Victor after he learns to speak human language and asks for sympathy saying,
“[l]isten to my tale … hear me … Listen to me, Frankenstein” (69). The creature commences his
narrative by explaining that before he learned to speak, he observed the extralinguistic
signification of other animals. Listening to the song of birds, he discovers that he is an auditor.
Much critical attention has been given to the significance of the works of literature that the
creature reports reading particularly Milton’s Paradise Lost. Less attention has been given to the
creature’s interaction with the songbirds. He recalls for Victor, “I first discovered that a pleasant
sound, which saluted my ears, proceeded from the throats of the little winged animals” (71).
Rather than seeing the birds, the creature first hears them, which emphasizes aural
communication. His sentimental rendition of his preverbal experience of hearing the birds is
compelling as he attempts to recreate for Victor his preverbal thought. When this incident took
place, he did not know the word “bird.” In his recollection, he substitutes “little winged animals”
even though these words were not then available to him either.
Adapting John Locke’s tabula rasa theory, holding that humans have no innate
knowledge and learn everything through sensory impression, Shelley echoes Montaigne’s
argument that animals communicate with each other. The creature’s representation of his own
attempt to make sense of the external world through sensory impressions reveals the creature’s
perception of the vocalization of other animals. The vocalizations of the birds are described as a
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“pleasant sound” and the creature recognizes their relationship to the body, identifying the
“throats” as the source (71). In his preverbal state, the creature is represented as highly attuned to
the embodied semiosis of the other creatures. And this language of animals precedes the human
language he will eventually acquire.
The creature not only hears the vocalizations of the birds, but he interprets them as
signification. His interaction with the birds demonstrates Shelley’s view of the formation of
subjectivity. First, it is a function of communication, of speaking and being spoken to, of hearing
and being heard, rather than apriori metaphysics. Second, as opposed to a Euro-masculinist
conception of identity formation as the self that makes all others the same, subjectivity here is
presented as dependent on intersubjective relations rather than appropriation or colonization.
An intransitive verb, “to salute” means to address someone with respect, good wishes, or
courtesy. The creature interprets the bird song as signification addressed to him as the intended
interlocutor. The OED cites Percy Shelley’s Hellas 46 (1822) as an example of the poetic sense
of salute in reference to birds greeting the sun or dawn with song. However, Shelley reinvents
the long-standing tradition later invoked by Percy, representing the creature as perceiving
himself as the recipient of the birds’ salutations. Thus, the scene illustrates one possible outcome
of interspecific communication: the creature’s status as subject. In the imagination of sensibility,
subjectivity or human identity is a function of language, constructing it through communicative
interaction. This applies to animal-animal relationships. The natural antagonism between cat,
literalized in the body of the creature, and the birds is exchanged for the intersubjective
relationships engendered by cross-species communication. The creature realizes that he shares
the prelinguistic modality of the other animals but says that he can only produce “uncouth” and
“inarticulate sounds” (71).
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Shelley introduced the phrase “inarticulate sounds” in the reanimation scene (36). Here
she reemphasizes her interest in extralinguistic signification and human language. The
animalistic tone of the creature’s preverbal sounds, he says, “frightened me into silence again,”
he says (71). The potential of human vocalization to produce guttural nonverbal sounds and
high-pitched screams, a feature of the horror genre later maximized in the medium of film, is
frightening because it edges closer to human animality, to the precipitous edge of losing
ontological footing.
However, it is here in the exchange with the birds that the creature comes into being,
rather than the moment of reanimation. After his entrance into the world of intersubjective
relations via the experience of hearing the music of the birds, the creature craves additional
relationships and stows himself away on the property of the De Lacey family where he sees and
hears a symphony of extralinguistic signification, including music. The power of music to elicit
human emotion and embodied response in this portion of the narrative complements Shelley’s
exploration of its connection to the signification of human and animal languages. The creature
reports that the “sweet mournful air” played by the elder De Lacey “drew tears” from his
companion’s eyes until she eventually “sobbed audibly” (74-75). “He then pronounced a few
sounds … and smiled with such kindness and affection,” says the creature, “that I felt sensations
of a peculiar and overpowering nature” (75). The feelings he experiences are more potent than
“hunger or cold” and he says, “I withdrew from the window, unable to bear these emotions”
(75). The exchange of nonverbal signs witnessed by the creature elicits feeling to the point of
overwhelming him, demonstrating the power of embodied forms of communication unavailable
to conventional language. Shelley shows an interest in what is now called zoomusicology and
makes an analogy between the signs of the body and music. Rousseau believed that language
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came from the emotions and music and not reason.
The creature observes that young Felix De Lacey, in addition to music, makes sounds that
are “monotonous” (75). He is describing the sound of Felix as he reads a book. The creature’s
description presents human language as a diminution of music, especially reading as the oral
translation of written language, one step removed from authentic verbal expression of thought. It
is monotone in contrast to music, which is often comprised of polyphony, or, as in the case of a
single musician or instrument, the linear sequence of notes that compose melody. This detail is
meaningful because it presents a counterpoint to the Enlightenment view that verbal language is
a superior endowment indicating a superior ontology.
The creature learns to speak by watching the interactions of the De Lacey family.
Initially, he is frustrated by the arbitrariness of language saying, “the words they uttered” had no
“apparent connexion [sic] with visible objects,” but he learns by degrees (77). He notices that the
De Laceys speak in both verbal and nonverbal modes. For instance, the love interest of Felix De
Lacey, Safie, who does not yet speak their language which is French, speaks through “gestures”
and can communicate “her lively gratitude” without words (85). In distinct echoes of the
Montaignian viewpoint on language, the creature says that Safie “uttered articulate sounds, and
appeared to have a language of her own” (81). Yet verbal communication is impossible since
Safie and the De Laceys speak different human languages. “They made many signs which I did
not comprehend,” says the creature (81).
Montaigne implied that animals speak languages of their own, reinfusing Renaissance
discourse with this idea from both biblical natural theology and thinkers of ancient Greece.
Shelley establishes that even within the human species, multilingualism prevents understanding.
Nevertheless, that does not prevent all communication. Safie and the De Laceys compensate via
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nonverbal “signs” (81). If verbal language is not necessary for all human communication, it
suggests the possibility that humans and animals can engage in a measure of nonverbal
interspecific communication.
Rather than experiencing the human affection that his partial humanity craves, the
creature will experience a second disavowal, this time by a member of the De Lacey family.
Shelley deploys feline imagery a second time to bring out the meaning of the scene. The creature
befriends the elder De Lacey, a blind man unaware of his hybrid appearance. One day, Felix De
Lacey, the son, whose name shares the etymology of “feline,” happens upon the creature visiting
his father and tries to intervene. Felix, poor because of his father’s misfortune, and unhappy,
exiled from his homeland and in love with Safie, a Christian Turk, who is forbidden by her father
to marry him due to religious reasons, is anything but lucky or happy as his name would suggest.
His unhappiness clashes with the creature’s only happiness, which is the acceptance of the blind
De Lacey. The antagonism between the two is represented in the leonine imagery. He is
described as having “sublime force” as he tries to separate the creature and his father (94). The
creature describes himself saying, “I could have torn him limb from limb, as the lion rends the
antelope” (94). In this zoological image, one of nature’s large felines tears apart its prey, echoing
the violence of the creature’s murders and foreshadowing Victor’s destruction of the female
creature, accomplished by the same method. The ferocious quality of the lion resonates with the
creature’s animal or base nature, but as Shelley demonstrates in the evocation of theriophily
mentioned above, the creature’s partial humanity causes his lust for revenge, which has degraded
him beneath the animal.
The creature’s experiences, namely, his traumatic coming into being as a resurrected
composite of humans and animals; the preverbal semiotic exchanges; his acquisition of language;
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his observation of the love between the De Laceys; his piecemeal construction out of a handful
of written texts; his repeated repudiation by humans based on his “hideously deformed and
loathsome” physical appearance; and his acute loneliness, prompt him to ask the ontological
question at the center of the novel: “What was I?” (70). He observes, “I was not even of the same
nature as man” (83). The ambiguous creature does not have an apriori “nature” (83). Rather than
the Stoics, the creature’s point of view aligns much more with Montaigne and the skeptics. His
question resonates profoundly with Montaigne’s well-known summation of the skeptical
position: “What do I know? (“Que sçay-je?”) (100). Montaigne stresses epistemological and
metaphysical uncertainty, an uncertainty that vexed Descartes.
In describing his new metaphysical “method” with which he endeavors to “rid” himself
of all his previous “opinions,” Descartes alludes to Montaigne: “In doing this, I was not copying
those sceptics who doubt for doubting’s sake, and pretend to be always unable to reach a
decision, for, on the contrary, the aim of my whole plan was to reach certainty” (25). Answering
Montaigne with one undeniable affirmative is his stated modus operandi. In the broadest terms,
the entire project of Descartes can be understood as a quest to answer Montaigne’s summative
question (Van Den Abbeele 41).
In order to reach this “certainty,” Descartes must first address the uncertainty presented
by the animal mind, necessitating his theory of the beast machine (25). Descartes attempted to
solve his conundrum by separating mind and matter, implying that we can’t know with certainty
that other human minds exist, we can only infer that they do. Only his mind is a certainty. But
this raises another problem: can’t we then infer that animal minds exist? To put it another way,
how can we know for certain that animal minds do not exist, if we only know other human minds
through induction? The presence of verbal language in the human was Descartes’ attempt at an
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answer. In other words, Descartes’ answer to Montaigne’s question, “What do I know?” is “I
think therefore I am.” Shelley returns the volley by framing the question in ontological terms:
“What was I?” The rhetoric of the creature’s question challenges Descartes’ concept of absolute
ontological distinction among species, and by extension, all claims to epistemological or
metaphysical certainty (70). His use of “what” rather than “who” points up the materialcorporeal dimension of being to suggest that neither the body, nor reason, nor language are allencompassing foundations of certainty.
Victor’s, however, is a quest to attain Cartesian certainty, instantiated in the power of
“bestowing animation on lifeless matter” (32). He himself deploys the word “certainty,” so
heavily loaded in the post-Cartesian philosophical lexicon, as he searches for the key to life:
“Sometimes, on the very brink of certainty,” he says, “I failed” (33). The philosophical irony is
that even once he attains the “certainty” of performing resurrection, the product of that
resurrection, the creature, creates an even greater unknown. The creature then asks, “[w]as I then
a monster?” (83). In the original mythic definition of the word, a “monster’ is a human and
animal hybrid. By that definition, the creature is a monster. However, the “then” in the creature’s
question has a distinct temporal connotation. It is not until after his moral transgression of killing
William that he becomes a human monster.
The creature’s narration has a momentary effect on Victor, opening him up to
compassion, but the creature’s ontological question and the implications it suggests causes more
existential conflict. If he were to accept the creature, it would be tantamount to accepting his own
animality, which he will not do. Emblematizing the position embraced by most of Western
philosophy, he insists on absolute ontological distinction, enacted through repeated disavowal.
At the beginning of the creature’s tale, he refuses to listen and exclaims, “I will not hear you!

155

There can be no community between you and me” (68). Shelley’s use of “community” draws
etymological attention to the function of communication in intersubjective relationships (68). As
he did in the reanimation scene, Victor disavows the creature a second time. At the end of the
creature’s narration, his moving and talking, his speaking in both modes, rekindles Victor’s
disdain and he says, “my feelings were altered to those of horror and hatred” (103). The
creature’s animal movement and his human speech cause Victor’s third attempt at disavowal. In
other words, his performance of his literacy narrative has the effect of highlighting human
animality rather than human transcendence. He is literally a talking animal, which is always
brought to the fore by his corporeality, or the reality of his corpus, literally constructed by human
and animal scraps. The creature’s human speech does not erase his animality.
Shelley viewed the concept of the human as a linguistic construct, an idea enabled as a
function of language rather than a transcendent essence, suggesting that human subject identity is
performative and predicated on communication with others, whether human or animal. A second
biographical detail from Shelley’s life helps to elucidate my point. On the day Shelley was born,
Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin said to William Godwin, “I have no doubt of seeing the animal
today” (qtd. in Seymour 27). As Seymour observes, this rings strangely in our contemporary ears
but “animal was a word frequently applied to babies” in Shelley’s time (27). The Oxford English
Dictionary cites a 1795 letter from Wollstonecraft to Gilbert Imlay, the father of her illegitimate
first daughter, Fanny, under the definition of “animal.” Wollstonecraft wrote, “my animal is
well.” This historical use of the word “animal” speaks to the theory that subjectivity is something
acquired as young humans learn to speak language and enter what Lacan calls the “symbolic
order” of the human community. Rousseau had a similar idea viewing the human as naturally
innocent until corrupted by language and culture. The use of the term “animal” to refer to young
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humans in Shelley’s time indicates a very different perspective from our contemporary mindset.
We impute subjectivity to our infants. This does not seem to be a given in Shelley’s time, and it
points to an understanding of the social construction of the human as a status acquired through
linguistic, social, religious, and political means, rather than apriori ontology.
Victor will disavow the creature once more before the narrative ends. He agrees to make
a female companion to assuage his loneliness, but at the point of completion, he tears her apart
like an animal tearing apart prey or a butcher cutting up an animal. He vows to do the same to
the creature and from then on, the two engage in a sort of cat and mouse game. The creature toys
with Victor, killing his childhood friend Henry Clerval in yet another revenge. As they begin the
artic chase that commences the novel, the creature tells Victor, “you will find near this place, if
you follow not too tardily, a dead hare; eat and be refreshed” (147). By providing the dead prey,
the creature ensures the cat and mouse game will continue. Victor chases the creature who can
never be caught, just as the creature’s ontology can never be finally determined and his
ontological question, therefore, never finally answered. His hybrid body ensures that the only
certainty is uncertainty, demonstrating Shelley’s skeptical philosophical self-positioning.
“Horror,” explains Stanley Cavell, “is the title I am giving to the perception of the
precariousness of human identity, to the perception … that we may be, or may become,
something other than we are, or take ourselves for” (418). Cavell’s concept of horror is
essentially a philosophical definition. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein anticipates this concept of
horror. To experience “horror,” as Victor describes it, is to recognize the instability of
conceptions of human ipseity represented by the creature’s multi-corporeality and his capacity to
signify (103). Cavell’s insight prompts the question: What, then, do we “take ourselves for”
(418)? Historically, the answer has been framed in the negative. Whatever we are, we are not
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animals. Shelley suggests, however, that human identity might be mistaken.
Cavell’s conception of horror is not unrelated to Derrida’s conception of human identity.
According to Derrida, the human “I am,” is always “near what they call the animal. It is too late
to deny it, it will have been there before me who is (following) after it. After and near what they
call the animal and with it—whether we want it or not” (11). In other words, human identity is
predicated on the animal. The disavowal of the animal can never be final because the animal
being precedes the human being. Walton articulates a similar statement near the end of Victor’s
story saying, “[w]ho can follow an animal which can traverse the sea of ice, and inhabit caves
and dens, where no man would venture to intrude?” (144). Walton asks, who comes after the
animal? Victor’s human identity follows the dogs, who follow the creature, who follows still
more dogs, forever into the unknown symbolized by the desolate arctic landscape. Victor’s
identity begins with the animal and dissolves in death.
Frankenstein is Shelley’s exploration of the human and animal relationship and the
human’s relationship to her own animality. Her view of human nature is rather cynical; she tests
human ethics through representation of the creature’s reanimation an event that indicates the fine
line of vulnerability between animal life and death in the scientific practice of vivisection. In
Shelley’s era, the advancements of the Scientific Revolution were rapidly expanding, powered
by the nascent Industrial Revolution. Those advances were in no small part made possible at the
expense of animal life in experimentation, creating an even greater sense of urgency in terms of
critical response, necessitating Shelley’s creature. The concept of an exclusive human ontology
gives rise to questionable ethics that exact a high price in terms of human and animal suffering.
Thus, what Shelley is getting at in Frankenstein is a discussion of the material exploitation of
animals, made possible through the interpolation of human beings into adherence to
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philosophical notions that form the core of Western identity, which is an underlying mechanism
of capitalism.
Intervening in the debate framed by Montaigne and Descartes, Shelley, like the other
writers of sensibility that I have discussed in this study, challenges the Enlightenment definition
of speech as an exclusive human property. In the first three chapters of this dissertation, I
examined scenes of human and animal interspecific communication in works by Jonathan Swift,
Christopher Smart, and Frances Burney, arguing that these scenes register Enlightenment
anxieties over human and animal difference as framed by the debate between Montaigne and
Descartes. As works belonging to the literature of sensibility, they present a sympathetic view of
animal semiosis. As a concomitant competing discourse, the sensibility movement countered the
androcentric humanist discourse of the Age of Reason as it progressed historically. Frankenstein
belongs to this cultural heritage.
While Swift, Smart, and Burney depict the human and animal relationship as one of
benevolence based on intersubjective communication, Shelley exposes what Victor calls the
“dark side of human nature,” one that, despite a verbal petition for sympathy from the creature,
ends in disavowal (41). Victor refuses to hear the creature, and thus, refuses intersubjective
communication. Victor’s solipsistic disavowal of his creature emblematizes the human
repudiation of the animal that Montaigne described as an “insane arrogance” (51). Frankenstein
intimates a troubled trajectory for the West’s relationship with animals, borne out in the everincreasing manipulation of species in areas such as industrial farming and bioengineering,
anticipating earlier twentieth-century works such as Upton Sinclair’s critique of human and
animal exploitation in The Jungle and more recent speculative fiction such as Margaret
Atwood’s Oryx and Crake.
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Shelley read Frances Burney’s The Wanderer in December of 1816. Like Burney’s
outcast heroine, Juliet, the creature wanders alone. In its insistence on the confrontation with
human animality, however, Frankenstein owes more thematically to Gulliver’s Travels. Percy
read it aloud to Shelley during the drafting phase of her masterpiece. It is Victor who struggles
with the insanity, so often levelled at Gulliver, of a singular-minded pursuit, whether in the initial
act of creation or subsequent quest for destruction of the creature. Frankenstein exposes the
madness of the human repudiation of the animal because, as the hybrid body of the speaking
creature constantly reminds the reader, it is tantamount to rejecting the human. Unlike Gulliver
who eventually avows the animal in himself, narrowing the human and animal divide, Victor will
spurn the creature, and in doing so, disavow his own animality (103). However, Victor is not
unsympathetic. Victor’s ambitions and the consequences they unleash illustrate the tragic
potential of human reason. His character is buffeted by experience like the creature, and his
emotions careen back and forth between irrational hatred and profound remorse. He says to
Walton, in a statement worthy of Montaigne, “‘Man,’ I cried, ‘how ignorant art thou in thy pride
of wisdom!’” (144). For writers such as Montaigne, Swift, and Shelley, human pride, which is in
part based on our self-defined superiority over animals, is the source of much trouble and
suffering.
Animals, such as the sled dogs and the hare, have a meaningful presence in Shelley’s
masterpiece, but the creature is an extraordinary literary invention, encompassing Enlightenment
debates about the animal question, showcasing Shelley’s singular genius, and making
Frankenstein the most compelling representation of the human and animal relationship in
English literature. Part feline, the creature is not unlike Montaigne’s cat, in form and function,
toying with the reader, as he toys with Victor in a kind of cat and mouse artic chase, engendering
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doubt about what it means to be human and interrogating preconceived notions concerning
animal minds. Shelley’s philosophical novel confronts the reader with the monster of ontology,
articulated in the question, “What was I?” (70). The creature’s question forever imprints
Shelley’s skeptical ethos, goading the reader to attempt an answer to a question far from
rhetorical. The question of Frankenstein is not whether Victor or the creature are human or
monster, but rather are they human or animal? The answer is both, and so, of course, are we.
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Conclusion

The cultural anxiety generated by the animal question did not cease with Shelley’s
definitive skeptical argument for human ontological ambiguity articulated in Frankenstein. The
idea of animal language continued to vex nineteenth-century Britain and it manifested in the
growing market for children’s literature. In the decades after (and even leading up to) the
publication of Frankenstein, a spate of didactic novels and poems for children featuring animal
narrators was published (including Mary Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories). Sarah Trimmer's
Fabulous Histories (1786) inaugurated the talking animal tradition as we know it today (Cosslett
4). Previously, Trimmer had clearly demarcated the line between human and animal in her An
Easy Introduction to the Knowledge of Nature, and Reading the Holy Scriptures, Adapted to the
Capacities of Children (1770) (Cosslett 17-18). Cosslett writes, “her emphasis on speech as one
of the essential differences between man and animals explains her worries about the talking
robins in her later book Fabulous Histories” (18). The mother who tells the story encourages
sympathy with animals but says: “You never see them conversing together and telling their
thought and opinions as mankind do” (qtd. in Coslett18). This sounds very familiar. It is a
reiteration of the Stoic position that internal speech differentiates human from animal.
Like Montaigne, Trimmer believed that she was using natural theology in order to lead
readers into a correct reading of scripture; however, she denied animals language. Some of her
ideas are not very different from the androcentric point of view espoused by Descartes and his
adherents. Many of the era’s children’s authors seem to fear “that their child readers will be
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misled into thinking animals really can talk,” indicating a “self-consciousness about animal
language as a literary device” (Cosslett 4-5). Trimmer’s literalism is a potentially troubling
development in the use of natural theology, for even the bible speaks of speaking animals. About
animals, her narrator tells children, “[w]e must kill them, to preserve our own lives, but should
never be cruel to them while they do live” (qtd. in Cosslett 18). For a vegetarian like Shelley, the
first half of this statement would be less than truthful. It would also point up the inherent paradox
in the notion that humans should be kind to animals up until the moment they destroy them.
Parents, of course, do not want their children to confuse fact and fiction, but if considered more
carefully, this authorial fear betrays an ever-present anthropocentric cultural bias concerning
animal language (Cosslett 4).
These late-eighteenth and early nineteenth-century children’s stories were the seeds of
the full-fledged media industry featuring animal-centered narratives booming in the West today.
They include everything from Anna Sewell’s highly influential 1877 Black Beauty, a descendant
of Gulliver’s Travels in terms of its exposure of cruelty to equines; to early twentieth-century
radio shows such as Rin Tin Tin; television shows such as Lassie; animated cartoons; myriad
films in multiple genres such as drama, horror, and comedy from Old Yeller to Jaws to 2018’s
Zoo, based on a true story about two youths in Ireland who save a baby elephant during the 1941
blitz; as well as the continuation of print with its volumes upon volumes of children’s books. On
the one hand, the ubiquitous presence of animals in these cultural forms is an indication of the
human fascination with and love of animals, especially pets. The anthropomorphism of the
talking lion of The Lion King and the human voice over of a dog’s inner monologue in A Dog’s
Purpose can have positive effects such as teaching children, and adults for that matter, to
imagine animals as subjects. On the other hand, many representations of talking animals
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ironically silence real animals by transforming them into a commodity to be consumed as
entertainment. In some ways, these representations function as a distraction from the debate
about animal language, human ontology, and the ethical implications involved. Thus, cultural
representations of animals have multiple and often conflicting meanings and effects.
In recent years, the topic of animal communication has exploded in popular discourse.
Countless stories have been featured in popular magazines and newspapers. For example, a
recent article in the HuffPost entitled “Goats May Have Better Communications Skills Than We
Give Them Credit For” summarizes research on the communicative gaze of this member of the
caprinae family. A May 2017 New York Times article features the title “Can Prairie Dogs Talk?”
The subtitle reads, “An Arizona biologist believes their sounds should be considered language—
and that someday we’ll understand what they have to say” (Jabr). In August of 2019 National
Geographic devoted an entire issue to the subject of animal communication entitled “Secrets of
Animal Communication.” It would be impossible to say exactly what has led to this cultural
zeitgeist, but if anything, it demonstrates that the animal debate continues. Perhaps the trend is
related to the animal turn in the humanities and social sciences. It also demonstrates a significant
shift in scientific thinking on animal communication, which has received much serious inquiry in
recent years. As my study shows, people have long been fascinated by the concept of
communicating with animals, and the credibility of the scholarly trend may signal to people that
the topic is not relegated to children and so-called “crazy cat ladies.”
But why this “rise of the animal in the modern imagination” in the first place? (Brown
20). Laura Brown attributes it to two material causes: the practice of pet keeping and the
discovery of the great ape (20). She argues that these “innovations in human-animal contact
generated a vital imaginative power” that transformed representations of animals (20). She says,
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for writers of the time, “imaginary animals … provide a new lens through which to examine the
significance of the nonhuman being for human identity, human experience, and human history”
(x). Brown’s thesis articulates an anthropocentric bias of early modern culture, placing the
human at the center of all literary representations of animals.
I have been arguing, however, that the literary representations in this study were
generated as response not to material encounters but to ideological forces, and that they
challenge the anthropocentrism of the Enlightenment paradigm. The cultural upheaval caused by
the substitution of the mythopoeic interpretation of nature for a scientific view in the early
modern era is traceable in representations of animals in British literature of the long eighteenth
century. The older tradition had been available since the days of ancient Egypt and Greece,
linking humans and animals in the very origin of language. I have been arguing that the literary
animals of this period offer a counter narrative to the dominant discourse of Cartesianism, which
articulated a radical ontological split between humans and all other species. This split was made
possible by the Enlightenment’s denial of animal language—a silencing of the animals,
described by Eric Miller as the Enlightenment’s “evacuation of the figurative” (99) and by
Matthew Senior as the “extradition” of animals “from human consciousness and speech” (62). I
am arguing that in the representative literary works of this study, it is particularly the semiotic
capacity of animals, as outlined by Montaigne, and the implications of interspecies
communication, that forms the evidentiary basis for critiquing Descartes’ solipsistic rationalism
and zombified beast machines. With Frankenstein, it’s as if Shelley was attempting to reanimate
the animal question, to keep literary animals alive in the world of philosophical discourse in
response to the growth of children’s literature and as the debate moved into the political arena
(the first Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was formed in England in 1824 and
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in 1835 Britain passed the Cruelty to Animals Act, one of the first laws in the industrialized
world to protect animals).
The literary works of this study are part of a cultural movement known as the discourse
of sensibility. In a broad sense, this movement was a reaction to the Scientific Revolution and to
rationalism. The literature of sensibility paid attention to the “somatic utterance” of the body
such as blushing, crying, and gesturing (Goring 6). I have claimed that the “somatic utterance” of
animals in the works in this study is another example of the discourse of sensibility’s focus on
extralinguistic forms of communication (Goring 6). Tobias Menely explains that the “period’s
valorization of first order signs, such as sympathetic communication to which eighteenth-century
moral philosophers ascribed an unprecedented ethical valence” is in part a reaction to the
“impersonality and disembodiment, reproducibility and indefinite address” associated with print
culture (6).
And while this may seem like an unrelated tangent, it’s not. Stephen Toulmin has
accounted for the era’s need for written propositions that could stand outside of contextual
meaning and application (34). This cultural shift privileging written “proofs,” stemmed from the
tremendous carnage of European religious wars (34). While the proliferation of print culture in
this era may be ascribed to various factors such as the increase in literacy and leisure time—a
luxury reaped from Colonial expansion—print culture is also bound up, like vellum enclosed in
leather covers, in the broader cultural shifts that are tied to the animal debate.
Writers and philosophers of the eighteenth century understood that the signification of the
animal voice precedes both verbal and written propositions (Menely 31). The “communicativity
that begins” in the senses, they understood, is “always in excess of conventional meaning”
(Menely 9). Thus, human language is in some ways inadequate for describing animal language.
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Anticipating the Derridean idea that the signifier can never contain all the signified, Montaigne
argued that animal communication falls within this domain of uncertainty; it may be inaccessible
in the full sense to humans even though humans and animals can engage in interspecific
communication to a degree. The situation of communication is, according to Derrida, the
fundamental ethical situation for which one model is friendship (Menely 39). What we are
getting at here, then, in terms of a vision of the human and animal relationship in the literary
works in this study is an alternative to the Cartesian view of a superior human ontology. In other
words, these works espouse a relational ontology whether in benevolent friendships or
antagonistic disavowal.
This ethic of a relational ontology is present in Gulliver’s Travels. In chapter one, I
claimed Swift’s exploration of embodied semiosis is derived from Montaigne’s An Apology for
Raymond Sebond. Both Swift and Montaigne deploy the semiotic capacity of animals, an
indication of a measure of reason, to question human pride in that faculty as a proprietary
endowment. Gulliver’s horseness is a satire on the human belief that our species is transcendent
over other animal species—that we are not animals at all. It emblematizes his embrace of his
human animality. Yet, Gulliver’s Travels is more than satire. It’s a hybrid work of several genres
including philosophical treatise and travel narrative; it’s also a proto novel of sensibility in which
Swift anticipates Derrida’s model of friendship. Gulliver befriends the sorrel nag and is saddened
to leave him when he is evicted from the land of the Houyhnhnms. Once Gulliver returns to
England, he encourages the model of ethical friendship. Gulliver’s horses live in “friendship”
with one another and are “strangers to bridle and saddle,” living in “amity” with him (244).
Other English horses are treated like friends by humans with “kindness and care” and then they
are eventually sold into “drudgery,” worked to death, and profanely “left as carrion for birds and
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dogs” (203). Gulliver and his horse-like movements are in some ways a mirror image of
Shelley’s creature. Swift morphs Gulliver into a sort of human-horse hybrid, emblematizing his
avowal of his human animality.57
Christopher Smart’s zoopoetics in Jubilate Agno presents an alternative to a mechanistic
view of animals and the growing hegemony of scientific discourse. Of the works I have
discussed, Smart’s poetry is the most heavily invested in the tradition of natural theology. He
presents his cat, Jeoffry, as a source of spiritual comfort that helps alleviate his physical and
mental anguish. Jeoffry manifests, for Smart, divine meaning in the semiotics of his many
motions. In the tradition of Montaigne’s famous encounter with his feline, Smart deploys the
topos of the writer’s cat to illustrate the spiritual significance of feline kinesis, figuring Jeoffry as
a symbol of religious freedom. Jeoffry’s capacity for worship contradicts contemporary religious
doctrines that exclude animals from participation in spiritual activities. Smart presents Jeoffry as
his only friend in the asylum. Like Androdus and the lion, Smart and Jeoffry have a friendship
based on the solidarity engendered by situational similarity, and their relationship demonstrates
the political implications of interspecific friendship.
In chapter three, I argued that canines are represented as “woman’s best friend” in
Frances Burney’s novels and her diary. Burney’s cross-species friendships represent an ethical
model of human and animal relationships, predicated on interspecific communication. Her
depictions of human and canine communication are multivalent and complicate the “misogynist
trope” of the lapdog in eighteenth-century discourse (Ellis 97). Burney aligns the sentimental
“unswerving servant” dog usually associated with men with her heroines (Wyett 276). She
depicts canines as highly agential, significantly impinging on human outcomes.
In Cecilia, Burney explores the signification of emotion on the face of an animal and the
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language of a dog’s barking. For a time, Fidel, the dog, is Cecilia’s only friend, and his
communicative agency has a direct impact on the reunion of the hero and heroine. The extended
scenes of gestural communication between Juliet and the dog Dash in The Wanderer are
extraordinary in their portrayal of the semiotic complexity possible in interspecific exchanges.
The dog’s ability to send and receive signs, to be befriended by Juliet, has a causal relationship
with her eventual befriending of the two menacing woodsmen. Interspecific friendship in this
case prevents violent outcomes. Dash is further befriended by Harleigh, the hero, and taken to
live with him and Juliet after their marriage. Burney also wrote about the importance of canines
in her own life. In her description of the harrowing incident at Ilfracombe, Burney describes her
dog Diane’s range of semiotic behaviors, and it is the dog’s presence that helps Burney
psychologically. Burney’s depictions of cross-species conversations, fictional and nonfictional,
depict an ethic of friendship between humans and canines.
In contrast, Shelley’s portrayal of Victor’s refusal to engage in a friendship with the
creature registers the antagonistic violence of some human and animal relationships, stemming
from a disavowal of human animality in early modern metaphysical postulations, particularly the
Cartesian. Shelley’s speaking creature challenges definitions of the human as distinctly different
from or superior to the animal. Shelley levels this provocation in her invention of the creature’s
patchwork corporeality, an oblique nod to the topos of the writer’s cat, which presents a constant
counter-argument to his eventual acquisition of language and, therefore, according to the
Cartesian paradigm, humanity. Shelley entertains the skeptical position of Montaigne, exploring
ethical aspects of the human and animal relationship that obtain in the intersection of animal
semiotics and vivisection. Shelley’s portrayal of the dark trajectory of human and animal
relations at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution anticipates contemporary speculative
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fiction about animals and bioengineering.
The animal representations in the works of Swift, Smart, Burney, and Shelley are heavily
indebted to Montaigne. If animals represented a part of speech for Montaigne, he would call
them verbs, speaking their own languages of movement. Montaigne reminds his readers that
animals are excellent communicators with members of their own species as well as other animals
(17). In addition to movement, animals communicate in vocalization. He writes, a “horse knows
there to be anger in a given bark of a dog; but that horse does not take fright when the same dog
makes some other meaningful cry” (18). He asserts that animal vocalizations signify meaning.
What is most striking about Montaigne’s argument is that he maintains that animals engage in
interspecific communication with humans, as I have discussed in previous chapters and repeat
for emphasis: “How could they fail to talk among themselves, since they talk to us and we to
them?” (23). Regarding canines, Montaigne observes that humans have many “ways … of
speaking to our dogs and they of replying to us!” (23). He writes, “we use different languages
again, and make different cries, to call birds, pigs, bulls and horses; we change idiom according
to species” (23). The variety of animal languages, he says, parallels that of human languages (2324).
He does not deny difference completely but reconfigures the human conception of
hierarchy as a continuum: “We are neither above nor below them … some difference there is:
there are orders and degrees: but always beneath the countenance of Nature” (24). Montaigne
stresses human and animal similarities over differences writing, “we ought to note the parity
there is between us. We have some modest understanding of what they mean: they have about
the same of us” (17). Animal semiosis narrows the ontological gap, and all species are beneath a
personified Nature. Humans, in their inferential capacity, can understand many instances of
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animal communication, but it’s important to acknowledge, according to Montaigne, that animals
can interpret human semiosis to a degree as well.
The ethical implications of interspecific communication are staggering: if humans and
animals can communicate, it implies that animals possess language in some measure and use it
with intentionality. They should be within the human moral purview as sensitive and intelligent
beings. What I have been getting at, what the literary works of this study get at, are the
ramifications of the application of human philosophy to the lives of animals. This is significant
because “humanist culture goes to great lengths to insist that nonhuman animals look but do not
see, make sound but do not speak” (Feder 70). Before we can understand the “traces of dirt and
blood from material relationships between species” as represented in the literary texts of the
period, I argue that we need to understand the philosophical ideas that make the “material
relationships” possible (Armstrong 7). This understanding, I have been arguing, is available in
the debate about animal language between Montaigne and Descartes. Their debate is part of the
ideological underpinning that makes possible the animalization and exploitation of human beings
in Western capitalism.
If instead of denying animals language, we take friendships with animals as an ethical
model, what might this look like in terms of new ideas and philosophies? As an alternative to the
Cartesian paradigm, contemporary French ethical ethologist Dominique Lestel proposes a “biconstructivist” approach to human and animal relations, in which humans recognize that they coconstruct meaning with animals. Bi-constructivism is an approach which “considers that animals
are not machines but are interpreters of meaning, subjects, interpreters of the world, interpreters
of others and interpreters of themselves” (188). Descartes claimed that “animals can’t use words
or signs” (my emphasis 46). In contrast, Lestel says, “humans must understand that animals are
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not just pretty scenery, a food resource or a source of affection, but a semiotic space that
participates fully in their very humanity” (my emphasis 196). This idea is not radically different
from Montaigne’s emphasis on natural theology, which teaches that animals are themselves
signs. To be human, then, is not to be defined against the animal, as has been the case
historically, but to be a species engaged in semiosis with other species. Humans and animals
create meaning together.
Lestel calls on scholars in the humanities and social sciences to create new forms of
inquiry and knowledge about animals eschewing the “available data” which has its own “cultural
history” to create what he calls “phenomenological ethology or biosemiotic ethology, in other
words, a non-Cartesian ethology” (189). “We need to develop,” says Lestel, “a relational
perspective and move on once and for all from the ontological perspectives that the West has
favored since Aristotle” (190). “Artists and writers have to be involved with animal studies not
just critics,” he says, and interspecific friendship needs to be thought about (194-195).
Eighteenth-century writers approached a relational ontology and thinking about friendships
between species nearly three hundred years ago. Swift’s complex depiction of Gulliver as
equinesque, using both the conventions of satire and sensibility, emphasize human animality.
Smart’s feline friend, Jeoffry, performs a liturgy of motion, depicting animals as spiritual beings
with inherent value. The canines in Burney’s writing are friends who interact in the affective
domain and whose agency create cause and effect patterns in human lives. Shelley’s creature, the
supreme figure of the human and animal relationship in Western literature, articulates the
question at the foundation of ontology itself: “What was I?” (70). Remaining skeptical, Shelley
refuses a simple answer, implying, therefore, that the question is continually posed in the present
as “What am I?” How we choose to answer that question has profound implications for human
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and animal lives. Animals are, despite their ambiguity, for Swift, Smart, Burney, and Shelley,
neither invisible nor mute. Their representations of animals and humans communicating and
creating meaning together demonstrate that literary forms, as Sir Phillip Sydney argued in his
Defense of Poesy, can quicken us to matters of ethics much more profoundly than philosophy or
history.
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Endnotes

1. See, for example, Christopher Hitt’s “Ecocriticism and the Long Eighteenth Century.”
2. Bougeant’s treatise then is a response to the watershed of Cartesianism. Bougeant
aimed to reconcile animal intelligence with Cartesian philosophy. He rejected Descartes’ notion
that animals are unconscious machines while preserving his belief in the transcendent human
soul. Ironically, Bougeant was exiled for a time to La Flèche where Descartes was educated, not
for his theological theory accounting for animal intelligence by attributing it to demonic
possession, but most likely because his real intent was a satirization of Jesuit “sophistry”
(Harrison, “God” 75). His own solution to the conundrum created by the Cartesian view of
animals conclusion was an equally controversial theory. He claimed that far from being
machines, animals possessed the souls of fallen angels. Even though his treatise was meant
primarily as a satire, Bougeant’s observations on animal semiotics leveled criticism on the
proposition that animals operate on purely mechanical instinct. In any case, his work was so
controversial, he was banished from Paris (Percival 55).
3. Some of Montaigne’s animal anecdotes are fantastical and stretch the limits of
credulity; however, many of them are credible observations of animal behavior.
4. Many of these same debates were taken up in the early eleventh century by preeminent
Islamic philosopher Avicenna, who “denies animals awareness of their self-awareness”
(Alwishah 73).
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5. Unless otherwise noted, all Swift citations refer to Gulliver’s Travels.
6. The first two descriptors appear in Kathleen Williams, “Animal Rationis Capax,” 75.
For “asinine” and “hippanthropic folly” see Michael Franklin, “Lemuel Self-Translated” 7, 10.
For “delusional” see Heather Keenleyside, Animals and Other People, 125. For “mad” and “of
questionable sanity” see Julia Goldberg, “Houyhnhnm Subtext,” 269.
7. For example, Sir Walter Scott referred to Swift’s “incipient mental disease” meaning
madness—the proof of which was his extreme misanthropy (Williams, Critical Heritage 290,
312-13). Orrery, Warton, Young and Jeffrey also thought Swift’s “philosophy … the result of a
diseased mind” (Wedel 24). He was retrospectively diagnosed with Ménière’s disease, a malady
of the inner ear.
8. A notable (perhaps only) exception is Anne Cline Kelly who has also questioned this
assumption in her perceptive analysis of Gulliver’s positioning as both pet and pet keeper. See
“Gulliver as Pet and Pet Keeper: Talking Animals in Book 4.” pp. 323-349.
9. Claude Rawson provides an extended discussion of Swift and Montaigne’s similarities
regarding the topos that “man is worse than a beast” in terms of ethnographic studies of
indigenous cannibalism and how it compares to atrocities of Western Colonialism. He notes even
domestic instances such as the cannibalistic victimization of French Huguenots by Catholics in
Montaigne’s time. See chapter one, “Indians and Irish from Montaigne to Swift,” pp. 17-91.
10. All quotes from Montaigne are from the Apology although I make a reference to his
essay “Of Cruelty.”
11. See Toulmin’s magisterial monograph Cosmopolis for an extended analysis of the
Montaignian-Cartesian controversy.
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12. I would stress, as does Melehy, that an allegorical interpretation does not deny the
literal aspect of “animal qua animal” in Montaigne’s writing. Melehy writes, “the function of the
allegory is to describe the limiting of real animals,” but he also considers the rhetorical aspects of
literary play in Montaigne’s writing (273).
13. For a discussion of a “bi-constructivist” approach to human and animal relationships
in contemporary ethology, see Dominique Lestel, p. 187
14. Anne Cline Kelly likens Gulliver’s state of mind when he returns to “posttraumatic stress syndrome.” See “Gulliver as Pet,” p. 339.
15. This insight is inspired by Jacques Derrida’s encapsulation of the Western
philosophical tradition’s (non)engagement with the “seeing animal” as an “immense disavowal,”
but it was there in Swift long before (Animal 14).
16. See J. Paul Hunter for a concise treatment of Gulliver’s Travels and the realistic
novel.
17. Bougeant was exiled for a time to La Flèche where Descartes was educated,
not for his theological theory accounting for animal intelligence by attributing it to
demonic possession, but most likely because his real intent was a satire of Jesuit
“sophistry” (Harrison, “God” 75).
18. Swift’s references to vivisection and the mistreatment of horses are additional
examples of animal corporeal vulnerability in Gulliver’s Travels. In using the phrase “semiotic
vulnerability,” I am alluding to Jacques Derrida’s highly compelling discussion of the umbrella
signifier “animal,” which others all non-human beings. He writes, “The animal is a word, it is an
appellation that men have instituted, a name they have given themselves the right and the
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authority to give to the living other” (23).
19. For an in-depth examination of humans privy to animal language see Tess Cosslett’s
Talking Animals in British Children’s Fiction, 1786-1914.
20. I do not intend to imply reductively that all scientists, anatomists, or ethologists,
etc., are unfeeling or unethical regarding animals. Sometimes in his private correspondence,
Descartes seemed vague on these matters, and he even doted on a pet dog named “Mr. Grat”
(Mr. Scratch). See Peter Harrison, “Descartes on Animals” (220). Yet once the theory was let
loose in the Discourse like Frankenstein’s monster, it was sometimes used to deny animals pain,
which I will discuss in chapter four.
21. Donald Keesey’s “The Distorted Image: Swift’s Yahoos and the Critics” provides an
illuminating argument that Swift positions the human lower than the Yahoo.
22. Williamson notes following information from Boswell’s Life that Johnson “may have
visited Smart in the asylum at this date” (PW vol. 1 114). This portion of the poem where the line
about Johnson appears was written between June 12, 1762 and January 30, 1763 (Williamson
PW vol. 1 108).
23 . It was William H. Bond, in his 1954 edition of Jubilate Agno, the second ever
published, who first proposed the generally accepted arrangement of Smart’s surviving folio
fragments into corresponding “Let” and “For” lines which the first editor William Force Stead
had published in separate sections. Bond argued that Smart had modeled his poem on the
antiphonal structure of the Hebrew psalter, based on Smart’s personal acquaintance with Robert
Lowth whose 1753 De sacra poesi Hebraeorum was a “pioneering study” of the bible as
literature (20). Harriet Guest has persuasively argued for a revised view based on other OT
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structures, namely the book of Job, in which the “Let” verses are “dependent solely upon one
another, forming a sublime mode of poetry through the inter-connections created by their
external exhibition of structural parallelism, … and the reflection of this in their internal,
antiphonal parallelism” (142).
24. See, for example, D.J. Greene’s pioneering 1953 “Smart, Berkeley, The Scientists
and the Poets—A Note on Eighteenth-Century Anti-Newtonianism.” John Block Friedman calls
Newton “[o]ne of Smart’s favorite scapegoats,” writing that “Smart connects Newton and the
Newtonians with the Deist emphasis on natural religion as well as with the Mechanists' rejection
of spirit” (253). Rosalind Powell claims that Smart’s work “characterizes Newtonian science as
a misreading of the world and its mistranslation into vain human language” (“Systema” 365).
Karina Williamson observes that Smart’s “outright rejection of Newtonian science in Jubilate
Agno was a new feature of his poetry” and probably influenced by John Hutchinson’s Moses
Principia, which was a refutation of Newton based on the biblical book of Genesis (PW vol. 1
131). She claims that Smart is rebutting the “metaphysical foundations of science itself”
(“Principia” 414).
25. Christopher Devlin also discusses the questionable circumstances surrounding
Smart’s confinement. See chapters seven and eight, pp 88-127.
26. This and all subsequent Smart citations are from the Williamson edition.
27. Menely’s interest in the intersection of zoosemiotics and literary studies is like mine.
His compelling The Animal Claim: Sensibility and the Creaturely Voice focuses on the
sensibility movement and the later animal rights movement, in general, while I focus on
natural theology and the Montaignian-Cartesian divide.
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28. This well-wrought phrase is Geoffrey Hartman’s. He compares Jeoffry’s spiritual
moves to Ignatius of Loyola’s “spiritual exercises” (440). The sense is primarily metaphorical,
and he does not follow it with an examination focused on Jeoffry’s actual movements (440).
29. Douglas Gray suggests that Pangur Ban is perhaps the “remote ancestor” of Jeoffry
(191).
30. Ironically, it was Seaton’s contribution to the University of Cambridge which
founded the annual poetry contest on sacred subjects which Smart won on five occasions,
establishing his poetic reputation.
31. Coincidentally, friends of Cowper, who also suffered from madness, saved the
manuscript version of Jubilate Agno. William Haley and the Reverend Thomas Carwardine
studied Smart’s manuscript for insight into “poetic mania” (Blaydes 97). The poem remained
unknown for nearly two hundred years until William Force Stead found the manuscript in the
library of Carwardine’s great-grandson, Colonel. W. G. Carwardine Probert.
32. My use of the phrase “semiotic vulnerability” is inspired by Jacques Derrida and
more fully elaborated below.
33. For example, Laurie Shannon argues that figuration keeps animals in the “yoke of
symbolic service” (5).
34. Kathryn Ready argues in “The Lapdog of Luxury and Tobias Smollett’s The
Expedition of Humphry Clinker” that the novel, whose canine representative, Chowder, “draws
attention to the ambiguous role of animals in the eighteenth-century literature of sensibility,” is
“Smollett’s intervention in the luxury debate” (153). Smollett associates Chowder not only with
Tabitha, the sister of Matthew, the novel’s hero, but with the hero himself “to make the point that
the male critic of luxury is not exempt from the criticism he directs at commercial society” (164).
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In “The Lady and the Lapdog: Mixed Ethnicity in Constantinople, Fashionable Pets in Britain,”
Teresa Braunschneider examines the satirical use of the lapdog in a letter written by Lady Mary
Wortley Montagu “to show how Montagu’s reference to her own pet functions as a critical
response to satirical representations of fashionable women as thoughtless consumers of luxury
goods” and how Montagu’s deployment of the trope draws “parallels between pets and slaves in
British culture” (32). Laura Brown claims that representations of the lady and her dog
demonstrate how the eighteenth-century “imagination” “processed” the “encounter with alterity”
[in the age of Imperial expansion] and “the idea of difference” (31).
35. For an interesting discussion of the “theoretical and practical” importance of dogs and
the animal controversy in seventeenth and early eighteenth-century French discourse, see
Christine McCall Probes’ “Controversy and Consolation: The Animal in the Royal Court,
Madame and her Spaniels” (23). Probes discusses some of the many references to pet canines,
Descartes, and the animal question in the voluminous correspondence of Madame Palatine,
duchess of Orleans. Palatine corresponded with Leibniz and both believed in animal immortality
(Probes 7). Probes notes that Palatine’s library contained Montaigne and that she was a serious
student who would have read him, thus speculating she would agree with his argument that there
is sometimes more difference between people than people and animals (23).
36. Burney was also familiar with the writing of Jonathan Swift and calls him
“admirable” (ED 140). She also describes a plan to write a book dedicated to “Miss Notable,” the
main character of Swift’s “Polite Conversation” (ED 314). Undoubtedly, she had read his human
and horse conversations in Gulliver’s Travels.
37. Menely does not discuss Burney.

180

38. Seeber makes a similar observation (101).
39. Joyce Hemlow writes in her footnote to this passage: “FBA was perhaps unaware that
The Rights of Man of Thomas Paine (1737-1809) had evoked not only A Vindication of the
Rights of Woman (1792) by Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-97) but also A Vindication of the Rights
of Brutes (1792) by Thomas Taylor (1758-1835) the Platonist” (305). I think it just as likely that
Burney was indeed aware of this. D.D. Devlin interprets this quote as a direct reference to both
Wollstonecraft and Paine (65-66).
40. Helena Feder makes a similar claim about the confrontation with animality (70) as
does Jackson Petsche (104). I arrived at it independently through the intellectual investigation I
have conducted in this dissertation, particularly my analysis of Gulliver’s Travels as a
representation of a human who learns to avow his animality.
41. For example, Ellen Moers argues that Frankenstein is a “birth myth” that registers the
horror of the exploitation of women, based on sexual reproduction (319). In terms of the
colonized subject, Karen Piper argues, “the ‘birth’ of the creature in Europe could be said to
represent cultural fears of the invasion of the ‘primitive’ in ‘civilized’ society, or the arrival of
the colonized, in search of revenge, on the shores of the colonizer (63). For discussions of the
marginalized Other, see Anne K. Mellor’s “Making a Monster” and Peter Brooks.
42. Scholars such as Jackson Petsche and Stephanie Rowe have also noticed this
important detail.
43. This is the thesis of Bryce Christensen’s “The Apple in the Vortex: Newton, Blake,
and Descartes.”
44. My effort to procure the 1813 version of this text where this quote appears for further
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examination was unsuccessful.
45. This insightful interpretation of Montaigne’s An Apology for Raymond Sebond as an
allegory of the “limits of human reason” is Hassan Melehy’s (273).
46. Anne K. Mellor’s Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Work, Her Monsters is the
groundbreaking study on this topic, particularly her chapter entitled, “A Feminist Critique of
Science” (89-126). Karen Williams discusses vivisection and vegetarianism in Frankenstein
framing it predominantly within arguments for animal rights.
47. I am indebted to Jackson Petsche for the inspiration for this idea. Petsche argues that
Shelley critiques discourses of carnivorism and asserts that the creature, partially made from
slaughterhouse refuse, is literally “meat resurrected” (102).
48. Critics have made similar claims. For example, John H. Lamb has argued that the
monster’s fall is not like that of Milton’s Satan, but that his “‘fall’” is “into culture and language
…” (303). The novel is about the “monstrous myth of identity that leads to violence” and
demonstrates that “being is a verbal construct” (305). Shelley presents language not as a
“transcendental” means to escape prescribed identities, but as monstrous in itself (312).
However, I argue Shelley reveals how notions of human identity arising out of theories of
language as philosophical/epistemological premises precipitates the violence done to animals,
which is the foundation of cultural transference to violence against humans. Therefore, language
is not monstrous; the monstrosity is the ontological theory deduced from the phenomenon of
verbal language.
49. I am aware that my emphasis on the Cartesian paradigm leaves out the influence of
the Judeo-Christian biblical tradition teaching human dominion over the earth and its animals as
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discussed, for example, by Lynn White. However, Descartes is a product of that system, and my
emphasis is the alternate biblical tradition of natural theology so influential on thinkers like
Montaigne.
50. The relative merits of the 1818 and the 1831 editions of Frankenstein have been
debated by scholars. There is what might be called a purist school who have argued that
Shelley’s revisions for the 1831 edition indicate her bowing to conservative religious and social
pressures. For instance, Anne K. Mellor, who prefers the 1818 edition, set the tone in her
landmark monograph about Shelley. However, scholars such as Nora Crook and James
O’Rourke belong to what could be called the “revisionist” school and have persuasively argued
that the 1831 edition deepens the moral implications of the original, and that therefore the work
deserves its own merited status.
51. This interpretation of Wittgenstein comes from Gary W. Levvis (170).
52. The appearance of “Frankenstein” as a shambling green zombie in popular culture is
so pervasive that I hardly need draw attention to the significance of what may be, in some
respects, a more accurate visualization of the creature’s actual appearance. It is interesting to
note, however, that the green pallor has stuck to Shelley’s character nearly since his creation.
Angela Wright observes that it was the hugely popular 1823 dramatic adaptation of Frankenstein
by Richard Brinsley Peake entitled Presumption, or the Fate of Frankenstein in which Victor
first “shrieked ‘It lives!’” which propelled what had otherwise been a lackluster reception of the
novel, commenting that the “greenish face” had its inception here (3-4).
53. This discussion of “grin” and the following is based on the entry for the word in
Oxford English Dictionary.
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54. The second entry in the OED gives the definition of a “forced” or “clownish” smile
associated with “grin” now.
55. The word “torture” appears in eleven instances in the 1818 and twelve in the 1831
editions.
56. For example, Stephen C. Behrendt has observed, “the importance of language and its
inadequacy in communication are stressed repeatedly by all the major characters” in
Frankenstein (80).
57. Anne Cline Kelly has made a similar suggestion writing, “Gulliver acquires an
oxymoronic label—‘wonderful Yahoo’—to denote his hybrid character” (327). The context of
Kelly’s observations is the cultural interest in the weird, including people who were viewed as
hybrids such as the “primitive” people who “supposedly mate with animals, such as the Irish
with wolves” (328). What I am arguing, however, is that Gulliver’s horse-like semiosis is Swift’s
demonstration of human ontological ambiguity vis à vis the animals and language debate.
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